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Executive Summary 
Why have so many countries lagged behind in terms of agricultural development, structural 
transformation and poverty alleviation? This thesis is based on the proposition that a lack of attention to 
institutions and governance is partly responsible for the limited success in meeting food security and 
development goals in many developing countries, in spite of significant investments in agricultural 
development. In particular, the interplay between formal and informal intuitions has not been 
thoroughly explored, in part because this interplay is not well captured in the quantitative analytical 
approaches that dominate the literature on agricultural development. Informal and non-market 
institutions play an important role especially in early phases of agricultural development. Therefore, a 
better understanding of informal institutions and their interaction with formal institutions is expected to 
provide valuable insights on how to facilitate agricultural development more effectively and to better use 
its potential to promote food security, and poverty reduction.  
Institutions can be defined as the socially constructed formal and informal rules that constrain human 
behaviour and provide the framework of incentives that shapes economic, social and political life.  In 
the literature on agricultural development, institutional analysis typically builds on the theory of 
neoclassical economics and draws on its analytical tools, but it appears useful to explore theoretical 
approaches developed in other branches of the social sciences and to apply their methodological 
approaches to analyse the role of institutions in agricultural development. Qualitative methods are 
particularly promising to provide new insights into the role of institutions in agricultural development, in 
particular with regard to informal institutions.  
The main objective of this thesis is the development and application of novel methodological 
approaches to analysing the interplay of informal and formal institutions in agricultural development. 
The thesis is based on four case studies conducted in three developing countries: Malawi, Pakistan and 
Kenya. The case studies deal with three selected themes of institutional development in agriculture, 
where the interplay of formal and informal institutions is particular important. Two themes relate to 
specific sub-sectors of agriculture: institutions for managing irrigation systems and institutions that 
facilitate agricultural exports. The third theme is cross-cutting and addresses the question how gender 
equity can be promoted in institutions that matter for agricultural development. Considering that 
institutions are nested, the case studies cover different levels, including the household, farmer group, 
local government and national government level. Together the case studies provide insights on how 
institutional analysis—with an emphasis on social institutions, informal rules, perceptions, and norms—
affect agricultural development initiatives.  
The case studies make use of methodological approaches that are relatively novel in the field of 
agricultural development studies and thus serve to broaden the toolkit of methods for institutional 
analysis. These methods include two versions of a participatory mapping tool called Net-Map and 
Process Net-Map. As a third approach, qualitative interviews with the inclusion of tactile power mapping 
exercises have been applied. As the case studies cover different levels, the data collection methods have 
been applied with a wide range of participants that had highly diverse social and educational 
backgrounds, ranging from national-level policy actors to farmers residing in remote areas. 
Epistemologically, these methods support a social constructionist research approach, wherein the 
informal and socially constructed aspects of agricultural policy and governance can be assessed. 
This first study, “Gendered perceptions of power and decision making in rural Kenya,” utilizes focus 
group discussions and tactile Power Mapping to understand socially constructed views of gender, power, 
and household decision-making. Development programs are commonly concerned with altering social 
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norms related to this issue based on an understanding of their embeddedness—the extent to which they 
negatively affect economic and social outcomes. A better understanding of the social norms and beliefs 
makes it possible to identify strategies to change them. The analysis shows that men and women are 
constantly negotiating for power in the household, within the bounds of their gendered limitations. A 
zero-sum conceptualization of power may undermine common development approaches to 
empowerment. 
The second study, entitled “Gender-inclusive governance of ‘self-help’ groups in rural Kenya,” examines 
governance structures in community self-help groups and the extent to which they can promote inclusive 
participation of women in group decision-making. This study also utilizes focus group discussions and 
tactile Power Mapping as data collection tools. The study shows that group-member endowments 
influence the group’s understanding of gender issues and political processes, and that the pro-gender 
intentions behind governance structures are more important than the structures themselves.  
In the third study, entitled “Progress of constitutional change and irrigation management transfer in 
Pakistan: insights from a net-map exercise,” the Net-Map tool is applied to examine the effects on 
federal and provincial water governance structures after a de jure shift in a constitutional amendment for 
devolution of governmental power to provincial level. The findings indicate the potential for a successful 
shift of decision-making on irrigation that was made possible due the constitutional change. However, 
weaker perceptions of the role of irrigation management transfer (IMT) in water governance were found 
than would be expected considering the long history of this approach. The results provide evidence that 
additional effort is necessary to complete the shift towards a decentralized IMT model.  
The fourth study with the title “Governance Challenges of Agricultural Export Promotion: The Case of 
Soybean in Malawi” uses the Process Net-Map tool to examine the institutional problems involved in 
developing functioning export markets, focusing both on the institutional environment and the “rules of 
the game”. The study also analyses the role of social norms that contribute to governance challenges of 
export promotion. The results show that there is a high level of discretion and variability in the 
enforcement of the rules. Exporters need to rely on clientelism to fulfil the requirements in a timely 
manner. The study indicates that these governance challenges stifle the growth of the export sector. 
Taken together, the case studies show that in a developing country context, the informal rules 
(described as “rules-in-play”), which are based on social norms, often play a more significant role in 
guiding the behaviour of economic actors than the formal rules and regulations of the state. Thus, the 
consideration of social norms is critical when devising policy reform strategies, devolution processes, 
and addressing corruption. The studies identified the following factors, which should be considered 
when undertaking policy development or policy reform: a) the capacity of the government to enforce 
rules and laws; b) social norms that determine the extent to which rules-are followed; and c) the impact 
of additional rules that aim to promote compliance on transaction costs. The case studies also provide 
insights on the role of that informal institutions play with regard to gender, power and community 
groups. The findings indicate that gender norms are slowly changing even in the remote area of Kenya 
where the case studies were conducted, which is confirmed by other empirical work. The findings 
indicate that such change is very slow due to internal societal pressures against it. However, a better 
understanding of when and how informal institutions are changing provides entry points for action. The 
studies indicate that there is a potential for community groups to serve as a parallel institution to that of 
the home, governed by constitutions and by-laws, that do enable women to push the boundaries of 
community gender norms, although both are embedded in the same community. And although 
gendered participation in groups is mixed, there are drivers that can be supported to flourish by 
development partners and government. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit der Rolle informeller Institutionen in der landwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung. Sie beruht auf der Prämisse, dass die mangelnde Beachtung von Institutionen und 
Governance-Problemen dazu beigetragen hat, dass viele Entwicklungsländer ihre Ziele im Bereich der 
landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung und Ernährungssicherung nur unzureichend verwirklicht haben, 
obwohl erhebliche Investitionen in diesen Bereich geflossen sind. Insbesondere ist es das 
Zusammenwirken von formalen und informellen Institutionen, das wenig Beachtung gefunden hat, 
zumal es in den quantitativen Forschungsansätzen, die die agrarökonomische Literatur zur 
landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung prägen, nicht vollständig berücksichtigt werden kann.  
Institutionen können als sozial konstruierte formale und informelle Regeln definiert werden, die das 
menschliche Verhalten steuern und den Rahmen für die Anreize bieten, die das ökonomische, soziale 
und politische Leben prägen. In der Literatur zur landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung werden 
Institutionen überwiegend auf der Basis der Neuen Institutionenökonomie analysiert, die auf der 
neoklassischen Wirtschaftstheorie beruht und deren analytische Instrumente nutzt. Es erscheint jedoch 
sinnvoll, auch theoretische Ansätze und analytische Methoden zu verwenden, die in anderen Bereichen 
der Sozialwissenschaften entwickelt wurden. Qualitative Methoden erscheinen besonders aussichtsreich, 
um neue Erkenntnisse zur Rolle von Institutionen in der landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zu gewinnen, 
insbesondere im Hinblick auf informelle Institutionen.  
Vor diesem Hintergrund verfolgt die vorliegende Arbeit das Ziel, neue methodische Ansätze zu 
entwickeln und anzuwenden, mit denen das Zusammenwirken von formalen und informellen 
Institutionen in der landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung untersucht werden kann. Die Arbeit basiert auf 
vier Fallstudien, die in drei Entwicklungsländern durchgeführt wurden: Malawi, Pakistan und Kenia. 
Die Fallstudien befassen sich mit drei Themen der institutionellen Entwicklung im Bereich der 
Landwirtschaft. Zwei von diesen Themen behandeln spezielle Institutionen im Bereich der 
landwirtschaftlichen Produktion und Vermarktung: (a) Institutionen für das Management von 
Bewässerungssystemen und (b) Institutionen für den Export landwirtschaftlicher Güter. Das dritte 
Thema (c) ist übergreifend angelegt und geht der Frage nach, wie die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter 
innerhalb von Institutionen vorangebracht werden kann, die für die landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung 
relevant sind. Da Institutionen auf verschiedenen Ebenen ineinandergreifen, decken die Fallstudien 
auch verschiedene Ebenen ab: die Ebene des Haushalts und die Ebene der Gruppe innerhalb einer 
Dorfgemeinschaft sowie die lokale und die nationale Regierungsebene. Insgesamt vermitteln die 
Fallstudien Erkenntnisse darüber, wie die Institutionen, insbesondere sozialen Institutionen, informelle 
Regeln, Wahrnehmungen und Normen, landwirtschaftliche Entwicklungsprogramme beeinflussen. 
In den Fallstudien werden methodische Ansätze angewandt, die für Studien zur landwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung bislang wenig eingesetzt wurden. Mit diesen soll das Spektrum der institutionellen 
Analysemethoden im Bereich der landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung erweitert werden. Zu den 
angewandten Methoden zählen neben Fokusgruppendiskussionen und Experten-Interviews zwei 
Versionen einer partizipativen Mapping-Methode, die als „Net-Map“ und als „Process Net-Map“ 
bezeichnet werden. Als weitere qualitative Methode wurde das „Power Mapping“ angewandt. Da die 
Fallstudien verschiedene Ebenen umfassen, wurden diese Erhebungsmethoden bei Zielgruppen 
angewandt, die sich sehr stark im Hinblick auf ihren sozialen Hintergrund und ihren Ausbildungsstand 
unterscheiden. Somit konnte ein breites Anwendungsfeld der eingesetzten Methoden getestet werden. 
Epistemologisch wurde in der vorliegenden Arbeit ein sozialkonstruktivistischer Ansatz verwendet.  
Die erste Fallstudie trägt den Titel „Geschlechtsspezifische Wahrnehmungen von Macht und 
Entscheidungsverhalten im ländlichen Kenia.“ In dieser Studie wurden Fokusgruppendiskussionen und 
„Power Mapping“ eingesetzt, um sozial konstruierte Ansichten über Geschlechterrollen, Macht und 
Entscheidungen innerhalb des Haushalts zu untersuchen. Die Analyse zeigte, dass innerhalb des 
Haushalts kontinuierliche Aushandlungsprozesse zwischen Männern und Frauen stattfinden, die sich 
jedoch innerhalb von geschlechtsspezifischen Grenzen bewegen. Die Studie weist darauf hin, dass 
Entwicklungsprogramme die Verteilung von Macht und Entscheidungsbefugnissen innerhalb des 
Haushalts und auf Dorfebene nicht als „Nullsummenspiel“ konzeptualisieren sollten, wenn sie 
erfolgreich die Stärkung benachteiligter Gruppen („Empowerment“) erreichen wollen.   
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Die zweite Studie befasst sich mit der Governance von Selbsthilfegruppen im ländlichen Kenia, wobei 
insbesondere die Einbindung von Frauen in die Governance-Strukturen solcher Gruppen beleuchtet 
wird. Auch diese Studie wurde auf der Basis von Fokusgruppendiskussionen und Power Mapping 
erstellt. Die Studie zeigte, dass Selbsthilfegruppen, dazu beitragen können, Gender-Normen zu 
verändern, weil sie eine parallele Institution zur Familie darstellen, in denen neue Governance-
Strukturen aufgebaut und praktiziert werden können. 
Die dritte Studie befasst sich mit der Dezentralisierung des Bewässerungsmanagements in Pakistan. Für 
diese Studie wurde die Net-Map Methode angewandt, um die Auswirkungen einer 
Verfassungsänderung auf die Institutionen des Bewässerungsmanagements auf föderaler und auf 
Provinz-Ebene zu untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Verfassungsänderung tatsächlich zu 
einer Verlagerung der Entscheidungskompetenz im Bewässerungsmanagement geführt hat. Dennoch 
war bei vielen Akteuren das Verständnis des Transfers von Entscheidungsbefugnissen auf die lokale 
Ebene (Irrigation Management Transfer) nicht sehr stark ausgeprägt. Die Studie kam daher zu dem 
Schluss, dass zusätzliche Anstrengungen erforderlich sind, um dieses Konzept vollständig umzusetzen.  
Die vierte Studie widmet sich den Governance Problemen von Programmen, die den Export 
landwirtschaftlicher Produkte fördern, wobei der Export von Sojabohnen aus Malawi als Fallbeispiel 
analysiert wird. Für diese Studie wurde das Process Net-Map Tool eingesetzt. Die Studie zeigt, dass 
soziale Normen erheblich zu den Governance Problemen der Exportförderung beitragen, 
insbesondere, da es einen großen Spielraum in der Interpretation der bestehenden staatlichen Export-
Regelungen gibt. Exporteure müssen oft klientelistische Beziehungen zu der für den Export zuständigen 
Verwaltung unterhalten, um die rechtlichen Anforderungen zeitgemäß umsetzen zu können. Die Studie 
legt den Schluss nahe, dass Governance Probleme ein wesentlicher Grund sind, dass Länder ihr 
Exportpotential für landwirtschaftliche Produkte nur unzureichend nutzen.  
Insgesamt zeigen die vier Fallstudien, dass informelle Regeln, die auf sozialen Normen beruhen, oft 
eine wesentlich wichtigere Rolle für das ökonomische Verhalten von Akteuren spielen als staatliche 
Regelungen. Daher ist die Beachtung sozialer Normen für die Entwicklung von Strategien für die 
Reform agrarpolitischer Maßnahmen in Entwicklungsländern von besonderer Bedeutung. Die Studien 
weisen darauf hin, dass bei der Planung einer Politik-Reform folgende Faktoren beachtet werden 
sollten: a) Die Kapazität einer Regierung, Regeln und Normen tatsächlich umzusetzen; b) die sozialen 
Normen, die bestimmen, inwieweit staatliche Regelungen eingehalten werden; c) die 
Transaktionskosten, die durch zusätzlichen Regeln verursacht werden, die darauf abzielen, 
regelkonformes Verhalten zu erreichen.  Die Fallstudien liefern auch Ergebnisse zur Frage, wie 
informelle Institutionen solche Programme beeinflussen, die auf eine Änderung der Geschlechterrollen 
in ländlichen Regionen hinwirken. Die Studien weisen darauf hin, dass sich geschlechtsspezifische 
Normen in Kenia langsam wandeln, was auch durch andere empirische Studien belegt wird. Jedoch 
vollzieht sich dieser Wandel deswegen sehr langsam, weil es einen erheblichen gesellschaftlichen Druck 
gegen diesen Wandel gibt. Daher ist es wichtig, geeignete Ansatzpunkte zu finden, um 
Wandlungsprozesse gezielt zu fördern und Rückschläge („backlash“) zu vermeiden. Aus der Studie lässt 
sich folgern, dass Selbsthilfegruppen, die ihren eigenen Governance-Strukturen unterliegen, einen 
solchen Ansatzpunkt darstellen. 
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1 Introduction   
Agriculture is the cornerstone of growth and poverty alleviation throughout much of the developing 
world. FAO’s 2015 report on the State of Food and Agriculture summarizes the current situation, 
noting that 795 million people still suffer from hunger and almost one billion people still live in extreme 
poverty (2015). While many parts of the world have made progress, it is largely in sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia that problems of hunger and poverty persist. Pervasive global poverty and food 
insecurity must be addressed principally through the agricultural sector and its supporting institutions; as 
most of the world’s poor depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, and growth in the agriculture 
sector is seen to be at least twice as effective in decreasing poverty than growth in other sectors (World 
Bank, 2008). Literature on agricultural transformation documents a process of increased productivity of 
the agriculture sector leading to surplus food and labour, thus laying the groundwork for a flourishing 
non-agricultural sector that provides higher-income employment and leads to increased growth and 
development (Dorward, Kydd, Poulton, & Bezemer, 2009; McMillan & Headey, 2014; Timmer, 1988). 
However, while some developing countries have succeeded in making this transition—from agriculture-
based to industrialized—and decreasing poverty and food insecurity along with it, there are still many 
countries struggling at different points along the pathway out of an agriculture-based—often subsistence 
agriculture-based—economy (World Bank, 2008).   
1.1 Institutions and Agricultural Development 
Why have so many countries lagged behind in terms of agricultural development, structural 
transformation and poverty alleviation? Agriculture-based economies face a number of global challenges 
today including turbulent food and fuel prices, increasing climatic shocks and variability, and differential 
access to yield increasing inputs and technologies. While consensus among development actors has 
been shifting over the past few decades in terms of the appropriate balance of state-led versus market-
led development approaches (for instance, state-led input subsidy programs have come in and out of 
fashion over the past two decades (Jayne & Rashid, 2013)), there has been a general trend toward the 
promotion of market-led development and decentralized governance (Dorward et al., 2009). In 
particular, the current model for promoting development involves interventions to increase smallholder 
farmer productivity such as improved technologies, investment in infrastructure, and promotion of well-
functioning markets, such as those for inputs, outputs, and credit (Collier & Dercon, 2014; Kirsten, 
Dorward, Poulton, & Vink, 2009). Applying a gender lens to agricultural transformation, agriculture is 
the primary activity for 79% of women in developing countries (Doss, 2014). However, many of those 
women face gender-specific constraints that reduce their productivity and limit their contributions to 
agricultural production and economic growth, therefore increasing smallholder farmer productivity also 
involves addressing gender disparities such as control of assets and household bargaining power (FAO, 
2011; Quisumbing & Pandolfelli, 2009).   
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When considering the overall failure to meet food security and development goals in developing 
countries, namely many of the Millennium Development Goals on poverty and hunger (United 
Nations, 2015), in spite of significant investments into agricultural development, a lack of attention being 
paid to institutional processes and constraints may be to blame (Kirsten et al., 2009). Williamson (2000) 
uses the example of Russia to describe how a lack of attention to institutional factors resulted in the 
failure of market-focused reforms during the transition out of communism. Dorward et al. (2009) 
provide a number of explanations for why common market-led development approaches have not been 
effective in much of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. These include: i) partial implementation, ii) 
weak institutions, iii) coordination failure, and ix) lack of political commitment to reforms (often 
entailing resistance of officials to withdraw from rent-seeking opportunities). Thus, an institutional 
perspective can help us develop a better understanding of how to facilitate the development of 
economic institutions that improve the efficiency of agricultural sectors of poor rural economies 
(Kirsten et al., 2009, p. 1094). 
Though arguably not prominently in the mainstream of economics, the importance of institutions and 
governance to economic activity has been explored for many decades (Dequech, 2007; Hodgson, 2007). 
Furthermore, it has been gaining prominence and authority in recent years, particularly in some 
economic sub-disciplines. While neoclassical economics typically view institutions as static, renowned 
economic theorists such as Coase, Ostrom, North and Williamson (among others) have increasingly 
highlighted the importance of the analysis of institutions (Coase, 1998; North, 1991; Ostrom, Gardner, 
& Walker, 1994a; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000). 
In development economics there has been increasing emphasis on institution. Dorward and Omamo 
(2009) argue that understanding institutional dynamics is fundamental to understanding and influencing 
processes of social and economic change in agricultural development. Institutional analysis is also 
prominent in economic research on property rights and natural resource management literature (Katon, 
Knox, & Meinzen-Dick, 2001; Ostrom et al., 1994a).  
Institutional economics typically employs methods from Transaction Cost Economics, agency theory, or 
borrows from neoclassical economics. While the methodological approaches depart from and expand 
upon transitional neoclassical economics, as discussed below, it still leaves a gap in terms of analysing 
the social aspects of institutions that institutional theory attempts to explain. This thesis argues that new 
research approaches are required to fill this gap in understanding and to help address some of the above 
mentioned challenges to agricultural development related to the social embeddedness of economic 
institutions.   
1.2 Objectives 
The broad objective of this thesis is the development and application of novel methodological 
approaches to analysing the interplay of informal and formal institutions in agricultural development. 
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This is achieved by applying methodological approaches from other social sciences to the study of 
agricultural development in order to investigate various aspects of the embeddedness of institutions in 
social life and how social life drives or constrains institutions.  
More specifically, the remainder of this chapter lays out an argument for the need for novel research 
approaches by highlighting the current understanding of institutions in agricultural development and the 
knowledge gaps related to institutional embeddedness. Next, it lays out an in depth rationale for the 
usefulness of these methods by reviewing their past applications, strengths, and weaknesses.  
The subsequent chapters of the thesis describe four case studies wherein such novel approaches were 
applied in three developing countries: Malawi, Pakistan and Kenya. Exploring selected themes of 
institutional development in agriculture where the interplay of formal and informal institutions is 
particular important, the case studies explore different institutional levels and subtopics within 
agricultural development. Together the case studies provide insights on how institutional analysis—with 
an emphasis on social institutions, informal rules, perceptions, and norms—affect agricultural 
development initiatives. 
 
1.3 Literature Review  
The literature summarized below provides an overview of institutions, as they have been defined and 
studied in economics and related fields, with an emphasis on understanding both formal and informal 
aspects of institutions. In particular, key frameworks for understanding and analysing institutions are 
described, and then sub-fields of institutional study are summarized that are particularly relevant for the 
content explored in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. Namely, these subfield are: Gender and 
decision-making in community institutions, perceptions and legitimacy of local governance reforms, and 
institutional capacity and trade facilitation. 
 Institutions and “New Institutional Economics”  1.3.1
North defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (1991, p. 97). Ostrom et al. 
and Hodgson both describe these constraining factors as rules and clarify that the rules that constitute 
institutions must be followed—they must be “rules in use”—or they have no impact on social life (2006; 
1994a). Whether formal or informal, “ignored laws are not rules” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 6).  
Rules are embedded in social life through habituation of rule-following behaviour. For a habit to 
become a rule it must have an inherently normative content and be prevalent within a group. Habits 
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strengthen institutions, "providing them with enhanced durability, power, and normative authority” 
(Hodgson, 2006, p. 7). 
Ostrom et al. (1994a) presents the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) approach, wherein 
institutions are made up of three key components. First, there are actors who have preferences, 
information-processing capabilities, selection criteria and resources. Second, there are action situations 
in which the actors participate. In an action situation participants have a position or role and must 
decide among a diverse set of actions in light of the information they possess about how actions are 
linked to potential outcomes, and the costs and benefits thereof. Third are the rules that determine what 
is required, permitted or prohibited in a given action arena, and the sanctions from not following the 
rules.   
North applies the concept of path dependence to institutions, explaining that the histories of economic 
institutions in different contexts "reflect the differing opportunity sets of the actors in each case” (1991, 
p. 110). Furthermore, according to Hodgson, “by structuring, constraining, and enabling individual 
behaviours, institutions have the power to shape the capacities and behaviour of agents in fundamental 
ways: they have a capacity to change aspirations instead of merely enabling or constraining them” (2006, 
p. 7). 
These theorists fall broadly into the category of New Institutional Economics (NIE), one branch of 
institutional economics. NIE departed from some neoclassical economic assumptions. Williamson 
describes the key shift away from neoclassical economics taken by NIE as consideration of the firm as a 
governance structure rather than a “black box” with a production function. Of particular significance, 
NIE does not assume that transaction costs are zero, but rather considers that for most complex 
transactions, contracts are incomplete and therefor economic actors attempt to economize transaction 
costs (Tadelis & Williamson, 2012; Williamson, 2000).  
Referred to as the transaction-cost economics branch of NIE, in this framework economic actors are 
presumed to invest transaction costs to mitigate transaction risk (or the risk of failure of a transaction), 
however they are not able to completely eliminate transaction risk. Dorward et al. summarize a number 
of common transaction costs and risks: transaction costs involve (1) the establishment and enforcement 
of exclusive property rights and/or (2) the definition and enforcement of the attributes of the good or 
service being exchanged (2009, pp. 1097–1098). Transaction risks are the losses sustained because of 
failure to (1) enforce exclusive property rights, (2) enforce required attributes, (3) complete the 
transaction, or (4) protect transaction benefits from 3rd party predation. 
The authors go on to explain that these problems—specifically 2-4—take place when there are 
institutional or informational challenges such as those related to: information of goods, services and/or 
parties involved in a transaction, enforcement of agreements, and protecting property rights. Dorward et 
al. (2009) characterize these problems respectively as failures of commitment, opportunism, and rent 
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seeking. Furthermore, when it comes to smallholder farmers', transaction costs are also increased by the 
small scale of their transactions, dysfunctional service delivery, and limited farmer voice. 
Williamson (2000) lays out a framework (Figure 1) of four different levels of institutional analysis. 
While NIE has been principally concerned with analysing the second and third levels, all are of interest 
to the field. Level one is the social embeddedness level. Embeddedness refers to the degree to which 
economic activity is constrained by non-economic institutions. This is the level where norms, mores, 
traditions are located. This level is usually considered static by institutional economists, largely because 
institutions change very slowly at this level.  
Williamson (2000) notes that there is not a good enough understanding of these institutions, in spite of 
the lasting effect they have on social life. Similarly Douglass North says, "What is it about informal 
constraints that gives them such a pervasive influence upon the long-run character of economies?" 
(1991, p. 111). There are different kinds of embeddedness (social, cultural, structural and political) that 
should be distinguished and better theoretically specified. In particular, a better understanding of the 
mechanisms through which informal institutions arise and are maintained would inform initiatives to 
promote change at this level.  
Level two is the institutional environment, described as the “rules of the game” (Kirsten et al., 2009; 
Williamson, 2000). These are the formal rules such as constitutions, laws, and property rights. This 
category is more or less constant (does not change in the short-run) except in the case of a major social 
or political upheaval that creates a window of opportunity for broad reform of the institutional 
environment. Positive Political Theory, or explanatory political theory, is an approach concerned with 
examination of level two features and understanding the economic and political ramifications thereof. 
Williamson (2000) characterizes analysis at this level as positive analysis to determine how to design 
better policies. For instance, much of the property rights research falls into this category.  
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Figure 1. Level of Analysis in Economics of Institutions 
 
Source: Originally found in Williamson (2000), with adaptations by Dorward and Omamo (2009) and the author. 
 
The third level refers to “how the game is played” (Dorward & Omamo, 2009; Williamson, 2000). This 
level is particularly concerned with contractual relations, assuming that all complex contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete, and that economic agents bear the cost of contract failure. The primary 
concern of analysis at this level is getting the governance structures right to economize transaction costs. 
And finally, at level 4 analysis is concerned with traditional economic issues of resource allocation, 
employment, prices, quantities and incentive alignment. Here traditional neoclassical economic analysis 
and agency theory are appropriate.  
Building on the IAD approach and the transaction-cost economics branch of NIE, Dorward and 
Omamo (2009) develop a framework to guide empirical analysis of institutions for agricultural 
development in Africa.  
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Figure 2: Framework for Institutional Analysis of Agriculture in Africa  
 
Source: Dorward & Omamo, 2009, pg. 79 
Central to the Dorward-Omamo framework for institutional analysis is the identification of the action 
domain, borrowed from the IAD approach, which defines the spheres of activity and interest of the 
analysis (such as economic exchange of goods and services or the management of natural resources) 
(Dorward & Omamo, 2009, p. 78). The action domain is made up of: the institutions to be analysed, 
the activities that the institutions engage in, and the actors in those institutions and activities. An 
important facet of utilizing the analytical framework is the identification of each of these components 
and their relevant attributes.  
The action domain is set in and affected by a wider environment, which is made up of the broader 
policy and governance environment, socioeconomic characteristics, and physical infrastructure. 
Institutions, actors, and activities are affected by the broader environment, and in turn they can affect 
the environment.    
The literature reviewed here collectively conveys that institutional analysis can take place at many 
different levels. However, levels are defined differently by different theorists. For instance, Williamson’s 
levels of analysis refer to the different aspects of the study of institutions that one is interested in, and 
suggest that different analytical methods are better suited depending on the level of analysis. Others 
refer to levels of analysis in terms of the framing of the action domain, or determining the scale of 
analysis. For instance, Hodgson says: 
“There are multiple levels, in which organizations provide institutional rules for 
individuals, and possibly in turn these organizations can also be treated as actors 
within broader institutional frameworks. For example, the individual acts within the 
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nation, but in turn the nation can sometimes be treated as an actor within an 
international framework of rules and institutions.” (2006, pp. 10–11) 
While North considers organizations as actors in broader social and political institutions, Hodgson 
(2006) finds value in exploring the inner working of organizations as made up of individuals. One must 
simply define the specific action domain institutional scale of interest, as demonstrated nicely in the 
Dorward-Omamo framework. 
Williamson’s (2000) framework of levels of analysis is of particular relevance to the following chapters 
in this thesis. It helps to categorize different levels of institutional analysis, the analytic approaches they 
require, and other characteristics. This thesis is largely concerned with the interplay of level 1 
institutions—those related to social embeddedness or informal socially-constructed institutions—with 
other institutional level. As such social theory and economic theory are applied in this thesis and 
qualitative analytical approaches are used to explore this nexus. As norms, customs, and perceptions 
cannot be easily captured through quantitative approaches.  
Furthermore, the Dorward and Omamo (2009) develop a framework well-suited to guide empirical 
analysis in this field, especially for analysing the interplay of different institutional levels.  This 
framework is explicitly applied in Chapters 2 and 4, and guides some of the thought in the other 
chapters. Finally, discussions by Hodgson (2006) and others on scale of analysis influence the decision 
to undertake case studies at multiple institutional scales, from the household, to group, to local 
government, to national government.  
 Institutional Sub-fields of interest   1.3.2
Institutional theorists, particularly those concerned with NIE, frequently describe the importance of the 
social context to other institutional and economic outcomes. However, while the study of institutions 
has gained prominence in recent years, there is a dearth of research on informal institutions by 
economists as they are largely taken as static (Williamson, 2000). Moreover, the interplay of formal and 
informal institutions has received even less attention in the institutional literature. This section briefly 
reviews the specific institutional areas studied in the subsequent chapters. In particular it examines the 
common approaches to institutional analysis in these study areas and the extent to which a focus on the 
interplay of formal and informal institution fills a gap in the current state of knowledge.  
Gender and decision-making in community institutions 
Kabeer and Subramanian (1996) argue that the norms and values that determine gender inequalities are 
rearticulated at all levels of institutions, and thus to understand the role of women in groups one must 
assess institutions at the levels of family, community, market and state. They also define a set of 
constitutive components of institutions that can be used to empirically assess them: rules, activities, 
resources, people and power.  
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This thesis first explores the most basic institutional level: the family. Development economics typically 
considers household decisionmaking issues through a neoclassical economic lens. Through such a lens, 
a household members’ ability to realize their preferences depend on their bargaining power as if 
spouses are bargaining and the one with the highest “outside option” will win 1. In this literature women 
have separate preferences for family consumption and do not necessarily pool income. This has led to 
the oft cited notion that children are better off when the mother controls a larger percentage of 
household resources (Haddad, Hoddonott, & Alderman, 1997). However some empirical examples 
have complicated this picture, and led to questions of the completeness of this conceptualization and 
the effectiveness of—for instance—asset transfers to women as a mechanisms for improving women and 
child welfare as it can sometime lead to unintended negative consequences (Eves and Crawford, 2014; 
Hidrobo and Fernald,  2013).  
While there have been many approaches and innovations in terms of quantitatively assessing household 
bargaining dynamics and women’s empowerment, they are typically somewhat detached from their 
institutional context (Heckert & Fabic, 2013). Chapter 2 develops socially-constructed and articulated 
definitions of power and decision-making for men and women in rural Kenyan households. The 
research approach allows for examination of the institution, and the gendered power dynamics that are 
played out within that institution. This allows for a deeper understanding of the level 1 institutions in 
order to inform gender policies and programs.  
The third chapter examines gender and decision-making in the institution of the community group. 
Groups are mechanisms for developing women’s social capital, improving livelihoods by facilitating risk 
pooling, promoting the adoption of agricultural technologies, and facilitating asset accumulation 
(Meinzen-Dick, Behrman, Pandolfelli, Peterman, & Quisumbing, 2014; Meinzen-Dick, Bernier, & 
Haglund, 2013).  While empirical evidence shows a relationship between women’s control over group 
resources and their voice in group decision-making, it has also been found that social risks associated 
with group participation often outweigh the benefits for women when they are not designed with 
women’s priorities in mind (Meinzen-Dick R. & Zwarteveen M., 1998; Valdivia & Gilles, 2001). Thus 
there is a need for detailed analysis to identify the major factors that can strengthen women’s 
participation in groups, raising one of the central problems considered in Chapter 3.  
Along these lines, Agarwal (2001) examines the factors that impact the effectiveness of women’s 
participation in groups in South Asia, which are: gender-restrictive social norms (negative); ability to 
form women-only groups (positive); and external agents supporting women’s effective participation 
(positive), (especially when supported from the beginning before men’s territorial interests are 
established). Even though women-only groups enhance women’s inclusion, other results indicate that 
mixed-sex groups can be more effective, so understanding how to enhance women’s effective 
                                                     
1 See below for a critique of Freidman’s “as if” argument.  
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participation in them is worthwhile (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014; Sultana & Thompson, 2008). Therefore 
Chapter 3 of this thesis builds on Agarwal’s (2001) approach, assessing the governance mechanisms that 
impact women’s effective participation, with an emphasis on the “rules in use” and the effect of the 
social context in shaping those rules. Distinctly, it is applied in the Sub-Saharan African context where 
gender-restrictive social-norms are not as strict as in South Asia. 
Perceptions and legitimacy of local governance reforms 
Chapter 4 moves on to consider issues of agricultural policy and agricultural water management wherein 
reforms have devolved power from federal to local levels in Pakistan through a constitutional devolution 
process and an Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). These types of transfers of responsibility seek 
to empower local authorities to advocate for local priorities (Mitchinson, 2003). IMT reforms in 
particular seek to enable local user groups to manage water resources themselves, often in the face of 
weak state capacity to enforce resource management (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999). When considering 
this literature it is useful to recall Ostrom et al.’s IAD approach to analysing community management of 
natural resources (1994a). Ostrom et al. strongly emphasizes the role of "working rules" (rules in use) in 
addition to formal rules, and the requirement for a shared interpretation of any rule for it to be 
effective. She also points to challenges measuring the shared interpretation of rules. It is the underlying 
social beliefs and norms that lead to shared interpretations and working rules, described by Ostrom at 
al. as attributes of the community. However, the IAD framework does not explicitly address how to 
capture social concepts.  
Community management of natural resources is generally viewed as more effective than government in 
the literature. Failures of community management are typically blamed on low capacity of the groups to 
manage themselves, inappropriate incentive structures for the groups (such as weak or no property 
rights), the government’s incomplete transfer of responsibility (perhaps due to a resistance to giving up 
rents that are being earned), or a lack of funding for the local management body (Carney & Farrington, 
1998; Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999).  Much of the institutional research on this topic examines the 
effectiveness of the transfer of responsibility for managing resources and design elements or rules that 
objectively increase effectiveness (Carney & Farrington, 1998; Cox, Arnold, & Tomás, 2010; Johnson, 
1995). Distinctly, Suhardiman and Mollinga (2012) delve into farmers’ and government staff 
perceptions and shared beliefs about IMT and challenges in implementation to better explain the cause 
of the challenges. They emphasize that the irrigation agency has an identity and interests of its own and 
cannot be treated merely as an implementer. 
Likewise, chapter 4 considers the identities and interests of the reformed agencies, as well as the other 
stakeholders that could influence the implementation, by mapping the complete network of actors, their 
perceived formal and informal linkages and influence. Once again with an emphasis on the “rules in 
use” as perceived by experts and professionals in the sector, the chapter sheds light on some potential 
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barriers to the formal reform implementation by determining their shared beliefs about progress in the 
reform process.   
Institutional capacity and trade facilitation 
While facilitation of the business environment broadly, or trade specifically, often focuses on physical 
infrastructure (such as roads or electricity) or decreasing financial barriers (such as import or export 
tariffs), the quality of institutions can play a powerful role therein. Where institutions are weakly 
developed, individuals engaging in that particular arena often bear high transaction costs due to weak 
coordination of economic activity and enforcement of formal rules (Kirsten et al., 2009). Similarly, 
states with weak institutions are also more inclined to corruption (Levy & Kpundeh, 2004).   
A number of studies explore and confirm the relationship between institutional weaknesses—in 
particular corruption and red tape—and challenges in business and trade facilitation (Eifert, Gelb, & 
Ramachandran, 2008; Harstad & Svensson, 2011; Levy & Kpundeh, 2004; The World Bank, 2009). 
However, these have rarely taken place within the agriculture sector in terms of promoting agri-business 
development. Furthermore, because institutional dynamics are context specific, the quantitative 
approaches taken by most studies are not able to illuminate the distinct social and political realities 
underlying the institutional outcomes and incentives for economic actors.  Chapter 5 of this thesis fills 
this gap by exploring the policy and regulatory environment related to agricultural exports. It contrasts 
the formal regulations and the “rules in use” and explores the shared beliefs about policy reform 
dynamics that determine the regulatory environment. 
 
 Methodological Approaches  1.3.3
The vast majority of research in agricultural development, with its basis in neoclassical economics, is 
quantitative and postpositivist. Postpositivm is based on an assumption that an objective and measurable 
social world exists and that there is a separation of object and subject in research (Daly, 2007). 
Neoclassical economics largely falls into this category because, distinct from purely positivist 
approaches, it recognizes and tries to account for limitations in knowledge and biases. Distinctly, a social 
constructionist approach (also described as interpretivist) is based on the belief that people construct 
meaning about their experiences based on “socially available, shared understandings of reality” (Daly, 
2007, pg. 32). Accepting the premise that there is an external reality that can be subjectively perceived – 
through the lens of the past experiences and frame of reference of the observer – this research paradigm 
lies between objectivist and subjectivist extremes. Thus it is concerned with how participants have 
experienced a particular social phenomenon, rather than attempting to capture an objective truth, and 
acknowledges the potential for multiple interpretations of reality (Daly, 2007). Furthermore, social 
constructionism approaches assume that the researcher cannot be separated from the knowledge 
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creation process, and thus supports a diligent awareness and analysis of the researcher’s role in the 
process of interpretation of reality.   
Neoclassical economics has been criticized for being overly concerned with abstract theories and 
mathematical formalization and thus detached from real world phenomena2. As articulated by Ronald 
Coase, “mainstream economics...has become more and more abstract over time, and although it 
purports otherwise, it is in fact little concerned with what happens in the real world” (1998, p. 72). This 
critique is exemplified in both the widespread acceptance of and concurrent opposition to Freidman’s 
(1953) “as if” argument that assumptions need not seem explicitly reasonable as long as they have not 
been empirically disproved.  
However, the study of institutions begins to break away from this paradigm. While NIE often draws 
from neoclassical economics in terms analytical tools and attempts to build on its theory, it also draws 
on theory from a variety of other social sciences (Williamson, 2000). And thus there is a basis for also 
borrowing methodological approaches from other social sciences. In fact, answering some of the level 
one questions raised by Williamson require it (2000). Furthermore, the increasing prominence of 
mixed-methods research intends to harness the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches (Adato & Meinzen-Dick, 2007). 
Buchanan, Chai and Deakin (2013) explore a range of methods for assessing institutions and argue that 
quantitative methods, while helpful, do not sufficiently answer some institutional questions. They 
point out that institutional phenomena are path-dependent and contingent on local factors, making it 
critical to ascertain the aspects of the social environment that have shaped the institutions of study. 
Furthermore, qualitative approaches can more easily reveal nonlinear and cumulative effects, clarify 
issues of sequencing, and delve into assumptions of quantitative research methodologies. Finally, where 
social norms and conventions do not yield a high level of respect for laws and rules, issues of 
enforcement and implementation—which are challenging to measure quantitatively—generally are more 
important in guiding actor behaviour than are de jure laws.  
Econometric and other quantitative analytic techniques are becoming more sophisticated, while donors 
and other development partners increasingly call for measurable evidence of the effectiveness of their 
development investments. While these trends promote accountability and rigour, and help to answer a 
number of important research questions, they also further emphasize quantitative analytic techniques 
over qualitative. This leaves some of the critical question of development that are embedded in 
perceptions and norms, and are difficult if not impossible to measure quantitatively, under-researched. 
Therefore, agricultural economists are challenged to develop and rigorously apply new methodological 
techniques such that they can begin to fill this knowledge gap.  
                                                     
2 Critiques of qualitative research methods are more common and typically revolve around a lack of 
generalizability and ability to address researcher bias.  
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This body of research employs Net-Map, process Net-Map, and qualitative interviews with the inclusion 
of visual Power Mapping. Epistemologically these methods allow us to move away from post-positivist 
approaches typically employed in the study of neoclassical economics to social constructionist 
approaches that allow for the analysis of subjective interpretations of reality. Net-Map and related tools 
are well-suited to subjective and participatory research approaches. The strengths of taking these 
approaches are that: 1) the researchers are able to examine issues of social embeddedness, or the 
institutions of norms, mores and traditions, normally viewed as constant and not analysed by 
economists; and 2) the participants are able to learn from and contribute to the knowledge creation 
process. Thus, in part, the contribution of the body of work is the realm of understanding provided by 
this epistemological approach. 
There are many other participatory approaches also used in agricultural and rural studies. Perhaps the 
most common approach is Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which belongs to a broad family of 
tools, including Rapid Rural Appraisal and Participatory Learning and Action, wherein participatory 
research and action research are intermingled (Chambers, 2007). These methods require researchers to 
act as facilitators while local people are directly involved in the investigation of their situation 
(Chambers, 2007). There are a variety of tools and techniques available that can be used for PRAs, 
depending on the context or specific objectives of the research, such as ven diagrams, matrix ranking, 
and matrix scoring, and they generally emphasize visualization of data.  
This branch of methods holds dual goals of participatory knowledge creation and action or change such 
that participants’ well-being is improved and relationships are more equitable (Reason & Bradbury, 
2008). While a number of methods share the dual categorization of action research and participatory 
research, Bergold and Thomas (2016) note that it is useful to differentiate the core objectives of the two 
approaches. The common aim of action research approaches is to “change social reality on the basis of 
insights into everyday practices that are obtained by means of participatory research” (Bergold & 
Thomas, 2016, p. 3). Thus action research with its emphasis on social change through objectively 
assessing and altering the social reality falls into a critical paradigm, closely related to postpositivism 
(Daly, 2007; Pascale, 2011)3. While participatory research approaches are commonly applied in a 
critical realist research paradigm as well (Daly, 2007), their primary aim is for collaborative knowledge 
production that somehow “enlightens” the participants though there is no explicit objective to promote 
social change (Bergold & Thomas, 2016, p. 5)4.  
                                                     
3 Daly (2007, l. 768–909) makes a distinction between critical realism/postpositivism and critical paradigms, putting 
use of participatory and action research into the toolbox of the latter, while Pascale (2011, pp. 46–49) describes 
critical realism as a branch of postpositivm (i.e., based on an assumption that an objective social world exists and 
that there is a separation of object and subject in research), but inflected with theories of Marxism, feminism, and 
class conflict and seeks to uncover instances of inequality.   
4Reason and Bradbury emphasize that there are a range of approaches and perspectives that may be considered to 
be in the family of participatory action research and that to define the field too narrowly is to misunderstand some 
of the core tenants of inclusivity and creativity (2008). That said, for the purposes of this chapter it was useful to 
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Net-Map was developed to examine multi-stakeholder governance and to promote participant learning, 
thus incorporates participatory research concepts into a framework of tools for examining institutional 
issues. However, in contrast to many participatory research and action research approaches, Net-Map 
emphasized examination of informal social dynamics and supports discussion of subjective concepts 
such as power, influence, and informal social exchanges. While it can be applied in a postpositivist 
paradigm, as demonstrated in a review of applications in the following section, it lends itself easily to in-
depth discussions of participants’ perceptions of their social reality and collective, socially-constructed 
explanations of their networks.  
The value of applying a more subjective research approach, or more specifically a social constructionist 
epistemological approach, is that it allows us to delve into the social embeddeness issues continually 
raised throughout this thesis. Thus in leaning towards more traditionally sociological research 
paradigms, this thesis illuminates the social aspects of institutions. Specifically, the research approaches 
allow for a better understanding of the socially-constructed and agreed upon meanings and beliefs that 
drive behaviours of economic actors—such as (lack of) rule-following behaviour—and are a key 
component of the development of institutions at all levels. Furthermore, social constructionist research 
is well-suited to inductive analysis, which allows for the development of empirically-based theory (Daly, 
2007). Considering the critiques of neoclassical economics as being detached from the real world, this is 
a refreshing approach to the field.   
There are a number of other unique and tools and methods for undertaking institutional analysis, some 
of which are detailed in a World Bank report on the topic (2007). Furthermore, as mentioned above, 
there is a recent emphasis on explicitly combining qualitative and quantitative research approaches. For 
instance, Adato and Meinzen-Dick review a number of studies that combine economic and social 
science analytic approaches, and discuss the contributions of such mixed-methods research to 
agricultural development (2007). However, many such approaches stay within a postpositivist or 
otherwise objective research paradigm (Locke & Lloyd-Sherlock, 2011), and thus miss out on the 
possible contributions of applying subjective research approaches in to the field of institutions for 
agricultural development outlined in this thesis. Locke and Lloyd-Sherlock (2011) explore this very 
issue, contrasting the application of the same qualitative method—life histories—applied to a relatively 
structured critical realist research study, and also to an unstructured more interpretivist study. While 
both produced complex and policy-relevant results, the second example provided a deeper more 
complete view of the data and the respondents’ lives. They highlight how qualitative studies tend to take 
on more structured and objective epistemological approaches, in spite of the value of subjective 
approaches, in order to be seen as valid in a field of development research dominated by postpositivist 
and quantitative analytical approaches.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
specify the commonalities and distinctions between many applications in action research and participatory 
research.  
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The next section describes Net-Map and its family of methods in detail. It also reviews the empirical 
applications of the methods and the research paradigms in which they were applied to provide more 
insights into the relative value of the different approaches used.   
 
 Net-Map: Review of Empirical Applications  1.3.4
Actor-oriented approaches to research help illuminate how individual actions combine to create a 
“process of mutual construction” of institutions (Keeley & Scoones, 1999, p. 23). A network can be 
viewed as a conceptualization of the institutional environment, yet it is also made up of individual 
relations—also referred to as links or ties—that represent social capital, control of knowledge, or aspects 
of power, depending on the context (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Net-Map can be describes as a 
participatory interview method combining social network analysis (SNA), stakeholder mapping, and 
power mapping.  
The specific steps involved include, but are not limited to: 
1. Listing of all actors involved, through an actor generation exercise to determine who is involved 
in the network, and physically writing them on cards to place on the network.  
2. Drawing linkages among actors with pen and paper. SNA is concerned with relations among 
actors and, as described by Hanneman and Riddle (2005), it is in selecting linkages that 
determine the kinds of relationships that exist. Net-Map uniquely encourages multiplex 
networks (more than one kind of link connecting actors within a network). 
3. Attributing actor goals, objectives or policy positions for each actor in the network, which 
provides the interests that exist for the actors in the network.   
4. Attributing actor power examines the relative power or influence of each of the actors in the 
network over the specific topic of the mapping, or as defined by the group. Participants 
physically stack wooden pegs to represent power of each actor on the map. 
5. Discussion of the map can take many forms depending on the objectives of the research, but 
commonly will examine strong or weak actors and links, strategic opportunities, or challenges.  
Schiffer and Hauck (2010) described the rationale for the design of the approach, in terms of its 
departures from traditional approaches to collecting network data, the additional layers of power scores 
and goals, and the visualization of the data during the data collection process, in a methods review of 
Net-Map. They note that the Net-Map tool enables participants to make implicit knowledge and beliefs 
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about networks of influences explicit, detect sources of conflicting goals and potentials for cooperation 
by drawing multiplex networks that include both formal and informal. The following paragraphs 
summarize Schiffer and Hauck’s review of Net-Map and its innovations as a method, or perhaps more 
correctly put, a combination of methods.  
Firstly, the authors describe the motivation for developing a participatory research tool (Schiffer & 
Hauck, 2010), beyond the ethical motivation of giving a voice to people who normally do not play a part 
in knowledge creation (Bergold & Thomas, 2016). Agricultural development research is typically 
undertaken in an intercultural context so the probability of misunderstandings is high. Through 
participatory, flexible approaches, intercultural differences can be uncovered and discussed compared 
to predefined closed-ended data collection approaches that do not leave room to explore socially 
constructed views that may colour responses. 
Secondly, the authors describe the innovative and flexible approach to data collection, which moves 
away from network surveys towards participatory data collection process that can be done with a subset 
of the network with groups or individuals (Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). While typical social network 
analysis requires the collection of data from every actor in the network of study, McCarty et al. (2007) 
showed that, for most purposes, a network of 25 alters can sufficiently reproduce the structure of a 45-
actor network, cutting the information needed from 990 to 300 pairs. Furthermore, research by 
Krackhardt (1987) indicates that the perceptions of a well-positioned actor in terms of network structure 
and actor power are associated with data collected directly from all network actors. While this requires 
careful sampling of experts representing different parts of the network and with different perceptions of 
network actors, the authors then use this empirical result to support the use of small group interviews in 
the place of full-network individual interviews. As noted above, individual interviews may also be used, 
depending on the objectives of the research (Aberman et al., 2012; Hauck, Stein, Schiffer, & 
Vandewalle, 2015), yet still the full population of network actors is not required.   
Finally, Net-Map is a tool that layers information to yield a rich picture, valid for application in complex 
governance situations and other situations with many actors and perspectives. Schiffer and Hauck 
(2010) suggest drawing multiplex networks—mapping a number of unique types of exchanges of interest 
in the network, both formal and informal. In addition to the structure-based measures of power that can 
be assessed from network data, Krackhardt (1990) also suggests asking actors directly who is powerful as 
it yields different information. This is valuable as it is not uncommon to find an actor with few links who 
is perceived as highly influential by others in the network. Furthermore, the process of drawing out each 
of these steps, enables the participants to “make implicit knowledge about networks of influences 
explicit, detect sources of conflicting goals and potentials for cooperation” (Schiffer & Hauck, 2010, p. 
12). 
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Schiffer and Hauck (2010) describe a case study wherein researchers are working to improve 
coordination of all the stakeholders of the White Volta River Basin Board toward economically and 
environmentally sustainable use of water. With little enforcement capacity, it was necessary to 
understand the influence and goals of stakeholders for board members to use this information 
strategically. Furthermore, the researcher was interested in testing the effectiveness of the tool for the 
dual goals of data collection and participants' learning.  
Drawing the maps helped the board structure their own thoughts and served as a tool to prioritize their 
extensive but implicit network knowledge (Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). This, in turn, helped them focus on 
actors of core importance for strategic planning, due to their alike goals or high influence.  
There are many unpublished or non-peer reviewed practical applications of Net-Map.  These include 
initiatives to strengthen development project implementation, understand stakeholder networks, or 
build actor coalitions (Aberman et al., 2015; Kohli, Pradhan, & Menon, 2014; Schiffer, Narrod, & 
Grebmer, 2008). However, in the last few years it has been increasingly applied in peer reviewed 
empirical research in agriculture and rural development, as well as other fields.   
Net-Map should be viewed as a method of inquiry. Or, more specifically, a set of data collection tools 
combined to create a specific useful method. However, it is not inherently linked to any particular 
research paradigm or epistemological approach, nor are the components of which it is comprised. 
These, rather, must be applied by the researcher. Most applications of Net-Map that were reviewed 
here tended to take a social constructionist epistemological approach in that they are concerned with 
how participants perceive a particular network and its actors’ characteristics. A social constructionist 
approach is concerned with how participants have experienced a particular social phenomenon, rather 
than capturing an objective truth (Daly, 2007).  
For instance, a study using Net-Map to assess the political economy of the charcoal sector in Tanzania, 
documents the social, political and economic explanations for a lack of movement on previous attempts 
to reform the sector (Sander, Gros, & Peter, 2013). While the researchers do not explicitly state their 
epistemology (as is common for most published research outside of sociology and anthropology), their 
emphasis on stakeholder perceptions and strengthening of dialogues indicates a subjective bent5. A 
number of other unpublished studies take similar approaches, emphasizing stakeholder perceptions and 
collective social interpretations or beliefs about power and policy change, and how these drive or 
explain policy processes (Aberman et al., 2012; Aberman, Schiffer, Johnson, & Oboh, 2010; Chapoto 
et al., 2015; Kohli et al., 2014). 
                                                     
5 Daly describes a researchers’ epistemological stance as a choice along a continuum from an assumption of 
complete objectivity to complete subjectivity (2007). Rarely is research at the far ends of the continuum, but 
neoclassical economics is typically postpositivist and closer to the objective end while Net-Map applications tend to 
apply a more subjective epistemological approach.  
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Some published works in the health sector use Net-Map to track and evaluate changes in flows of 
technical information to key actors, such as to front line health workers. These papers seem to take a 
postpositivist approach in that they emphasize the measurement and counting of links over the 
discussions of participants, they note looking for objective criteria for identifying actors and determining 
influence, and consider it a limitation of the study that some answers were not factually correct (Ahmed, 
Limaye, & Harlan, 2015; Campbell et al., 2014; Harlan, Sullivan, & Hailegiorgis, 2013). 
Another empirical paper on Net-Map explores its use in transdisciplinary research related to 
environmental change (Hauck et al., 2015). The authors present three case studies of wherein complex 
governance challenges are central to the research, but otherwise they have different objectives. 
Contrasting the different objectives of the case studies also highlights the flexibility of the Net-Map tool. 
The authors note that the first required individual interviews to better understand flows and gaps in the 
network, the second required an emphasis on participatory and reflexive group interviews as a 
complement to previously collected network data, while the third was also a group interview but aimed 
at fostering strategic thinking for the project leader. 
A variant of Net-Map, Process Net-Map, was specifically designed to understand implementation of 
complex processes in practice, wherein linear steps in a process take the place of network data. There 
have been a couple of empirical examples published recently. In one study, the Process Net-Map tool 
was used to generate evidence on how social and power relations influence the design and 
implementation of veterinary policies and the functioning of veterinary institutions in Uganda (Ilukor, 
Birner, Rwamigisa, & Nantima, 2015). The study used the in-depth discussion and maps to assess the 
challenges related to veterinary service delivery and found that in Uganda there are a number of 
institutional challenges at the heart of low quality services.  
Another study combined Process Net-Map with survey analysis, experimental games, and key informant 
interviews to assess the effectiveness of rural producer organizations (RPOs) to improve livelihoods in 
Uganda (Latynskiy & Berger, 2016). They found that RPOs were successful in promoting aggregated 
sales, but did not provide many other services. Furthermore, the mixed-methods approach was useful 
for understanding the functioning of RPOs and the problems they face from different perspectives. In 
particular, the Process Net-Maps facilitated stakeholder involvement and improved the quality of the 
dialog between the respondents and the researchers.  
Other unpublished or discussion paper examples apply Process Net-Map to the functioning of 
development projects or interventions (Birner, Cohen, & Ilukor, 2011; Raabe et al., 2010). They shed 
light on opportunity points for corruption and breakdown of the systems they assess. 
Also, it is worth noting that the Power Mapping approach can be applied on its own without collecting 
network data, in contexts where networks are not of interest or the target population may not have 
sufficient education level for abstract thinking required for drawing even pen and paper networks. 
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Schiffer (2007) applied power mapping to analyse the governance effects of Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management (CBNRM) in Namibia. Schiffer found that the tool, which is undertaken by 
asking respondents to physically stack small pegs to create visual power towers, helped illuminate how 
power had indeed been devolved from the national to the local level. However, on the community level 
elite-capture was seen as a serious problem. The power mapping tool increases interviewees 
understanding of their own situation, as they explicitly discuss taken-for granted power dynamics of their 
community.  
Another approach to power mapping involves in-depth qualitative assessments of power, although 
absent a visual and tactile approach, analyses actors, interest groups, and structures to determine the 
institutional and social distribution of power (World Bank, 2007). Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) apply 
the method in Ethiopia with a view that a significant barrier to socio-political change in the country is a 
lack of power and engagement in political processes and decisions. 
This review of Net-Map and related methods clarifies that, while Net-Map is well-suited to subjective 
epistemological approaches, the research paradigm is the choice of the researcher (Daly, 2007). 
Furthermore, the theories and analytical approaches brought to bear depend on the research design. 
The literature reviewed demonstrates a broad range of subject matter to which Net-Map has been 
applied. Although not explicitly covered here, delving further into the literature described above, the 
analytical approaches and theories to which results were applied also span various disciplines.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The studies in this thesis take a social constructionist epistemological approach, viewing the Net-Map, 
Process Net-Map or Power Mapping approaches as tools to facilitate semi-structured group or 
individual interviews. The resultant data is transcribed (and translated when necessary) for textual data 
analysis. Social network software is used to visualize and analyse the positions of various actors in the 
network. Information on goals and power can be triangulated with the textual data and/or the network 
data to produce a deeper understanding of the social phenomena.  
The case studies were chosen to explore different themes of institutional development in agriculture, in 
Malawi, Pakistan and Kenya, where the interplay of formal and informal institutions is particularly 
important. In addition, because institutions are nested, the case studies cover different levels, including 
the household, farmer group, local government, and national government. Together the case studies 
provide insights on how institutional analysis—with an emphasis on social institutions, informal rules, 
perceptions, and norms—effect agricultural development initiatives. 
The rest of this thesis is organized into four empirical chapters and a concluding chapter. This first 
study, “Gendered perceptions of power and decision making in rural Kenya,” explicitly examines the 
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first level social analysis related to gender and power, applying focus groups and Power Mapping to 
understand socially constructed views of gender, power, and household decision-making. Development 
programs are commonly concerned with altering social norms related to this issue based on an 
understanding of their embeddedness—the extent to which they negatively affect economic and social 
outcomes—and so a better understanding of the social norms and beliefs allows us to contemplate how 
best to promote them to change.  
For the second study, “Gender-inclusive governance of “self-help” groups in rural Kenya,” analysis takes 
place at the first and third levels of social analysis, examining governance structures in community self-
help groups and the extent to which they can promote inclusive participation of women in group 
decision-making. This study also utilizes focus group discussions and Power Mapping as data collection 
tools. 
In the third study, “Progress of constitutional change and irrigation management transfer in Pakistan: 
insights from a net-map exercise,” we apply Net-Map to examine the effects on local water governance 
structures after a de jure shift in level-two institutions: a constitutional amendment for devolution of 
governmental power to provincial level and an Irrigation Management Transfer. Barriers related to level 
one and level three institutions are explored in terms of the barriers to implementation of the reforms.  
In the fourth and final study, “Governance Challenges of Agricultural Export Promotion: The Case of 
Soybean in Malawi,” analysis takes place at multiple levels as we examine both the institutional 
environment and the rules of the game (levels two and three respectively) using Net-Map and Process 
Net-Map, but analysis emphasizes the social norms that facilitate the inefficiencies at those levels.    
The final chapter describes the broad conclusions from across the four studies and the policy lessons 
learned from examining the interplay of informal and formal institutions with qualitative methods.  
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Development policies and programs rest on assumptions about what constitutes power and how 
to change power dynamics; however, development projects rarely consider local understandings 
of power.  A common perspective among development projects is that improving women’s 
resources relative to men will give them more power in household decision making.  In this 
paper we ask how these assumptions correspond with socially and culturally specific ideas about 
what power is, who can hold power, and how power can be transferred.  We conducted 26 
gender disaggregated focus group interviews with 229 individuals in rural Kenya’s lake region. 
We find that men and women are constantly negotiating for power in the household, within the 
bounds of their gendered limitations. We find a zero-sum conception of power to be common 
throughout communities, which may undermine common development approaches to 
empowerment.  However, we also explore opportunities through which development 
interventions can build on local concepts of power to improve intra-household outcomes.    
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2.1 Introduction  
Most development policies and programs rest on assumptions about what constitutes power and how to 
change power dynamics at the household level and are designed to be inherently transformative by 
changing people’s practices, opportunities and resources (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011). Furthermore, in 
recent years development interventions have increasingly emphasized objectives related to empowering 
women. Typically, understandings of power in development are rooted in economic models of 
household bargaining that focus on men’s and women’s relative stores of wealth and human capital. The 
assumption underlying these programs is that improving women’s resources relative to men will give 
them more power in household decision making and that women will utilize resources more effectively 
than men.  For example most large-scale cash transfer programs—such as Oportunidades in Mexico and 
Bolsa Familia in Brazil—target transfers specifically to women to encourage economic empowerment of 
women and promote positive outcomes such as improvements in girls’ education and health (DFID, 
2011).   
However, these and other assumptions may not correspond with socially and culturally specific ideas 
about power.  This includes ideas about what power is, who holds power and how power can be 
transferred.  Development projects that fail to take into account the complexity of local power dynamics 
may lead to ineffectual policy or programming or to unintended consequences within the household. 
This is particularly the case for projects that affect the resource distribution of households or groups. 
For instance, in some contexts, programs promoting economic empowerment of women have 
unintentionally increased women’s work burden relative to men and even led to increased incidence of 
domestic violence (Eves and Crawford, 2014; Hidrobo and Fernald,  2013).   
In recent years, there have been efforts to understand the implications of asset and cash transfers for 
household level gender dynamics, mostly in the form of large-scale quantitative impact evaluations (van 
den Bold et al., 2015; de Brauw et al., 2014; Roy et al., 2015). These studies have started to establish an 
important evidence base about how development interventions often have hetereogeneous impacts on 
household level dynamics—including both expansion and constriction in women’s participation in 
decision making and owership of assets. However, quanititive studies cannot answer questions about 
why development interventions often have heteregoeneous impacts on household dynamics. We argue 
that qualitataive understandings of people’s socially constructed ideas of power are essential to fully 
understanding how development interventions alter household dynamics. 
This study uncovers the subjective and socially constructed views and definitions of power and decision 
making using data from rural Kenya’s Homa Bay County (part of former Nyanza Province). Data was 
collected through 26 gender disaggregated focus group interviews with a total of 229 individuals 
interviewed from August 2013 to May 2014. Qualitative data was coded using inductive reasoning to 
identify themes and patterns in the data that can contribute to the current body of theory on gender, 
power and decision making.  In doing so we elucidate whether men and women’s ideas about power 
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correspond with economic and development paradigms of power and decision-making. Furthermore, 
we highlight the importance of understanding culturally conditioned socially constructed perceptions of 
power in development policy and programing.   
2.2 Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
Literature across disciplines has theorized about the nature of the family and intrahousehold power 
dynamics. The study of gender in development tends to draw from multiple disciplines. While current 
consensus in the development context acknowledges distinct priorities and activities of married couples, 
there are a variety of different conceptualizations of how and to what extent couples cooperate, 
negotiate, bargain, or threaten. This section provides a brief review of the literature on these issues, 
specifically in the context of development. We first focus on neoclassical economic conceptualizations 
of power. Then we explore gendered power from a development perspective, exploring the 
contributions of a few key authors in the sub-field that can be described as Gender and Development. 
This sub-field has its origins in economics but is heavily influence by social theory. Finally, we examine 
conceptualizations of power of some key power theorists to provide more insight into the social 
dynamics being explored in this study.  
Household Bargaining in Neoclassical Economics 
Many development projects strive—explicitly or implicitly—to change power dynamics in the household 
through the allocation of resources at the household level. Current theoretical and empirical 
understanding of household dynamics is based on economic models of “collective” household 
behaviour (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, 2007). In collective models men and women have separate 
preferences for family consumption and do not necessarily pool income. The bulk of evidence has 
supported the collective model of the household and has led to the oft cited notion that children do 
better when the mother controls a larger percentage of household resources (discussed more below and 
at length in Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997)).  
A key contribution of the collective household model is that it allows for examination of intrahousehold 
dynamics including consideration of the respective bargaining power of household members (Meinzen-
Dick et al., 2014). The literature focuses on the different preferences of household members and their 
ability to realize their preferences depending on their bargaining power. In this literature, bargaining 
power is determined to a large extent by an individual’s “outside option” or the level of satisfaction or 
welfare an individual could attain outside the household or marriage (Manser and Brown 1980; 
McElroy and Horney 1981; Lundberg and Pollak 2007; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). The theory being 
that the better the outside options the more bargaining power the individual is likely to have within the 
household or marriage (England and Farkas, 1986; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). Similarly, Sen (1985b) 
considers bargaining power to be a function of household members’ perceived contributions to the 
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household, creating more favourable outcomes for men as much of the contribution of women is in 
nonmarket labour.  
In her edited book, Quisumbing (2003:19) gives an overview of the factors that determine an 
individual’s “outside option”. These include an individual’s control over assets, their interpersonal 
networks, their basic attitudinal attributes, and other factors such as education and skills. She also points 
to some structural determinants, such as the degree to which social norms and relevant laws will make 
threats to take advantage of one’s “outside option” more credible thus adding to one’s power.  For 
instance, in Indonesia social norms allow spouses to take what they brought to the marriage in the case 
of dissolution.  
Arguably, as women gain more education or assets they are able increase bargaining power within the 
household. Indeed, this is the perspective taken by many development programs aimed at “empowering 
women” through increased resources such as education or assets. Under this model, it matters 
considerably to whom resources are distributed in any social protection or redistribution program (de 
Brauw et al., 2014). As such, a recent trend has been to target resources partially or exclusively to 
women (DFID, 2011).  The assumption underlying these programs is that improving women’s 
resources relative to men will give them more power in household decision making and that women will 
utilize resources more effectively than men.   
Gender and Power in Development 
In spite of the power of economic models to assess and explain gender and power, there are still 
significant challenges in conceptualizing, defining and measuring concepts that are highly influenced by 
one’s social and cultural perspectives (Alsop, 2004:chap. 10). Kabeer (2001) discusses Bourdieu’s idea 
of “doxa” to articulate how some aspects and manifestations of power—structural power to be specific—
are so taken-for-granted in a given society that people are not even aware of them, much less able to 
identify and measure them objectively. While felt, they are implicit to the point of invisibility. 
Framing much of the debates around power is the distinction between power as agency and power as 
determined by structure. Agency can be defined as an individual’s ability to make strategic life choices in 
their best interest. Agency, coupled with resources, forms the basis of Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
approach, allowing people the potential to live the lives they want (Sen, 1985a). As mentioned above, 
structures, such as laws and social norms, restrict the choices available to individuals. Returning to the 
discussion of doxa—the undiscussed and un-scrutinized—structural power relations can operate through 
“consent and complicity” when gender roles are taken-for-granted and naturalized (Kabeer, 2001:25; 
Swartz, 1997).  
Typically economic conceptions of power focus on agency and sociological and anthropological 
conceptions of power focus instead on social structure. Although gender analysis tends to blur these 
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disciplinary divisions and some power theorists critique this as a false dichotomy. For instance, Kabeer 
(2001:24) articulates how structure and agency collectively determine power in the quote below: 
Structures operate through the rules, norms and practices of different institutions to 
determine the resources, agency and achievement possibilities available to different 
groups of individuals in a society: our criteria of ‘alternatives’ (could they have 
chosen otherwise?) recognises these larger constraints. However, the actions and 
choices of individuals and groups can in turn act on structural constraints, 
reinforcing, modifying and transforming them: our criteria of ‘consequences’ draws 
attention to these possibilities. 
Kabeer (1999, 2001) also notes that agency can have positive and negative meanings. In the positive 
sense agency refers to someone’s capacity to define and pursue their own goals, or “power to”. Whereas 
agency could also be exercised over another, as in “power over” or domination. In the later sense, 
power over would over-ride or diminish the agency of another. Agency can also reflect “power within” 
when viewed in terms of one’s perception of ability and self-worth. This oft-cited—in development policy 
and practice—typology of power expressions is completed by a fourth power, that stemming from 
collaboration and solidarity: “power with” (Boudet et al, 2013; Csaszar, 2004). While perhaps hardest to 
measure and research, recent work on quantifying people’s aspirations for the future touches on this 
conception of power (Bernard et al., 2011; Dercon and Singh, 2013). 
Foundations of power and negotiation in social theory 
Often credited with laying the foundation in this field,  Max Weber described power as “the probability 
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (1978:53). Weberian power is seen as a shared 
construct in service to the powerful and legitimized by the powerless, depending on obedience. It is 
theoretically attainable and transferable, but becomes formalized and integrated into social life (Watson, 
2014). Weberian power is consistent with concepts of gendered power in the field of development, 
particularly when examining structural determinants of power.  For instance, the concept of internalized 
gender norms is the state of legitimization of the powerful by the powerless, in such a way that it 
becomes formalized and normalized in social life.   
Further delving into social and institutional aspects of power, Michel Foucault described power as a 
“machinery that no one owns” (1980, p. 156). Similar to Weber, Foucaultian power is seen as 
constantly present in all social relations, but not attained or possessed. Rather he saw power as 
constantly “in play”, based on a network of relations and as individuals constantly try to control the 
conduct of another, while the other resists (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012:55). Foucault’s characterization of 
power as both productive and restrictive provides valuable insight to the discussion of positive 
characterizations of power (Gaventa, 2003; Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). He notably saw power as that 
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which produces and creates in the world. While still emphasizing the structural aspects of power, 
Foucault brings relations, and thus individual action and agency, more strongly into focus. Thus for the 
study of household power dynamics, his theories are highly relevant.  
Practical and Empirical Evidence and Study Rationale 
From the above review of definitions and conceptualization of power, we can glean both the importance 
and the intractability of the concept. It is important to bring this exploration of power conceptualizations 
to bear on empirical evidence, practical experience, and socially-constructed conceptions.   
Alsop warns that development organizations working “without any clear and explicit conceptual 
underpinning” may unintentionally perpetuate the systems and structures that one is trying to change 
(2004:16). Moreover, in a review of measures of women’s empowerment, Kabeer critiques them for 
often being “disembodied from their context” and thus inaccurate (2001:51). Thus, a better 
understanding of the local conceptualizations of power and gender in the context of development will 
certainly contribute to the effectiveness of not only efforts to empower women but also policies and 
programs that generally aim to promote development but for which social norms and gender inequality 
are barriers to success. This requires delving into the localized foundations of power and assessing the 
concept as it is defined and perpetuated within a given society.   
These studies provide an important foundation for understanding the implications of development 
interventions on household level dynamics by showing that development interventions have 
hetereogenous impacts on intra-household decision-making. However in order to understand why these 
interventions have heteregoeneous impacts we need to move beyound program impacts and look at 
socially constructed ideas of power and how development interventions interact with local ideas about 
power. We argue, that understanding people’s socially constructed ideas of power is essential to fully 
understanding the limitations of development interventions to alter household dynamics.  
For instance, a social constructionist study on elites and power exmaines how elites themselves define 
power (Yamokoski and Dubrow, 2008). This research appraoch allows for actor-led improvements in 
social theory rather than reinforcing preconceptions of power. Based on Max Weber’s concept of 
charismatic power that describes how extraordinary personal charachteristics can lead to power over 
others (1978), the authors hypothesize that elites identify personality and respect as sources of social 
power. They find these are among the sources of power, and that charachteristics must be viewed 
positively (respected) and they must be constantly displayed by other elites to continue to yield power. 
Another qualitative study of power examines the nature of power differentials in police-citizen 
interactions in marginalized communities in Northern Trinidad, as evidenced by their discourses 
(Watson, 2014). Instead of deriving a general definition of power, the researcher determined that it is 
more accurate and useful to identify categories which may account for various forms of interactions. 
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They find that in each interaction between community members and police, both sides are actively 
working to shift power differentials. 
Similarly, this study asses the socially-constructed and perpetuated definitions of power rather than 
utilizing preexisting definitions of power, but in the context of gender and development. We assess 
power and decision making among men and women in the Nyanza Province of Western Kenya, with 
the specific aim of contributing to the body of theory on power and household decision making 
currently guiding much of the analysis, policies and programs in development today. Taking a 
multidisciplinary approach, we attempt to inform and expand on a traditionally economic understanding 
of gender and hosuehold bargianing and power by bringing social theory to bear. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
This study attempts to uncover the subjective and socially constructed views and definitions of gendered 
power and household decision making. Thus we are concerned with the collective generation of 
meaning produced by social processes (Pascale, 2011:52). We formalize the analysis with analytic 
induction, which refers to the process of systematic examination of similarities within and across the 
“cases” under analysis (Pascale, 2011:53). Qualitative data is coded to identify themes and patterns in 
the data. We then contrast the socially constructed definitions with the dominant economic paradigms 
of power, gender and household decision making that underlie much development work. 
 Data collection and sampling  2.3.1
The lakeshore province of Nyanza is characterized by subsistence agriculture and fishing. In 2010 
Nyanza Province was devolved into six separate counties, although national data is still reported by 
province (KNBS, 2014). This study was undertaken primarily in one of six former Nyanza counties: 
Homa Bay. Nyanza is predominantly populated by the Luo people, the third largest of Kenya’s 40 
different tribes. Smith (2006) describes the Luo as holding a paradoxical position in Kenyan society as 
they are both among the poorer populations of the nation, and also have contributed to some of the 
nation’s most notable public figures such as statesmen, academics, and lawyers. However they have a 
historically troubled relationship with the dominant Kenyan tribe, the Kikuyu, dating back to the 1960’s.  
Luo society is patriarchal and virilocal, and marriage is usually preceded by payment of bridewealth, 
often in cattle. An ethnographic study on Nyanza indicates a much higher rate of polygyny among Luo 
than the national average, although it has decreased over the last decade, and that household bargaining 
for resources in a polygynous context is detrimental and disempowering to co-wives (Oguda, 2012). 
Furthermore, the prevalence of early childbearing is highest (19.2 percent of girls from age 15-19) in 
Nyanza among all Kenyan provinces, and domestic and sexual violence is higher only in Western 
Province, the bordering lakeshore province (KNBS, 2014). Paradoxically, educational attainment 
among females in Nyanza is higher than the national average (5.7 years compared to 5.2 years) (KNBS, 
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2014). As is common in Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of domestic responsibilities fall to women, as 
do specific lower-impact aspects of agricultural production such as planting and weeding, while men are 
seen as responsible for protection of the household and heavy labour such as ploughing with drought 
animals.  
Data was collected through focus group interviews and complemented with key informant interviews 
and detailed field memos. In total, 26 sex-disaggregated focus group interviews were undertaken with 
229 interviewees (135 women and 94 men) between August 2013 and May 2014 in and around Homa 
Bay County, Kenya. The discussions were guided by a number of prompts to encourage participants to 
share their perceptions and experiences. After the open-ended discussion, we also asked respondents to 
rate their own power by choosing and stacking a number of pegs between 0 and 5 (Schiffer, 2007). This 
visual power rating exercise elicits their perception of their own power, making their views explicit, 
dynamic, and comparable. Translations of the prompts and initial discussion on the concept of power 
in the community were discussed in depth by the research team and validated with key informants 
before the start of data collection and after the first few interviews to ensure that they were culturally 
acceptable and elicited the desired information while avoiding leading or biasing question structures. In 
addition, detailed field memos were used to provide context and record nonverbal details of interest 
from the interviews, and were also viewed as the first level of analysis.  
While gender norms among Luo are not seen as highly restrictive compared to some tribal cultures in 
Kenya, but women are still disadvantaged in many ways, this region serves as a good case of study by 
providing a moderate or middle-of-the-road example of gender dynamics in the country. Furthermore, 
the safety and accessibility of the province were also considered, given the instability and violence in 
other parts of Kenya.  
Communities were purposively sampled based on the presence of an active mixed-sex community 
group. In addition, they were chosen at varying distances from the main town centre, in order to capture 
differences in gender norms due to exposure to towns. The data collection team made up of two 
women and two men, all of whom were Luo, as well as one female foreigner who was the lead 
researcher. Subsequent rounds were collected with a subset of the team. In each community 2-4 focus 
groups were facilitated. Data from focus groups were recorded, transcribed and translated from Luo to 
English and then coded for recurring themes to identify patterns across the interviews and patterns or 
contradictions within the interviews. 
Focus group discussions are an important qualitative method in the social sciences and have unique 
strengths compared to other qualitative methods such as interviews and ethnography. In particular, 
focus groups allow for discussion and exchange and enable participants to flesh out ideas (Robinson 
1999).  Furthermore, focus groups give the researchers insight into both individual and group dynamics 
(ibid). Along these lines, focus groups are uniquely suited to elicit a collective voice or discourse and 
avoid the imposition of meaning through the research process and decontextualization of the data 
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(Wilkinson, 1998, 1999). Focus groups also allow us to capture the voices and perspectives of a much 
larger group of respondents than would be possible through conducting individual interviews or 
ethnographic observation. While focus groups are sometimes critiqued as likely to obscure important 
perspectives due to strong individual opinions or group dynamics that reproduce normative discourses, 
the weaknesses of focus groups can be considered and accounted for during facilitation and analysis 
(Smithson, 2000;  Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 1996). For this study, focus groups are well suited to 
examining the collective understanding of power, interpreted from discussions and debates of group 
members. The dominant and conflicting views on gender and power are thus illuminated for analysis. 
Viewing power as a shared construct integrated into social life, the definition of the concept with most 
relevance on social life is that agreed upon by that particular society or group. 
This study underwent an ethical review and received consent from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute’s Institutional Review Board as a study bearing minimal risk. To ensure the 
confidentiality of the interview responses, care was taken to keep transcriptions in a password protected 
folder. All duplicate copies of recordings and transcripts were deleted from all locations except the 
primarily investigator’s computer. Specific names and villages were left out of the text of the paper.  
 Analysis 2.3.2
Based on a social constructionist epistemology, our analysis entails the subjective interpretation of 
community-defined conceptions of power and decision making (Daly, 2007:32). Rather than begin this 
research with predefined concepts, we view power as a sensitizing concept, defining the concept based 
on the empirical results rather than from pre-existing theory (Pascale, 2011:22). Sensitizing concepts can 
be seen as a starting point from which to examine the data and begin the inductive reasoning process 
(Bowen, 2008:2–3).  
The analytical approach taken was inductive and iterative. The initial round of data collection was done 
with in a relatively unstructured manner, with a few discussion points listed to enable discussion on 
power and decision-making. After the round of initial coding led to a list of empirically-driven themes of 
interest, a focused literature review was undertaken. The subsequent two rounds of data collection were 
based upon a revised—and somewhat more structured—list of prompts and questions. Upon completion 
of all data collection, all transcripts were coded according to the same set of main themes that came out 
of initial coding, with sub-themes emerging throughout the coding process. Consistency and variation of 
thematic patterns are examined across focus groups, within and across communities (2-4 focus groups 
were held in each community), and between men’s and women’s responses.  
 
2.4 Empirically-based Conceptions of Power  
The following section reviews the empirically-based conceptualizations of power in the sampled 
communities. We distinguish between how respondents defined power and what they described as 
37 
 
 
drivers of power, and find the common conceptualizations of power described in the literature review 
above—power over and power with—as useful ways of organizing the empirical results.  The results 
describe a complex conceptualization of power that is consistent across communities, though it appears 
to be shifting over time.  
 Power as Influence: “Power Over” 2.4.1
Universally across focus groups, power was conceptualized as one’s voice or influence at home or in the 
community. Influence, as defined by these communities, can be summarized as being listened to when 
speaking. Influence manifested in two distinct forms: that of domination and that of leadership. A 
number of facilitators of influence were described consistently across focus groups, and while the broad 
categories were the same for men and women, there were some key gendered differences that are 
illuminated below. 
The key facilitators of power include wealth, hard work, providing for the family, and unity. Wealth and 
control over or ownership of resources such as land were seen as directly contributing to one’s ability to 
act and make decisions, in addition to having a positive effect on one’s voice. Hard work and 
accomplishment was raised universally across focus groups; it was often described as setting an example 
that others would want to follow. The following quote from a male respondent exemplifies many 
people’s conceptions of power: 
“For someone to be considered powerful they must have sufficient food at home, he may have 
children in school, [he is] someone who associates with others, and – when amongst peers – he 
gives good opinions and may also have influence within the community.” 
Having a choice over one’s actions – closely linked to the concept of agency – was not a defining 
component of power in this context. But rather being seen as a hard-worker and overcoming adversity 
and challenge was central to making someone powerful. Linked to this concept of hard work, caring for 
and providing for others, especially one’s family, was also raised frequently. This was described in terms 
of generally providing for the family, ensuring food security of the family, or being able to feed guests. 
All of these were seen as leading to influence and a higher status in the community. Education, and 
educating one’s children, was only mentioned a few times and only as a facilitator for wealth 
development, especially in terms of investing in children for future financial reward. While wealth and 
social status were included in definitions of power, they were largely seen as the product of hard work, 
personal characteristics (like intelligence or morality), or luck.   
The realization of power, conceptualized as influence, falls squarely within the classification of power 
over others. This classification was manifested in two distinct forms: that of leadership and that of 
domination. Leadership was often attributed to inborn or otherwise intangible and un-learnable 
characteristics, such as charisma. Although other attributes such as confidence and eloquence – 
especially in terms of public speaking or dealing with conflicts in the home – were also described, and 
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could be either innate or learned through activities such as participation in community groups. A female 
respondent contrasts two key types of power in the following quote: “Power can be manifested in two 
ways; there are those who are good in the farms, [while] some are good at socializing – that is 
personality.” 
Power through domination as was discussed absent normative assessments. The ability to command 
one’s family members, to bring a woman to your land (take a wife), or successfully convene a group 
were all examples of power through domination. Men lamented moments of powerlessness as those 
when family members disobeyed them, indicative of both this common conceptualization of power as 
well as a masculine ideal that they must be highly respected, particularly within the home. The following 
quote provides a stark example of this, wherein a man feels powerless when he does not react in an 
expected way (presumably with violence) in an altercation with his wife:  
Interviewer: When did you feel that you were powerless and why? 
Male Respondent: It was when my wife annoyed me and instead of doing anything I just told 
her to pack and leave. 
Interviewer: What made your power go down? 
Male Respondent: The reason why my powers reduced is because I did not do anything to her, 
I just told her to pack things and leave. And my family members told me to forgive and I just 
forgave her. 
Power through domination is also conceptualized as a zero-sum game in many instances, wherein, for 
instance, women shy away from goals of attaining more power because it would diminish the power of 
their husbands, or men describe lowering their own power in order to allow their wives to hold some. In 
this conflictual power equilibrium, empowerment can only happen at the detriment of those who 
currently have power; or, as many widows note, after their husbands died and they were no longer 
competing for power in the household. When asked to rate their decision making power at home and 
in groups from zero to five, respondents universally implied that taking the top score depriving others of 
power, as illuminated in the quotes below: 
Female Respondent - …it would be difficult for me to reach five [top power] because at times 
when we disagree he ends up reigning on me and he carries the day. 
Male respondent - The reason I picked 5 [top power] is because I am the head of my wife and 
therefore I am in charge and everything is upon me. 
Female respondent - Men can do something without telling you; he can sell livestock and may 
not consult you and if you ask him he will be harsh and during this time you just keep silent and 
he will start abusing you because he has done something bad and he doesn’t want to be told. 
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He will say that he doesn’t want to be questioned after he has done something. There won’t be 
peace if the woman is also high. 
The notion of power as zero-sum complicates the assumptions that underpin many development 
projects by leading to a situation wherein men sharing power with women would be, by definition, 
disempowering to men. Thus, changing power dynamics may not be so easy as changing who has 
control of resources in the household because by implication increasing women’s power comes at the 
detriment of men.   
 Zero-sum power and household development 2.4.2
In spite of the definition of power as zero-sum, the data also suggests in some situations, men tolerate 
increased power for women, presumably at the expense of their own power, specifically when it leads to 
greater development for the entire family. The following quotes demonstrate how working toward 
household development, and thus greater power for the entire family, may trump resistance to 
intrahousehold power shifts. The following female respondent’s quote explains male-female divisions of 
power and responsibility, and how they are both responsible when it comes to development: “When he 
brings another wife, he will be consulting me because I am the eldest wife who is used to the duties at 
home. Now here my powers will increase because I have to be consulted. But things like ploughing will 
depend on him. And when it comes to development, we have to share.” Another female respondent 
explains that her husband has positive views of her group membership because of the benefit to the 
family: 
Interviewer: Did you ask your husband when you wanted to join the group? 
Female Respondent: I asked and he accepted. 
Interviewer: Was he happy about the group? 
Female Respondent: Only after seeing the benefits [to our crop yields]. 
 Domination and leadership: two sides of the same coin 2.4.3
The concepts of domination and leadership appear closely linked. However, we can differentiate the 
first as power based on having control over someone’s actions, whereas the second is based on being 
seen as influential and worth listening to, regardless of the impact – or lack thereof – on people’s 
actions. The differences between them, though subtle, are important. For the first, one must have 
control over another person’s physical actions, thus diminishing the other’s agency, consistent with a 
zero-sum notion of power. For the second, simply being heard, having a voice, and having one’s ideas 
appreciated is considered powerful. In every community, and almost every focus group, these 
conceptions coexisted. 
One particularly dramatic example of power through domination, widely cited by both men and 
women, is the power of a man to “take a woman” to his house through marriage. This is then described 
as the reason behind a woman’s lack of power, given that she is living on his land—and anything she 
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produces with it is his by default—she is subject to his rules, and she can be “sent home” if he is not 
pleased with her. This type of dominating power diminishes a woman’s agency and overall capabilities 
by making conditional her access to basic necessities for life, shelter and inputs for livelihoods. 
Additionally, men who do not fulfil this role—who do not adequately dominate in their homes according 
to what they perceive as the standards of their community—feel diminished and disempowered as men. 
The following quote elucidates this point, highlighting that male power is enhanced by virilocal patterns 
and the heavy physical and social capital he thus enjoys:  
Interviewer: Can you tell me what makes man more powerful than woman? 
Male Respondent: Men have power to marry a woman and take her to their home; that is one 
power from where I may decide to send her away if we disagree. But if the two could marry and 
leave their home and stay at a central place they would be have equal power. 
 Gendered differences in power as influence 2.4.4
While women and men consistently defined power similarly, their examples and personal reflections on 
power were systematically different. In all focus groups, men's examples showed them playing a more 
dominant role—such as allowing the wife some input in household decision making—while the women 
were systematically more passive, such as describing their power with caveats (for instance, that they are 
able to command only within the domestic domain) or describing feeling powerful when requests for 
money or assistance were granted by their husband or other authority figures. While these gendered 
differences are not surprising but rather fit into highly discussed gendered power disparities, the 
systematic differences in descriptions illuminate differences in the way women and men consider their 
own power and ability to gain power. These results point to a power hierarchy wherein male power is 
viewed as absolute and assumed while female power is conditional.  
 Power through Unity and Consultative Decision making: “it’s a different world” 2.4.5
Interestingly, the concept of power through domination coexists with a seemingly paradoxical concept of 
need for consultation in family decision-making. Unity and consultation was discussed by men and 
women in every community both as sources of power and requirements for a successful and happy 
family. Respondents described how sharing of ideas, finances, and encouragement can lead to greater 
power and achievement, in the home and in community groups. Others also described how a family 
must be united to be powerful. Every community—and almost every focus group—described how 
consultation on family decisions was a requirement. Some motivated this by a need for harmony and 
peace in the family—linked to increasing the power of a family and its members—while others discussed 
this as a requirement for effective planning and joint cooperation, as in the quotes below: 
Male Respondent: So this is what brings disagreement in the house because if you don’t sit 
together and decide on something you will definitely bring conflict in the family. 
41 
 
 
Male respondent: [To be powerful,] you must be a hard worker and one who provides for the 
family and you must also bring the family together so you can be respected. 
Female Respondent: [We become powerful] by consulting and sharing ideas so that we can 
uplift ourselves by working hard as a family. 
However, men consistently noted that there were certain areas that they would open to consultation and 
others for which they would choose to maintain complete decision-making power. The need or desire 
for consultation was referred to multiple times as a shift from the way things worked previously—noting 
that "we are in a different world now" wherein men are required to be consultative and not "reign over" 
their families.  However, this concept of family unity and consultative decision making easily coexisted 
with a man's dominance of decision-making power, as illustrated in these two female respondent quotes: 
Female Respondent: “I will leave for him to make decisions, though nowadays we help each 
other and things will be easy."  
Female Respondent: “When you are two people in the house you have to agree on issues and 
the man should sit the wife down and consult with her on what he wants to do and even if the 
woman refuses the man will still go ahead and do it because of the powers he has but in ideal 
situation the man should consult the wife.” 
 Hard work, taking care of the family and setting an example 2.4.6
Working hard was universally seen as important. This is congruent with power as dependent upon on 
how one is viewed by the community because it was often described in terms of an external observer. 
The following quotes illustrate this connection: 
Female Respondent: I am powerful in my house because I can leave in the morning, I can look 
for food for my children, I can go to the farm, I can tell my kids to prepare lunch or breakfast 
or I can do it on my own, when I go to the farm and worked hard until I harvest high produce, 
my husband becomes proud of me and I also feel proud of myself.  
Female Respondent: What I see in that issue of power is being persistent with your work and 
the person seeing you will say that that woman is very powerful. 
Male Respondent: Long ago when I lost my father and we used to stay in a dilapidated house, 
we worked hard and built my mother an iron sheet roofed house and so I felt powerful. 
In addition, the degree to which one’s hard work yielded results—and this increased one’s wealth, food 
security, and command in the household—was also an important aspect. Having a clean home, well-fed 
children and flourishing farm were often described as a mechanisms for achieving power because you 
are seen as successful and others will follow you, increasing your power as a leader. This male 
respondent described results in terms of development: “With me I think if someone works hard in his 
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home that person is powerful because he has development at home, you have food and many other 
things.” 
Taking care of the family is seen as an important driver of power across almost all communities, 
commonly characterized in terms of ensuring food security for one’s family. Respondents noted feeling 
powerful when they were able to provide food and described a powerful person as someone who 
ensures food security at all times for their family. Likewise, some examples of moments of loss of power 
in people’s lives were times when people went hungry or could not feed their children enough food. A 
female responded explained, “I have power in my house if I can go and buy food, cook it in my house, 
and the children eat it: that is power.” 
What constituted successfully taking care of the family was gendered. For instance, men talked of being 
powerful when they were able to “take care of the whole family” often vaguely without describing 
specific tasks or in terms of being a good “family man” whereas women talked specifically of being 
powerful when they were able to feed the children and husband well. When asked what different 
attributes make men powerful versus women, this male respondent replied: “First for a man if he takes 
care of the whole family and for a woman if she takes care of the children.” 
In general there was more overlap in terms of gendered accomplishments than the commonly 
conceptualized domestic and versus commercial split for women and men respectively. Men were 
highly concerned with ensuring that the family has food, and women described being concerned with 
the “development” of the family in terms of housing and education. This highlights the 
interconnectedness of rural life wherein, even though there are gender-specific responsibilities and 
distinct priorities, gendered concerns are complementary and cannot be separated from each other in 
terms of the functioning of the household. It may also relate to the increasing importance of family 
unity, such that divisions between gender-specific concerns become blurred.  
 Shifting gender norms: circumventing and coping with male dominance  2.4.7
While dominant views of gender roles power were largely reflective of stereotypical concepts of 
gendered power, such as the greater legitimacy of male power than female described above, there were 
also indications of shifting norms and associated internal community struggles. Our analysis of 
household bargaining dynamics lead to a typology of communities in terms of their views and 
approaches to women’s power.  
In some communities, regressive views on gender and agency describe men as being superior––often 
rationalized through religious beliefs about male superiority––in terms of intellect, ability to “focus”, or 
ability to “plan” for the future. We characterize communities wherein men and women both held these 
views as regressive in terms of gender norms. Of note, we find these regressive views are normalized, 
obscuring the impact on power relations to community members. The following quotes from female 
respondents exemplify regressive views on gender and power: 
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Female Respondent: A man is like a cornerstone of the home, even the kids that we have with 
him… And even if there is something bad that is going to happen he sees it first before a 
woman. A man is focused unlike a woman, they also plan the things that they do before doing 
them but a woman does not. A woman just does things generally. 
Female respondent - A man has power because he is the one who has brought you to that 
homestead to stay with him. Another thing is that we came from a man’s rib, it is the man who 
was created first and we have to respect that because it is from the Bible. So even if a man does 
not have money, we should just respect them because they are the house heads. 
A second view of gender and agency is characterized by attempts to circumvent conventional 
masculinities. Women described subtle approaches to obtaining desired outcomes such as “speaking 
softly” and “cooking a nice meal” to convince their husbands to change their minds about something, or 
indirect approaches such as simply disobeying what they know their husbands want and dealing with the 
repercussions. The following quotes from female respondents describe ways in which women attempt to 
circumvent gender norms that enable them to make choices they see to be in their best interest:   
Female respondent – [When there is a disagreement] you should sit down when things have 
cooled down and talk and be humbled also look for time when he is in his best moods and talk 
to politely then you will win him back. 
Female respondent - There are men who put a mark on the maize flour [so we cannot use it 
without their permission]. They can draw a Kenya map and when he comes back he would like 
to see that map the way he had drawn it. These are some of the things we hear when people 
give testimonies and me the way I know about this, I know how to deal with them. Me, if such a 
thing were to happen to me or if I go to my house and find it, I can give out that maize flour 
before he even draws that map on it and put it somewhere. Because not giving makes someone 
sad and I am a God’s person. If I can’t give and God also knows that I have been forced to do 
that and if I have some money -- for example ten thousand -- and have been forced not to 
invest, I will give someone five thousand to keep for me because tomorrow this man who is 
drawing for you the map will not be there. So I take three thousand and buy a cow then send it 
to someone to keep for me 
A third view is characterized by women’s increasing independence from men. In particular, it was noted 
that women are now capable of successfully living alone, often as widows. The following quotes 
exemplify a transformative view of gender and power wherein male and female respondents describe a 
new approach to gender relations and women’s input to the family.  
Female respondent - In the recent world women can have a voice or good ideas because of this 
gender thing and people are mixed in terms of gender in our group and the men know it. 
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Male respondent - There is a saying that behind every successful man there is a hard working 
woman so a woman becomes powerful if she is hard working and when she works hard in a 
family then you shall find that the family shall develop so I think women are very powerful 
because they are the ones who raise the status of the family and even if a woman were to be 
widowed then women would always work hard in the family more than a man would do, men 
become more vulnerable when they are widowed. 
While some communities described exclusively regressive view of gender and agency, circumventive 
and transformative views often overlapped within focus groups and even by the same person. 
Specifically, strong statements across the spectrum from transformative to regressive may be indicative 
of traditional conservatism clashing with progressive gender norms. While many communities expressed 
transformative views of gender and power, they were all accompanied by regressive statements and thus 
characterized as communities in internal conflict.  
2.5 Discussion 
The views of power described here reflect the socially constructed perception that increased power 
largely comes from diminishing the power of others. The process of negotiation and flux that emerges 
from the data is reminiscent of the Foucaultian conceptualization of relational power. The network of 
actors in a household or community are particularly concerned with exerting control over the actions of 
others. This negotiation is the process through which families decide how to invest their collective 
resources, such as money and time, the result of which has varying degrees of benefit for different 
members of the household. While negotiations for control are ongoing within families, it is not to say 
that there is never unity, collaboration or mutual benefit. Families increasingly value the notion of unity 
and, in many endeavours, consider working together to be the most productive approach.  
Consistent with the economic conception of household bargaining power, there are a variety of personal 
attributes and characteristics assumed to lead to high a degree of power. These include wealth and 
control of resources, confidence and charisma, and hard work and determination. The core cause of 
structural inequality discussed was related to gender. Men are seen as inherently more powerful, and—
for men and women—this is often naturalized. Furthermore, when it is critiqued or resisted by women—
or by men—there are social and welfare repercussions—especially in that men disproportionately control 
social and physical capital and so can deny women’s access in extreme situations of resistance. 
The view of power as zero-sum fits with this conceptualization: men and women are negotiating for their 
respective priorities within the household, each with some degree of power in their particular domains 
but with men having absolute power and women having power conditional on men allowing them some. 
The negotiations continuously, though marginally, alter the balance of powers within the household.  
Men are better endowed with physical capital, and this is a key reason for masculine domination. But a 
key policy question remains, can providing women with more resources necessarily alter this dynamic 
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and improve women’s bargaining power in the household? We see that in cases of extreme resistance of 
gender norms there may be backlash against women, and that allowing women more power—by 
definition—must be taking it from someone else (presumably men).  
However, there seem to be some cases in which power shifts are not met with backlash. These are 
situations wherein: 1) there is an exogenous relaxing of gendered social norms; 2) there are changes in 
family structure (like in the case of the death or absence of a husband); and 3) there are changes (or 
potential for changes) in power of the family as a unit as opposed to shifts of power within the family. 
Discussing these three cases in more detail below, we are particularly interested in situations in which 
the current development paradigm could be harnessed for improvements in women power and agency, 
based on the empirical results described here.  
Firstly, in communities where men and women both recognize and resist male dominance this opens a 
space for new patterns of bargaining and negotiations to occur wherein women’s agency can increase. 
Secondly, shifts in family structure, such as migration or death of a husband, that result in the household 
male relinquishing some or all decision making power to the women may open space for women’s 
increased agency. However, widowhood may also leave women vulnerable to loss of the husband’s land 
or other vulnerabilities. Finally, power is primarily viewed as power over others, and discussions are 
reflective of intrahousehold shifts in power. However, at times the family sees itself as a unit, associated 
with the potential for extrahousehold power shifts. That is, in some instances, activities that shift power 
marginally between men and women are viewed as “good for the development of the family” and not a 
threat to their own power, because they perceive a net increase in the family’s power over others in the 
community. This result suggests that development initiatives that work with the household as a whole 
rather than men or women separately would be more likely to be accepted in spite of possible 
intrahousehold shifts in power and that interventions should benefit realms that are of importance to 
men and to women.  
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3 Gender-inclusive governance of “self-help” groups in rural Kenya 
 
Noora-Lisa Aberman, Regina Birner, Elizabeth Okiri, Mary Anyango Oyunga, Barrack Okoba and 
George Otiep 
 
There is vast literature on groups as a useful mechanism for rural development, 
especially for women. However, for group participation to fulfil on potential benefits to 
women, gender-specific constraints must be addressed. This study examines how to 
promote gender-inclusive governance of mixed-sex self-help groups in the African 
context, analysing twenty mixed-sex focus group discussions with 190 group members in 
rural western Kenya. Emphasizing group member perceptions and beliefs about 
participation and governance, we undertake an empirical assessment of institutional 
factors that explain and facilitate effective participation of female members. We find that 
group-member endowments impact the group’s interpretation in terms of their 
understanding of gender issues and political processes, and that the pro-gender 
intentions behind governance structures are more important than the structures 
themselves. Furthermore, groups in this context serve as a distinct parallel institution to 
that of the home that enable them to push the boundaries of community gender norms. 
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3.1 Introduction 
There is vast literature on groups as a useful mechanism for rural development, especially for women. 
The literature largely views group participation as a mechanism for developing social capital in women 
and also an indicator of empowerment (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). Groups are also mechanisms for 
improving livelihoods more directly by facilitating risk pooling, promoting the adoption of agricultural 
technologies, and facilitating asset accumulation (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2013). Groups can generally 
decrease transaction costs that tend to be high for small farmers and women in particular and thus can 
address women’s specific agricultural constraints and increase women’s wellbeing and capacity to adapt 
to climate change (Dorward et al., 2009; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Markelova, Meinzen-dick, Hellin, & 
Dohrn, 2009). However, for group participation to fulfil its potential for women, gender-specific 
constraints must be addressed. In addition, group performance is enhanced when all members are 
active participants (Ostrom, 1992). 
Women’s and men’s participation are each constituted by different interests, priorities and abilities. 
Their respective roles and responsibilities—determined largely by existing gender norms—will determine 
their needs and priorities in terms of climate change adaptation and wellbeing more broadly (Bryan & 
Behrman, 2013). Thus women’s ability to voice their concerns and determine activities and strategies of 
groups’ approaches will largely determine how effective they are as mechanism for addressing women’s 
needs. That is, the degree to which groups fulfil women-specific needs depends in part on how 
substantial women’s engagement is in the group (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014, 2013).  
Groups made up only of women may be dismissed by men and face community challenges, while 
groups made up of both women and men may find women playing perfunctory roles in decision-making 
(Baden, 2013; Pandolfelli, Meinzen-Dick, & Dohrn, 2008). In addition, some authors criticize an 
attempt to address gender issues by focusing on women only, recommending approaches that examine 
the roles of men and women—and their social dynamics—to promote development and women’s 
empowerment (Bellows & Lemke, 2011; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; WCRWC, 2005). Thus it is 
important to assess which institutional characteristics can promote effective engagement of women in 
group decision-making of mixed-sex groups. Agarwal’s (2000a, 2001) research in India pointed to 
gender norms related to women’s roles in public as the major inhibitor to effective participation. 
However, in contexts where gender norms related to public appearances tend to be less restrictive, such 
as many—though not all—communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, gendered-dynamics in mixed-sex groups 
may be different. In addition, analysis in this context may provide additional insights into gendered 
group participation and which group governance mechanisms may promote effective participation of 
women. 
The degree of participation will affect the benefits accrued by a group member and the gender 
composition of the group impacts women’s participation (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). Thus failing to 
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understanding how best to design groups for women’s participation, we can miss out on many potential 
benefits of interventions, in particular the potential to address the gender gap in agriculture and food 
security and improve women’s ability to adapt to stresses of climate change. The majority of studies 
examining gendered group governance have done so in the South-Asia context where gender norms are 
more restrictive than much of Sub-Saharan Africa (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). As such, this study 
builds on past work on this topic, but applied to communities in rural Kenya.  
This qualitative study analysed twenty mixed-sex focus group interviews with 190 group members in 
rural western Kenya between August 2013 and May 2014. The objective was to determine the 
institutional characteristics—with an emphasis on group design and governance—that explain and 
facilitate effective participation of female members. It examines group member perceptions and beliefs, 
and then applies an analytical framework to guide the empirical analysis of gender-inclusive group 
decision-making. 
The paper is organized as follows: the following sections review the evidence on gender and group 
governance, lay out the analytical framework that guides analysis, and then describe the social, economic 
and political context in the study area. Then we provide detailed description of the methodology. 
Finally we summarize the empirical results and end by discussing the implications for policy and 
practice and the utility of the analytical framework for future studies.  
3.2 Review of Evidence on Gender and Group Governance  
As mentioned above, groups have become the major mechanism for development interventions and 
targeting of programs and services. There are a number of reasons for this, including using groups as 
mechanism to enable small farmers to pool risk and engage in the market economy, to broaden the 
reach of development partners or government interventions given limited funds, to encourage social 
capital development and women’s empowerment, or to promote sustainable natural resource 
management (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014; Thompson, Teshome, Hughes, Chirwa, & Omiti, 2009). 
Thompson et al (2009) describe groups (farmers groups in particular) as having elements of both 
traditional and formal organizations. They are often formally registered with the government and/or 
facilitated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and organized around economic principals. But 
they are also based in communities and “rooted in local contexts and customs” (Thompson et al., 2009, 
p. 2). Groups are particularly important for women as they provide access to information and resources 
that women may otherwise be excluded from (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). Given the emphasis on 
groups in development policy and practice, groups have been the focus of research in a number of sub-
fields of development. 
For instance, studies in development economics assess the incentives for collective action in group 
savings schemes such as ROSCAS (rotating savings and credit associations), where neoclassical 
economic theory would tell us that people are better off not participating, or participating once and then 
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dropping out. This body of literature finds various social considerations that promote group 
membership and continued participation such as women trying to separate some assets from the typical 
intrahousehold bargaining rules for assets, a desire for social capital and need to protect oneself against 
social rejection, and the power of self-commitment to a savings goal as an important mechanism for 
improving savings outcomes. Furthermore, these types of savings groups are generally found to be 
beneficial to members in terms of welfare outcomes, though they do tend to leave out the poorest of the 
poor (Greaney, Kaboski, & Leemput, 2013).  
In addition, natural resource management literature, often based on Ostrom’s seminal work on 
collective action and management of common-pool resources, considers how various groups can 
facilitate sustainable use and management of natural resources such as water resources, forests, or 
pasture, or more broadly for promoting community-based adaptation to climate change (Bryan & 
Behrman, 2013; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994b). This body of work provides some guidance on 
group design principles specifically for the sustainable management of common pool resources (Cox et 
al., 2010; Ostrom et al., 1994b).  
Some of this literature goes beyond natural resource management to focus on gender dynamics in 
groups. For instance, Valdivia and Gilles (2001) review a series of case studies looking at gendered 
access to and control of resources and find a close relationship between women’s resource control and 
voice. They also find that, in addition to a mechanism for risk sharing, group participation gives women 
a “legitimized and institutionalized context through which they can work” to develop their livelihoods 
and increase not only social capital but social control (Valdivia & Gilles, 2001, p. 8). However, 
according to Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen’s (1998) review of evidence on female participation in water 
user organizations, the time costs and social risks associated with group participation often outweigh the 
benefits for women. Thus they note the need for detailed analysis to identify the major factors that can 
strengthen women’s participation in groups. Similarly, Fischer and Qaim’s (2012) quantitative 
assessment of commercialization through farmers organizations finds that the benefit-cost ratio may be 
lower for women such that better targeting group activities to meet the needs of women would likely 
increase their participation.  
Kabeer and Subramanian (1996) develop a framework for the institutional analysis of gender programs 
and policies. They argue that the norms and values that determine gender inequalities are rearticulated 
at all levels of institutions, and thus to understand the role of women in groups one must assess 
institutions at the levels of family, community, market and state. They also define a set of constitutive 
components of institutions that can be used to empirically assess them: rules, activities, resources, 
people and power. Agarwal (2000a) finds that women in community forest groups in South Asia have 
low levels of participation in groups.  
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In a related paper, Agarwal (2000b) specifies factors that affect women’s participation: formal rules of 
entry, degree of awareness of rules by women, social norms restricting appearing and speaking in public, 
workload and logistics of childcare and tasks, and personal attributes such as education level, confidence 
and age. She describes a more meaningful definition of participation than the quantitative studies 
described above, explaining that beyond membership (which is linked to rules of entry) and attendance, 
there are finer degrees of participation that require such things as speaking out and having one’s 
opinions carry weight in decision-making.  
Along these lines, Agarwal (2001) develops a typology for group participation, ranging from nominal 
participation (membership) to interactive participation, wherein women have voice and influence in 
group decision-making. She illustrations empirically that women’s needs are not addressed when their 
participation is limited. She finds a number of factors that impact the effectiveness of women’s 
participation in groups, which are gender-restrictive social norms (negative), ability to form women-only 
groups (positive), and external agents supporting women’s effective participation (positive), especially 
when pushed from the beginning before men’s territorial interests are established. Agarwal also suggests 
consideration of various institutional levels that impact group dynamics, such as the state, community 
and household. 
In addition, in a review of evidence on women's participation in mixed-sex groups, Meinzen-Dick et al. 
(2014) found that women's active participation improves rule enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
overall group effectiveness. In addition, the literature they reviewed showed that mixed-sex groups may 
be harder to set up but have higher pay-offs. For instance, in a study of women-only, men-only and 
mixed-sex organizations for natural resource management in Bangladesh, Sultana and Thompson 
(2008) find that women-only groups prioritize inclusivity while men-only groups prioritize clear rule-
making. Furthermore, compliance with rules limiting fishing in protected areas is higher when both men 
and women are actively involved in the management groups, though women-only groups improved with 
time. 
In an empirical assessment of African farming cooperatives, Baden (2013) finds a few group 
characteristics that seem to work best for women. First, where women already have some assets and 
experience managing groups, women-only groups can be quite successful in promoting development. 
Second, with a critical mass of women members, women are more likely to gain leadership roles but 
that will not necessarily lead to equitable decision-making. Lastly, a rotational leadership mechanism 
ensured a minimum number of women in the group leadership at all times and lead to greater 
recognition of women’s positive contributions in mixed-sex cooperatives.  
The literature highlights the increasing importance of groups, and especially effective participation in 
groups, for development. While there is some evidence that women-only (or mostly women) groups can 
be beneficial, especially in a context where women are highly restricted in terms of public appearances, 
54 
 
 
the possible benefits of mixed-sex groups necessitates further examination of these to better understand 
how to support their pro-gender governance. As such this study complements previous studies on 
gender-inclusive group governance by developing and applying an analytical framework that assesses the 
various institutional factors that may affect women’s inclusion in the African context.   
3.3 Analytical Framework 
Gender analysis entails examination of how institutions create and reproduce, or break down, gender 
inequalities (Kabeer, 1999). Institutions affect inequalities through the rules, norms and practices they 
espouse. This view of inequality is often described as structural inequality, or as described by Dani and 
de Haan (2008, p. 3) “by the condition of attributing an unequal status to a category of people in 
relation to another,” in this case the status of women to men. This is a relationship “reinforced by a 
confluence of unequal relations in roles, functions, decision, rights and opportunities” (2008, p. 3). 
Institutions are human constructs that govern the peoples’ behaviour. As such, within the structural 
confines of these institutions, people also take actions and make choices. The extent to which they have 
freedom of action and choice can be described as agency. Agency and structure interact as structure 
defines the choices available, and the choices and action of individuals and groups can break down, 
reinforce or otherwise alter structural constraints (Kabeer, 2001, p. 26). 
Just as institutions exist at different levels, gender analysis can take place at different levels, such as that 
of the state, the community, or the family (Kabeer, 1999). This study undertakes gender analysis of the 
institution of the group, which is a community construct.  
This study is guided by an analytical framework adapted from the Social Relations Framework (Kabeer 
& Subrahmanian, 1996; Kabeer, 1999), the Framework for Institutional Analysis (Kirsten et al., 2009), 
and the Bargaining Framework (Agarwal, 2000b). The new framework is applied here as a guiding 
structure for the gender analysis undertaken.  
We begin with a definition of effective participation in line with Agarwal’s depiction of interactive 
participation wherein women have voice and influence in group-decision making (2001). As shown in 
Figure 1, the first three elements make up the action arena (the area under investigation): group 
member endowments, group strength, and group governance. We hypothesize that the components of 
the action arena determine the outcome of interest; the gender-inclusivity of group decision-making. 
The broader institutional environment is made up of national policies and other external support or 
services such as NGOs, while the underlying social context is made up of the social and cultural norms 
that drive beliefs and behaviours related to gender and livelihoods. We can think of the groups as 
embedded in the broader 
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Figure 2. Analytical Framework for Assessing Group Gender-Inclusivity 
 
Source: Adapted from the Social Relations Framework (Kabeer 1999; Kabeer and Subrahmanian 1996), the 
Framework for Institutional Analysis (Kirsten et al. 2009) and the Bargaining Framework (Agarwal 2000b). 
In addition, Kabeer’s and Subrahmanian’s classification of development policies in terms of their 
approach to gender issues—gender blind, gender neutral, gender specific, or gender transformative—is a 
useful analytical tool for this analysis (Kabeer & Subrahmanian, 1996; Kabeer, 1999). The rules and 
organizing structures of groups can be seen as group policies, per se, making this classification relevant. 
Policies can either be gender blind, not considering gender in their development, or gender aware. All 
the groups assessed here are gender aware in that the mixed-gender groups by design and deliberately 
have both men and women as members. Gender aware groups can then be categorized as neutral–
largely operating within existing gender division of resources and responsibilities and target delivery of 
services to both men and women–or specific–wherein they still work within existing gender divisions, 
but specifically respond to the practical needs of men and women. Finally, policies can be 
transformative in that they both recognize and seek to transform existing gender relations through the 
redistribution of resources and responsibilities. This last category is the most politically challenging 
category and that addressing the structural aspects of gender relations (Kabeer & Subrahmanian, 1996, 
p. 18). 
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3.4 Economic, Social and Political Context 
The rural western Kenya is characterized by subsistence agriculture and fishing. In 2010 Nyanza 
Province was devolved into six separate counties, although national data is still reported by province 
(KDHS, 2014). This study was undertaken primarily in one of six former Nyanza counties: Homa Bay. 
The locality is predominantly populated by the Luo people, the third largest of Kenya’s 40 different 
tribes. Smith (2006) describes the Luo as holding a paradoxical position in Kenyan society as they are 
both among the poorer populations of the nation, and also have contributed to some of the nation’s 
most notable public figures such as statesmen, academics, and lawyers. However they have a historically 
troubled relationship with the dominant Kenyan tribe, the Kikuyu, dating back to the 1960’s.  
As in many communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, women in this region are disadvantaged by gender 
norms that restrict their control over productive resources such as land (Farnworth, Sundell, Nzioki, 
Shivutse, & Davis, 2013), yet they are tasked with much of the labour involved in cultivation and with 
the majority of domestic responsibilities (Potash, 1985). Furthermore, women in Kenya have much 
lower access to agricultural inputs and training than men (The Nature Conservancy, 2013).  
Luo society is patriarchal and virilocal, and marriage is ideally preceded by payment of bridewealth, 
often in cattle. An ethnographic study on polygyny in Luo communities indicated a much higher rate 
among Luo than the national average, although it has decreased over the last decade (Oguda, 2012). 
Furthermore, they found household bargaining for resources in a polyganous context was detrimental 
and disempowering to the co-wives. The prevalence of early childbearing is highest (19.2 percent of girls 
from age 15-19) in Nyanza among all Kenyan provinces, and domestic and sexual violence is higher 
only in Western Province, the bordering lakeshore province (KDHS, 2014). Paradoxically, educational 
attainment among females in Nyanza is higher than the national average (5.7 years compared to 5.2 
years) (KDHS, 2014).  
Indigenous social groups of many sorts have long been common throughout Africa and in Kenya 
specifically, including funeral associations and labour sharing groups, wherein communities pool risk or 
labour in the absence of state support (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014). Farmers’ organizations such as 
cooperatives were a major part of agricultural policy previously. The Government of Kenya encouraged 
farmer cooperatives through the Cooperative Societies Ordinance in 1945 and the Swynnerton Plan in 
1954, resulting in the substantial growth of these farmer groups (Thompson et al., 2009). However, 
there was a major decline in groups throughout Africa, Kenya included, in the 1980’s leaving farmers 
largely without a collective voice (Thompson et al., 2009).  
In recent years, group-based approaches have once again taken an increasingly central role in the 
policies and programs of governments and development partners in Kenya (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014; 
Thompson et al., 2009). Currently the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development supports 
formally registered self-help groups through: community trainings on group dynamics, financial 
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management, leadership and governance; connecting the registered groups with other service providers; 
and providing financial support between Ksh 20,000 and 50,000 (approximately US $200–$525), 
depending on the proposed activities. In order to receive support, groups must have a valid registration 
certificate, be gender-sensitive (defined as having a majority of female members), hold elections to be 
attended by ministry officials, and be actively undergoing some group activities. This support seems to 
provide an incentive for groups to both register formally and ensure female-majority of members.   
In addition, international organizations and non-governmental organizations increasingly promote 
groups; some examples are the proliferation of group-loan schemes, the rise of the concept of social 
capital—through group participation or social networks—as a new key to development, and the use of 
groups as a mechanism for targeting of non-governmental organization (NGO) services and for 
facilitating market access for smallholders (Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Markelova et al., 2009; Pandolfelli & 
Meinzen-dick, 2007).  
Among the many reasons mentioned for starting groups, one is for better access to NGO and 
agricultural extension services. For instance, many NGO’s only target services to already formalized 
groups and group membership facilitates information sharing regarding services available, such as 
subsidized fertilizer and seeds, from the Ministry of Agriculture.   
The gender-focused policy environment in Kenya, historically subjugating women both in customary 
norms and through skewed legal colonial and post-colonial frameworks, has developed into one highly 
supportive of gender equality over the last decade, on paper if not in practice (Institute of Development 
Studies, 2013; Odhiambo & Oduor, 2010). A number of policies and plans have been put in place to 
address gender issues from the national government level down to the local village level, including 
revisions to the Constitution, Kenya’s Vision 2030, the Kenya National Policy on Gender and 
Development, and the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2010-2020. There have been critiques 
of some of these policies in terms of their effectiveness and degree of implementation, but the 
understanding of gender as a national issue in Kenya is widespread.  
While these new policies indicate a commitment by the Government of Kenya to begin to address the 
challenges of gender inequality, Odhiambo and Oduor (2010) remind us that even with adequate laws 
and policies in place, the structural aspects of gender descrimination may be slow to change without 
deliberate and practical interventions to address specific challenges.  
3.5 Methodology 
This study attempts to identify the institutional characteristics that promote effective participation of 
women in groups. We apply a social constructionist epistemological approach that allows us to define 
participation and supportive institutional characteristics based on the subjective and socially constructed 
views of the respondents. Qualitative data is coded using inductive reasoning to identify themes and 
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patterns in the data that can contribute to the current body of theory on gender and decision-making in 
farmers’ organizations (Pascale, 2011).  
Inductive analysis relies on the identification of patterns in the data, and logical explanations for those 
patterns. A strength of this approach is the emphasis on searching out and explaining “negative cases” 
that do not fit with emerging explanations or theories, and thus helping to avoid weak or abstract 
conclusions (Pascale, 2011, pp. 54–55).  
The analytical framework outlined above guides our analytical process by providing a broad set of 
categories into which data were coded. However, within the broad categories, specific themes and codes 
were empirically driven and not predetermined at the onset of the research. This allows for results that 
are driven by patterns within the data, rather than attempting to fit the data into a specifically defined 
framework that may encourage overlooking of unexpected results. While we hypothesized that all 
aspects of the analytical framework would be salient to effective participation, through the inductive 
analytic process we determined ones were supported by the empirical data.  
 Data collection and sampling  3.5.1
Data was collected through twenty mixed-sex focus group interviews with ten farmers groups and a total 
of 190 interviewees between August 2013 and May 2014 in and around Homa Bay County, a primarily 
Luo tribal area in western Kenya. Interview groups were made up of members of existing farmers 
groups and were purposively sampled according to their emphasis on activities that can be characterized 
as climate change adaptation and their geographic location. For smaller farmers groups all the members 
attended, but for larger ones, group leadership was asked to choose a subset of members to invite in 
order to make interview smaller and more manageable.  
While increasingly applied in the social sciences, the value and validity of focus groups has been 
debated by social scientist. Focus groups are sometimes critiqued as likely to obscure important 
perspectives due to strong individual opinions or group dynamics that reproduce normative discourses 
(Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 1996). However, other researchers consider focus group data to have 
unique strengths that make the weaknesses worth coping with. In particular, focus groups allow for 
discussion and exchange, enable participants to flesh out ideas, and give the researchers insight into 
individual and group dynamics (Robinson, 1999). Along these lines, focus groups are uniquely suited to 
elicit a collective voice or discourse and avoid the imposition of meaning through the research process 
and decontextualization of the data (Wilkinson, 1998, 1999). The weaknesses must simply be 
considered and accounted for during facilitation and analysis (Smithson, 2000).  
In addition, respondents were each asked to rate themselves in terms of their own decision making 
power in the group and their power at home, choosing and stacking a number of pegs between 0 and 5. 
This exercise was meant to encourage them to concretely consider and describe their experience of the 
social dynamics of power (Schiffer, 2007). The numerical data from the exercise were not quantitatively 
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analysed, but the discussions elucidated by the exercise were a very interesting part of the qualitative 
transcripts. Other data collected include three key informant interviews with staff working to support 
some of the groups and detailed field memos from each interview site. Field memos were used to 
provide context and record nonverbal details of interest from the interviews, and were also viewed as the 
first level of analysis. In advance of the data collection, the research team discussed and debated the 
appropriate translation of key terms into Luo.  
 Analysis 3.5.2
Data from focus groups were recorded, transcribed and translated from Luo to English and then coded 
for recurring themes to identify patterns across the interviews.6 The data was analysed using NVivo 10 
qualitative analysis software. Coding was undertaken in multiple phases. The first phase was broad 
coding into the categories laid out in the conceptual framework. Then, within those broad categories, 
data was re-coded into related themes and sub-themes. Finally, coded data was reviewed across 
interviews for patterns and divergences. We then sought empirical and theoretical explanations for the 
patterns. Analysis emphasized two main objectives: determining socially constructed group typologies 
related to their degree of gender inclusiveness, and identifying specific institutional characteristics that 
are associated their degree of gender inclusiveness.  
 Reflexivity, Validity and Ethics 3.5.3
The field team was very well-versed in the context of agricultural development, group engagement, and 
climate change, and were ethnically Luo, giving them an insight and understanding of the culture and 
society. This enhanced the validity of the results, while also providing opportunities for the whole team 
(the foreign principal investigator and the Luo field team) to reflect on our own expectations and biases 
throughout the data collection and analysis process.  
One limitation of the team was that all except the principal investigator were largely unfamiliar with 
qualitative methods. A training on the research approach and the interview guide was undertaken before 
the start of the data collection. The data collection process was closely monitored by the principal 
investigator, leading many of the interviews in partnership with the field team, discussing and reflecting 
on results and interview techniques at the end of each day, and taking time for short refresher trainings. 
In this way, the field team developed a good understanding of the data requirements. Nevertheless, the 
lack of experience in the approach combined with the principal investigator’s inability to speak Luo, 
does create the possibility of data quality issues and misinterpretation of responses, which was carefully 
considered during data analysis.  
                                                     
6
 Some of the interviews were translated to English in the course of the interview. Most of the interviews were 
done completely in Luo. All interviews, even those translated during the course of the interview, were translated 
word-for-word into English to ensure no details were missed.  
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Given limited time and resources, there was a trade-off between assessing additional groups versus 
understanding decision-making dynamics in more depth for a few groups. While useful and insightful 
empirical information was gained from this study, a useful follow-on study would entail deeper longer-
term assessment of group dynamics including going beyond group interviews to undertake participant 
observation in group meetings and individual interviews. 
Preliminary results of the analysis were presented to representatives from all the groups interviewed for 
their own learning and for validation of the results. Key elements of the later stages of analysis, such as 
group typologies, were circulated throughout the field team for validation and discussion. 
This study received approval of the International Food Policy Research Institute’s Institutional Review 
Board as minimal risk research. To ensure the confidentiality of the interview responses, care was taken 
to keep transcriptions in a password protected folder. All duplicate copies of recordings and transcripts 
were deleted from all locations except the primary investigator’s password protected computer. Names 
and village names were not mentioned in the text of the paper.  
3.6 Results: Assessing the Gender-Inclusivity of Group Governance  
The following sections describe the empirical results related to the examination of the action arena—
including group governance, member endowments, and group strength. Results are then synthesised in 
a table for comparison of group cases.  
 Group Governance  3.6.1
As discussed in the above analytical framework section, we consider women’s effective participation in 
groups to be characterized by their voice and influence in group decisions, or, simply put, their 
decision-making power. Empirically, group members universally considered attendance and speaking 
up in the group to be a key driver of a member’s decision-making power, along with other personal 
attributes such as intelligence and respectability. The ability to speak up and be listened to in the group 
is seen as a contributor to a member’s decision-making power, though it does not guarantee a voice in 
group decision-making. The quotes below illustrate the extent to which speaking up is seen as a driver 
of power in the group, such that it can overcome other weaknesses: 
Male Respondent: “I (have a lot of power) due to my nature of contributing always 
to the group and it happens that if someone does not always contribute then he may 
be considered as weak.”  
Female Respondent: “Women who talk well with people or relate well with people 
(are powerful) even if they are not wealthy. That also makes a woman earn more in 
terms of power. Yah they will be respected a lot.”  
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The groups interviewed were all formally registered with the government and thus all had a constitution 
and group by-laws, as per the requirements. The types of rules and governance practices in place were 
relatively consistent across groups, with elected officials and set term lengths, rules about taking on new 
members, participation requirements, and rules related to sharing of earnings and assets. The existence 
of these rules and governance mechanisms, in particular voting, were frequently cited as the reason for 
gender equality in decision-making in the group, in contrast to the home where a man has more 
decision-making power than a woman. However, when probed further, many respondents revealed that 
equality based on the formal rules does not ensure women’s effective participation.  
 
Addressing the Barriers: Typology of Approaches to Gendered-Governance  
Both men and women discussed barriers to women’s effective participation. Barriers mentioned were 
related to the personalities and other personal attributes of women, such as lacking confidence or 
knowledge. Other barriers mentioned were structural such as socially-based tendencies for women to 
keep quiet and not contribute their opinions. Based on these governance approaches of these groups, 
we apply the gendered typology of policies introduced earlier to characterize three different approaches 
to gendered group governance: 
1. gender-neutral groups are those who acknowledge the barriers to women’s effective 
participation but do not specify any governance mechanisms to address them,  
2. gender-specific groups specify governance mechanisms or rules in place that can help to 
overcome the barriers, and  
3. gender-transformative groups have governance mechanisms or rule in place that are explicitly 
meant to overcome women’s barriers to effective participation.   
Both gender-transformative and gender-specific groups showed an understanding of the structural 
nature of barriers to women’s participation. They both acknowledged gender inequalities and challenges 
to participation and pinpointed governance mechanisms to address them. But only the one group 
characterized as gender-transformative took explicit action to alter structures in favour of women—in this 
case, group rules. Rules developed explicitly to prioritized women’s needs and challenges start to 
rebalance the social structures that decrease women’s participation and provide a signal to female 
members that they are a priority and have an explicit right to engage in group decision-making. The four 
groups with gender-specific governance designs interpreted the typical group rules (typical in the sense 
that they were consistent across all groups) in terms of how they can be used to support women’s 
participation and decision-making power, putting the responsibility for equal participation on the group. 
However, importantly, they did not put in place governance mechanisms designed explicitly to promote 
women’s participation.   
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Alternatively, gender-neutral groups emphasized the de jure equality of men and women, and put the 
responsibility on the female members themselves to assert their rights and overcome their personal 
weaknesses and structural barriers. These groups considered the possibility of equality as sufficient. 
They put the responsibility for effective participation on the women themselves rather than on the 
group.  
Demonstrating the distinct nature of gender-neutral group governance, the following quote from a 
female respondent illustrates her acceptance of the democratic rules as ensuring that intra-group 
bargaining is fair and equal: “We are in this group and we are supposed to give our ideas. So in the 
group we cannot say that so and so has more power than the other. Or so and so has less power than 
the other. Because here everyone has to give his/her ideas, and after giving ideas is when we come to [a] 
conclusion.” Along with this blanket acceptance of the formal rules, there was a systematic resistance to 
discuss any deviations from the formal rules among women in gender-neutral groups. 
And when asked what constrains women from participating in group decision-making, the following 
quotes from gender-neutral group members demonstrates tendency to put the onus on  women to 
overcome their limiting personal characteristics:  
Male Respondent:  “Traditionally women were not allowed to contribute their ideas 
publicly and therefore this makes them until now not to be brave enough to air their 
ideas in an open manner.” 
Female respondent: “Women may not contribute in the group because they are not 
confident. Talking less makes women feel that they have less power in the group.” 
In the gender-specific groups, it was the men who noted the mechanisms or rules with potential for 
improving women’s participation. Only in one case did both women and men do so. In all other cases 
women described the personal attributes that lead to lower participation of women members but did not 
focus on the mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of women’s participation. Quotes from both 
gender-specific and gender-transformative groups illustrate these points:  
Male respondent from gender-specific group: "(Strengthened) democracy will help 
make women feel respected and valued in the group.”  
Female respondent in transformative group: “Being a group founded and run by 
women, men in this case don’t underrate our opinions since we own the group first 
hand.” 
Rules and Governance Mechanisms  
The rules and governance mechanisms were largely consistent across the groups, but the interpretation 
and enforcement differed greatly. All groups voted on leadership either annually or every two years and 
63 
 
 
all included women in leadership roles. Voting was described by all groups as the key mechanisms for 
resolving conflict or disagreement. Rules for including new members ranged from simply having to 
agree to the group rules, to undergoing a vetting processing and having to prove adequate assets to 
“keep up” with group activities. All groups had attendance requirements: commonly, missing three 
meetings would constitute dismissal from the group and late arrivals would be charged a small fine, but 
the extent of enforcement was varied. For instance, one group mentioned that they had not been 
charging fines to latecomers in spite of having such a rule.  
In addition to variation of extent of enforcement, interpretation of the rules also varied, and had 
implications for gender-inclusivity. For instance, a rule interpreted by gender-neutral groups as 
promoting “equality of group members”—with no emphasis on gender—could be interpreted by a 
gender-specific group as promoting women’s effective participation. While the formal rule was the same 
in both situations, its interpretation and application was an indication of group responsibility for gender 
equality.  
As discussed above, only the transformative group had rules in place explicitly designed for gender 
inclusivity. For instance, it instituted a rule that only women could hold leadership positions. These 
positive discrimination mechanisms promote a sense of ownership and legitimacy in female members.  
Conflict and Resolution  
Conflict and disagreement among group members tended to be viewed as negative, such that ‘working 
together’ surpasses democratic participation as a normative priority. Some respondents even described 
backlash against them for disagreeing with the majority or pushing for governance reforms, as 
demonstrated in the following quotes: 
Male respondent: “There was a time I demanded from the office bearers that they 
give us a financial report but they told me that they do not want people who are 
suspicious.”  
Male respondent: “I am the one who opposed the idea of registering the group into 
cooperative society. From then colleagues don’t trust me with some issues in the 
group.”  
Women were particularly uncomfortable with the idea that group dynamics may involve conflict or 
disagreement. Men tended to describe conflict in more concrete terms, discussing a specific instance 
where group members disagreed and how it was dealt with. Women were less likely to admit that the 
group experienced any conflicts or to describe those conflicts in detail. In particular, women in the 
gender-neutral groups did not provide examples of specific conflicts, rather stating that conflicts did not 
happen or that differences in opinion were insignificant as the “good governance” mechanisms ensured 
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that no conflict happened. The following quote exemplifies the difference in women’s and men’s views 
of conflict in gender-neutral groups when asked for an example of disagreement: 
Female respondent from gender-neutral group: “Most of the time we agree on the 
issues. Such a thing [disagreement] has not happened here.”   
Male respondent from same gender-neutral group: “We have disagreed on our 
opinions; the recent one was when we were advised by the Ministry of Social 
Services to register savings and loaning project as cooperative society. When we 
came back and shared that idea with members some disagreed and opposed and 
instead colluded and left the group, a number of members left the group reason 
being that they thought we wanted means to eat their shares.  We had to invite 
social services officials to come and clarify the idea, they came and talked to the 
members and they were able to see light in it the idea, those who opposed the idea 
felt a shamed and apologized. They came back and re-joined the group though this 
delayed the registration process. It is this disagreement that made the group officials 
to call the social services officials to intervene. 
In one instance the women of a gender-neutral group clearly recounted the details of a conflict. This 
group had experienced a crisis in recent years, falling from more than seventy members to just over 
twenty and coming close to dissolving. This crisis and the process by which the group dealt with it was 
clear in women’s minds and they recounted the details. We interpret this pattern as an indication that 
women are typically less experienced with political processes and thus have a tendency view rules and 
governance concepts (such as fairness and equality) at face value. However, the experience of a major 
conflict allowed the women of one group to reflect critically on governance challenges.  
Female members of groups that are cognizant of structural constraints to women’s participation—gender-
specific and gender-transformative groups—were better able to critically assess group governance, 
perhaps due to the presence of a critical dialogue present in the group.  
Allocation of Group Tasks and Roles 
Group activities were varied though all had some agriculture-related activities, and some had expanded 
into poultry-keeping. Many practiced aspects of conservation agriculture (typically combined with some 
chemical fertilizer use) as a means of coping with increasingly inconsistent rain and drought patterns7. It 
was also described by some widows as a means of cultivating their land without a man’s labour because 
there is no need to plough and less need for weeding. Most groups also had a formalized savings and 
loan program, wherein members contributed funds (through paying membership dues or, often, 
                                                     
7 While droughts and other issues of climate variability were mentioned by interviewees, it was not an explicit focus 
of this research. Another study undertaken in Kenya by Roncoli et al. (2010) delves more deeply into current 
gendered challenges and perceptions of climate change, the results of which were consistent with our results.  
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through buying shares in the group) into a group pot that could then be loaned out to group members. 
Some groups also had off-farm livelihoods activities, either as part of group activities—such as chair 
rental or catering services—or as individual small-businesses—such as kiosks—started with funds from 
group savings and loans programs.  
Issues related to the allocation of tasks include whether activities maintained traditional gender 
assignments and how leadership roles are assigned. A few groups described allocating group activities 
according to traditional gendered divisions of labour, while others explicitly stated that they do not 
consider gender when allocating tasks and roles. There was no clear pattern in terms of group typology 
and the extent to which group members perceived that tasks were determined by gender, but assessing 
the same issue through participant observation could uncover some patters that we have not.  
The presence of female leadership did not seem to have any implications for the effective inclusion of 
women. All the groups interviewed had women in leadership roles, but those women were not 
necessarily the most outspoken, empowered, or gender-aware of the groups. In fact, similar to previous 
studies (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2014), one group explained that men prefer to have women as treasurers 
because they are less likely to “run off with the money,” thus using women’s lack of mobility and 
perceived purity as rationale for putting them in a leadership role. Also, when women were asked to 
assess their own group decision-making power, women in leadership positions did not systematically 
give themselves higher power scores. The only mechanism through which female leadership seemed to 
impact the gender-progressive governance effectively was in the case of the gender-transformative group 
wherein only women were allowed to hold leadership positions.  
Group Formation 
Most commonly, people were motivated to form groups in order to take advantage of services and 
support targeted to groups and to generally cope with challenges of poverty and food insecurity. They 
described being prompted by NGO representatives to form groups (or formalize pre-existing groups) in 
order to take advantage of their services. In the case of CARITAS—a common supporter of groups in 
this area and supporter of many of the groups in this study—formal registration of the group with the 
government was a prerequisite of receiving CARITAS agricultural group support services. 
Two groups were formed by religious leaders in religiously homogenous communities to promote 
development therein. Both of the religiously motivated groups had a more top-down governance 
structure, tending to be leader-focused.  
Other groups started as simple saving groups for women, or merry-go-rounds, wherein women 
contribute small amounts of money on a monthly basis and each month one member benefits from a 
pay-out. The two groups that started this way describe using the funds to purchase household items like 
cups and plates or to pay for school fees. These groups eventually expanded into other activities like 
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more formalized village savings and loan programs, agricultural activities, or other livelihoods activities. 
When activities began expanding men took notice of the group and requested membership. In both 
cases the expansion of activities was prompted by an external organization taking notice of the group 
and providing support to expand into other activities.  
The last two groups, the transformative group and in one case a gender-specific group, were founded to 
promote development for the members and to provide charity to the less fortunate in their 
communities. They noted being motivated to uplift women and support orphans or poorer children in 
the community. They were distinctly focused on both developing their own members as well as 
contributing to the broader development of the community.  
The groups with a developmental impetus for formation were gender-transformative and gender-
specific, both demonstrating relatively high awareness of gendered challenges to inclusion and 
governance solutions. The groups that were externally motivated—those motivated primarily by the 
promise of NGO support or due to a religious leaders’ prompting—were gender-neutral, groups that did 
not take responsibility for women inclusion, with two exceptions. The exceptions are groups that had 
had the benefit of in-depth trainings on gender and governance from Action Aid. Men and women in 
both of these groups referred to the trainings as useful for improving their understanding of gender 
issues and ability to govern the groups inclusively.  
Male respondent from gender-specific group: “This [women’s exclusion] may only 
happen if the leadership is not always democratic and therefore does not feel free to 
talk during meetings. But right now through [governance trainings we] have become 
stronger.” 
 Group Strength  3.6.2
We hypothesized that the strength of the groups, defined as the level of assets controlled by the groups 
and the benefits received from being a part of the group such as through NGO support, might improve 
the degree to which members are invested in the group and thus strengthen their governance. We did 
find that more gender-progressive groups tended to report a high level of assets and savings. When 
probed, all groups reported some NGO support, so we were not able to ascertain any pattern in this 
area. Furthermore, our data does not clarify the causal relationship, and in fact the results suggest that 
individuals in groups that have high levels of assets may have started out with relatively higher levels of 
assets. 
 Group-member Endowments  3.6.3
The relevant group member endowments that arose are largely driven by gendered social norms. For 
instance women’s overall confidence and ability to be articulate was raised a number of times as a 
socially-driven constraint to power and decision-making in groups and elsewhere. Knowledge and 
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education were also raised as endowments that women had less access to but that were potential drivers 
of overcoming restricting gender norms. The central empirical result on endowments was the extent to 
which group members viewed groups as a mechanism to ensure effective participation in spite of a lack 
of endowments.  
Another important group-member endowment discussed above is the extent of political experience of 
the members. And the degree to which they have been sensitized to gendered challenges and strategies 
for addressing them through governance mechanisms. More developed capacity in both of these areas 
appears to be important for group members’ interpretation of the rules and their responsibilities in 
terms of equity in decision-making, and thus for promoting women’s effective participation.  
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3.7 Discussion  
Considering the drawbacks to women-only groups, the effectiveness of mixed-sex groups in supporting 
women’s empowerment and development deserves continued examination. However, for such groups 
to address the needs and priorities of women, they must promote gender inclusivity. As such, we 
examine the gender-inclusive governance of mixed-sex group in the African context where social 
restrictions for women tend to be less binding than in the South Asia context, where previous empirical 
work found social norms to be a major constraint to women's basic participation in mixed-sex groups.  
Through a series of sex-disaggregated focus group discussions with members of mixed-sex self-help 
groups in rural western Kenya, we assess the socially-constructed views of group governance and 
decision-making. As expected, and in contrast to the South Asia context, women are not restricted from 
basic participation, but the effectiveness of their participation is limited by social norms. As such, we are 
able to build on the work of Agarwal (2001) to investigate most effective governance mechanisms for 
promoting women's effective participation, in a context where social norms are somewhat less restrictive. 
Consistent with past literature (Agarwal, 2000b), group members universally considered attendance and 
speaking up in the group to be a key driver a member’s decision-making power, along with personal 
attributes such as intelligence and respectability. Therefore, attendance and speaking up were not seen 
as sufficient to ensure decision-making power if one is not perceived by group members as someone 
worth listening to. 
Most groups perceived the existence of democratic rules and governance structures as adequate group 
action for ensuring equality in decision-making in their groups. Women’s shyness or unfamiliarity with 
speaking in public was often blamed as the main barrier to their effective participation and input into 
group decisions. This conceptualization emphasized personal attributes as the core constraint to 
participation, putting the onus on women members to claim their de jure equality within the groups. 
We can relate this to Kabeer’s discussion on structure and agency that points to false choices wherein 
women are expected to take actions as though they are equal but the given structure makes such actions 
untenable for them (Kabeer, 2001, p. 26). However, a few groups, while acknowledging the constraints 
in agency faced by women, considered the group to be responsible for explicitly facilitating women’s 
participation through group rules and governance structures. Thus they focused on the structural aspects 
of gendered power inequalities and took responsibility for mitigating them.  
Contrasting these different group approaches, we develop a typology based on their approach to gender-
inclusive governance wherein: 1) groups that assume de jure equality and put responsibility on women 
to claim their rights are described as gender-neutral; 2) groups that emphasize the structural barriers to 
women’s decision-making power and consider the effectiveness of standard group rules and governance 
structures to help address them are described as gender-specific; and 3) groups that not only emphasize 
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structural barriers but develop specific governance mechanisms favouring and empowering women are 
described as gender-transformative.  
A few factors can be viewed as driving group approaches to governance and the extent to which the 
group takes responsibility for pro-gender outcomes. First, the original reason that the group was formed 
is a determinant of group governance approaches. Those that had explicit community-development and 
gender equality objectives at formation also took responsibility for women’s effective participation 
through rules and governance mechanisms. This is in line with Agarwal's (2001) assertion that early 
(from formation) support of gender-inclusivity ensures that male interests do not become entrenched in 
group governance. There are some exceptions wherein groups had pro-gender governance in spite of 
no emphasis on equality and development at their formation, but in these cases groups underwent 
extensive gender and governance trainings.  
In addition, women's own experience with and understanding of political processes and power dynamics 
is a potential driver of pro-gender group governance structures. Female group members in gender 
neutral groups did not critically assess intra-group power dynamics and tended to take group rules 
supporting fairness and equality at face value, overlooking intra-group power dynamics and limitations 
to women’s de facto decision-making power. Women in gender-neutral groups tended to repeat 
idealized descriptions of democracy while men in all groups provided examples of disagreements or 
conflicts and how the groups were able to resolve them. However, women in a gender-neutral group 
whose group had recently undergone and recovered from a major group-governance crisis also 
discussed and critiqued power dynamics and governance. This implies that engagement in political 
processes such as community and group governance processes, and governance trainings, including role 
playing and other mechanisms that enable women to gain experience in political processes, will support 
women’s ability to critically assess the effectiveness of their own participation and their resultant 
decision-making power.  
While lack of experience in political processes and exposure to critical gender dialogues may be part of 
the explanation for women’s hesitance to take a critical view of the governance structures and their own 
inclusivity, the idealized view of harmonious group functioning likely makes it even harder. Voicing 
problems is commonly seen as disturbing group harmony. In some cases disagreements on group’s 
activities were characterized as the fault of the protestor, as though one should not have different 
opinions from the collective. We can imagine that the same characterization could be applied to women 
who criticize the governance structures in place if it is not the common viewpoint.  
In order to apply these results more broadly, extract specific institutional lessons. Reflecting on the 
analytical framework presented above, we assessed group governance characteristics, groups strength 
and group member endowments. All three domains are found to be relevant to women’s effective 
decision-making. While we do not measure effective decision-making objectively, we analyse women 
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and men’s perceptions of gendered decision-making processes in their groups interpretively. First, find 
that group sense of responsibility for women’s inclusion is critical, and gender-trainings can promote this 
type of pro-gender governance. Secondly, rules and governance structures explicitly favouring women 
increase their feeling of legitimacy. Thus the rules themselves address structural challenges while the 
spirit of the rules enhance women’s agency, as reflected in other empirical studies (Baden, 2013). 
Thirdly, a lack of political experience could hinder women’s ability to critically assess group governance 
and thus decrease their ability to engage in some aspects of governance or advocate for their own voices 
to be heard. This is a result also supported by previous empirical studies (Baden, 2013; Sultana & 
Thompson, 2008). Incorporating role-playing of conflict situations and governance challenges into 
trainings may begin to address this.  
We find that more important than the specific governance structures in place is the group’s 
interpretation of its role in ensuring gender-inclusive governance. Group member endowments impact 
the group’s interpretation in terms of their understanding of gender issues and political processes. More 
developed capacity in both of these areas appears to be important for group members’ interpretation of 
the rules and their responsibilities in terms of equity in decision-making, and thus for promoting 
women’s effective participation.  
Finally, we confirm that variations in the restrictiveness of social norms across communities, countries, 
and regions greatly impacts the way in which women can participate in mixed-sex groups. However, 
similar to other empirical examples (Valdivia & Gilles, 2001), groups serve as a distinct parallel 
institution to that of the home, governed by constitutions and by-laws, that do enable them to push the 
boundaries of community gender norms, although both are embedded in the same community.  
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Pakistan hosts the world’s largest irrigation system, but it is fraught with issues of 
inequity and inefficiency.  Several recent processes of institutional reform are expected 
to have significant impacts on the agriculture and irrigation sector, namely the process 
of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) and the 18th Amendment to the Pakistan 
Constitution, which among other things devolved a number of decision processes from 
the federal to provincial governments.  We analyse the results of a Net-Map exercise 
conducted with water sector experts at the federal and provincial (Punjab) scales.  We 
find some indicators in the data suggesting potential for successful shifts under the 18th 
Amendment.  However, we find weaker perceptions of the IMT role in water 
governance than would be expected given its 15-year (or longer) history, providing 
further evidence that something new is necessary to help move the paradigm shift away 
from traditional modes of governance towards the decentralized IMT model. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Boasting nearly 60,000km of distribution canals, Pakistan hosts the world’s largest continuous irrigation 
system (Khan, 2009).  The sheer scale of this system seems to almost doom the prospect of any 
centralized approach to its governance to address problems of inefficiency and inequity – which in 
practice are widely reported (e.g., Kamal 2009, Raza et al. 2009, Ul Hassan 2009).  However, the 
appetite of this system, consuming 97% of Pakistan’s water resources (Kamal, 2009), makes these issues 
of equity and efficiency particularly critical from a planning perspective, particularly in light of the 
looming uncertainties of climate change.  Expectations for the climate future of the Indus range from 
strong deglaciation (e.g., Briscoe and Qamar 2005, Warren et al. 2010) to water-resource neutrality 
(e.g., Archer et al. 2010) to possible snowpack accumulation (e.g., Tahir et al. 2011).  Facing such broad 
uncertainty in the future of water resource availability, improving the capacity of the irrigated agricultural 
system to make efficient, equitable use of the resources that it has, and adapt to changes in availability, is 
critically important.  There is a significant body of literature in the fields of resilience and sustainability 
science that suggest decentralized approaches to resource governance as being a critical ingredient in 
building such capacity (e.g., Brannstrom, Clarke, & Newport, 2004; Smit & Wandel, 2006). 
There are currently (at least) two processes of change within water and agriculture management in 
Pakistan that are devolving decision-making capacity to lower, more local scales.  The first of these, 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), has roots as far back as the late 1970s in World-Bank-
sponsored on-farm water management projects (World Bank, 1981); with efforts to reform water use at 
the national scale beginning in the mid-1990s.  IMT moves decision-making authority from centralized 
provincial irrigation departments (PIDs) to a tiered management structure with organs for participatory 
irrigation management (PIM) formed at the scale of the local watercourse, the distributary, and the 
broader canal command.  The second, more recent process follows from the 18th Amendment to the 
Constitution of Pakistan (in 2010) and devolves a number of hitherto federally or jointly (federally and 
provincially) governed issues to exclusive provincial domain. 
Both of these reforms are acts in progress, and it remains to be seen how fully the process and spirit of 
decentralized governance will be embraced by Pakistan’s irrigation and agricultural sectors.  In this 
study, we examine data provided by a set of focus group interviews using the Net-Map method (Schiffer 
& Waale, 2008) undertaken in Pakistan in December of 2011 with local experts in water and agriculture 
issues, to look for signals of the extent to which the goals of these reform processes have taken hold 
among experts and professionals connected with the agriculture and water sectors. 
4.2 Background  
 Water Governance and Processes of Reform 4.2.1
Water is allocated among Indian and Pakistani riparian states by the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) (India 
& Pakistan, 1960), and inter-provincially via the 1991 Water Accord (WA) (Briscoe & Qamar, 2005; 
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Pakistan, 1991).  These agreements are not without current criticism.  While the IWT allocates most of 
the Indus Basin water resources to Pakistan, current dam development by India (allowed within the 
IWT) is raising concerns within Pakistan, as such development would give India the capability to disrupt 
discharge to Pakistan during critical points of the growing season; the development has currently been 
halted and is under arbitration (PCA, 2011).  Under the WA, the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) 
coordinates the allocation of about 114 MAF (million acre feet, the measure most commonly used in 
the Pakistan irrigation discourse; 1 MAF ≅ 1.2 billion m3) of water among the 4 riparian provinces with 
the bulk allocated to Punjab (56 MAF) and Sindh (49 MAF), and the remaining water (a little under 10 
MAF) allocated among Balochistan and what is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK); 
proportions are established in the WA for allocation of surplus supply in years it is available (Pakistan, 
1991).  However, the inter-annual variability of the Indus system, coupled with a lack of storage and 
considerable leakage, mean that the annual supply is often much lower than 114 MAF (Kamal, 2009); 
in practice, Punjab and Sindh end up sharing these shortages according to ‘historic use’, while 
Balochistan and KPK are exempted (IUCN, 2010).  The downstream riparian province of Sindh suffers 
from this shortfall, with ‘environmental flow’ to the delta (negotiated to be about 10 MAF) typically not 
being maintained (Kamal, 2009); perhaps ironically, Sindh as the lower riparian ends up receiving the 
larger share of floodwaters (a water surplus) under ‘historic use’ allocation, and ends up a victim under 
both scenarios (IUCN, 2010).  This power imbalance raises concerns regarding upstream hydropower 
and storage development that mirror at the provincial scale the above-cited concerns of Pakistan with 
India and the IWT.    
Distribution of water resources within provinces – largely for use in irrigated agriculture – is an 
area of active reform.  Pakistan does not have a comprehensive national water policy in place; 
the current draft (Pakistan, 2006) is more a “list of actions” without a “comprehensive 
approach” (Kamal, 2009).  However, driven by support from the World Bank and other 
donors8, the last two decades have seen the advancement of Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT) efforts to devolve many of the responsibilities held by provincial irrigation departments 
to local users groups, punctuated most clearly by the 1997 Provincial Irrigation Authority Act 
(PIAA) (Khan, 2009) and a World Bank-funded National Drainage Program (NDP) (Briscoe 
& Qamar, 2005). Under the reformed structure, responsibility falls to Provincial Irrigation and 
Drainage Authorities (PIDA) to manage delivery to canal commands (43, of which 24 are in 
Punjab); Area Water Boards (AWB) to manage delivery within commands to distributaries; 
Farmer Organizations (FO) to manage delivery within distributaries/minors to watercourses; 
Water User Associations (WUA) – locally referred to as Khal Panchayat (KP) – to manage 
delivery within watercourses (Asrar-Ulhaq, 2010).  The rules for distribution within the KP are 
                                                     
8 In this paper, the term donors broadly refers to private funders, unilateral funders, multilateral development 
banks and international financial institutions. While all these institutions do not speak with one voice, they were 
often aggregated in discussions and interviews by sources for this paper.  
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negotiated variants of the traditional warabandi or ‘fixed turn’ system, under which each user is 
entitled to the entire flow of the watercourse for a fixed turn in a rotation, with the duration 
proportional to the area under irrigation (and in practice, the user’s capacity to bargain and 
negotiate) (Bandaragoda, 1998). 
 Progress of IMT Reform 4.2.2
Pilot AWBs were established in each of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and KPK in the years 
following the PIAA and the start of the NDP.  At present, reform has expanded to 5 AWBs (of 
24 canal commands) in Punjab (PIDA, 2012) and 3 (of 14 canal commands) in Sindh (Memon, 
2006; SIDA, 2012); the irrigation departments of NWFP and Baluchistan do not include 
reference to AWBs or the IMT reform on their websites (BID, 2012; KPID, 2012), though 
performance of the pilot AWB in the Upper Swat Canal in NWFP under the Frontier 
Irrigation and Drainage Authority (FIDA) has been reported (Latif & Tariq, 2009).  Flow 
gauging is reported at the distributary level in NWFP (Latif & Tariq, 2009) and Punjab (Asrar-
Ulhaq, 2010; World Bank, 2010), with up-to-date flow data posted to the PIDA website in 
Punjab (PIDA, 2012).  It is beyond the scope of this introduction to examine in detail the 
factors explaining the slow advance of the reform, but one factor worth highlighting is that the 
PIDs in each province stand to lose much of their authority over irrigation in the reform, yet (in 
the case of Punjab) the PID has held responsibility for advancing it (Briscoe & Qamar, 2005). 
Within the expansion that has occurred, there have been issues with the reform and the 
performance of the new AWB and FO institutions has been mixed.  Various authors have 
observed that the reformed system does not recover the costs of operation and maintenance, 
leaving the organizations far from self-sufficiency (Ghumman, Khan, Hashmi, Kamal, & Khan, 
2011; Memon, 2006).  This results from problems at multiple points in process, starting with a 
price that is yet too low (Kamal, 2009; Khan, 2009).  Problems also arise in the ability of FOs to 
collect water fees or abiana from users (Asrar-Ulhaq, 2010); in many cases, FOs are inheriting a 
broken system where unreliable flow leads to a low willingness to pay (World Bank, 2010), 
where FOs may not have capacity to maintain adequate accounts or records (Asrar-Ulhaq, 
2010), and where pre-existing power relationships among farmers may limit the authority 
imposed by the FO structure (Ul Hassan, 2011).  Additionally, some FOs reported delays 
receiving their share of revenues back from irrigation departments, further limiting their 
capacity (Ul Hassan, 2011).  Ul Hassan (2009, 2011) attributes these poor performance aspects 
to a lack of downward accountability of the PIDAs and AWBs to their constituents, and to a 
focus in the reform on organizational design rather than the necessary incentives or instruments 
to drive reform.  The historical lack of enthusiasm for reform has been pervasive across actors 
– from the Irrigation Departments, who feared loss of authority under the restructuring to 
PIDAs; from large land-holders, who feared loss of the excess, unauthorized uses of water they 
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had accessed under the old system; and from smallholders as well, who feared increases in 
price and exploitation at the hands of more powerful elite farmers (Ul Hassan, 2009).  It is 
worth noting, however, that where NGOs (as opposed to the ID/PIDA staff) were deployed to 
mobilize and build capacity for the reform (as was the case for Sindh), efforts have been much 
more successful (Ul Hassan, 2011).  Among the accomplishments of the Sindh reform are a 
large number of small- and mid-size farmers represented among the Chairmen of FOs, and 
deliberate efforts to mainstream women’s participation into management, though there are yet 
no women represented among Chairmen (Memon, 2006). 
Despite the institutional, political, and operational challenges to IMT, efforts so far have 
manifested in reported improvements to water supply and crop production.  The reliability of 
irrigation supply in NWFP has improved, and cropping intensity (as well as crop yield) have 
increased, though it is noted that the current water supply may lead to waterlogging (Latif & 
Tariq, 2009).  Similarly, yields are improved in Punjab (Raza, Ashfaq, Hassan, & Hussain, 
2008; Raza et al., 2009), with the note that differences in yield from head- to tail-enders of 
canals yet remain.  IMT implementation is not a controlled experiment, of course, and some 
care must be taken in considering the attribution in these reports of water outcomes to the 
reform process. 
The 18th Constitutional Amendment and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan was passed in April 2010 and, among 
other elements, made a number of significant changes to the scale at which agricultural issues 
were governed.   One key change was the removal of the Concurrent Legislative List – a 
collection of issues for which there existed joint provincial and federal legislation, with federal 
legislation taking precedence in cases of overlap – with many issues shifting to exclusive 
provincial or federal domain, and others moving to the domain of the Council of Common 
Interests (CCI), which governs subjects for which significant inter-provincial coordination is 
necessary (Shah, 2012).  Most significantly, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MINFA) was 
dismantled, ceasing to exist by July 2011.  While provincial agricultural departments had 
initially expected to absorb all of the functions previously performed by the ministry, the strong 
position of MINFA was to be restructured rather than completely dismantled (National 
Management College, 2012).  In the final result, about a third of MINFA’s functions were 
devolved to provincial control, about a third were redistributed to various other ministries, 
while the remaining third were held by the newly formed Ministry of Food Security and 
Research, established in October 2011.  This process is still in progress, has commenced very 
recently, and there yet remain great uncertainties in funding and responsibilities.  At the same 
time, it is a process sure to be of relevance to experts connected with water and agriculture in 
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Pakistan, and the timing of the Net-Map exercise provided a unique opportunity to capture 
current understanding and perceptions of legislative authority in Pakistan in the months 
following the initial implementation of this major reform effort. 
4.3 Net-Map Exercise 
Net-Map is a participatory interview technique that combines social network analysis (SNA), 
stakeholder mapping, and power mapping (Schiffer & Hauck, 2010).  Interviewees create 
physical maps, enabling them to clarify their own view of a situation, promote consensus when 
views differ, foster discussion, and develop strategic approaches to their networking activities. 
The process also helps outsiders understand and monitor complex multi-stakeholder situations.  
Social network data is distinctively suited to move beyond the formal aspects of a network to 
examine the informal interactions and relationships between actors of interest (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994).  Net-Map’s visual and participatory characteristics are innovations on typical SNA 
data collection that support intercultural understanding and discussion of sensitive topics 
(Schiffer and Hauck, 2010). Furthermore, when formal interactions are mapped Net-Map 
allows a unique view into the perceptions and behaviours in practice, which often differ from 
the official design or procedure. For instance, when used to understand ex-post the influences 
that led to changes to fertilizer policy in Nigeria the Net-Map interviews illuminated an 
interruption to the formal process by which policies are supposed to be funded (Aberman et 
al., 2010). In a similar exercise in Malawi, some interviewees indicated in their maps, with 
unexpected links and high levels of power, perceptions of clientelism and nepotism that they 
were not willing to discuss verbally (Aberman et al., 2012).  In the current study, we apply Net-
Map to examine how perceptions of reform processes affecting agricultural water management 
in Pakistan differ from official plans and intended outcomes. 
To understand how actors interact with each other in a given process or policy field, social 
network analysis (SNA) approaches are especially suitable, as they allow for a sophisticated 
representation of system components and interactions, putting the actions of individuals and 
organizations into a larger context. SNA explains the achievements of actors and the 
developments within groups of actors by looking at the structure of the linkages between these 
actors (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Thus, while traditional social science survey approaches 
collect data about attributes of some members of the observed population, network analysis 
data pertains to the interaction, linkages, and flows between each of the actors in a population.  
The degree to which various actors in the network can influence or control other actors and 
outcomes is critical to understanding the policy context. Max Weber wrote that “power is the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own 
will despite resistance” (1922, p. 53). While social network analysts consider actor power to 
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derive from an actor’s position in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994), Net-Map 
considers that this may only be a partial reflection of an actor’s power. In line with Weber’s 
definition, Net-Map considers power to be socially constructed and thus relies on interviewees 
to determine socially-relevant indicators, meaning, and sources of power (Schiffer 2007). 
Furthermore, in intercultural research settings, often the terminology applied must be palatable 
in the context; for instance, in an early application of Net-Map in Ghana, the authors found the 
term power to denote negative concepts such as corruption, whereas influence was tended to be 
used interchangeably (despite their formal meanings) but without the negative connotation 
(Schiffer & Waale, 2008).  
The Net-Map process typically involves the following three steps9: 
1) Actor Generation: who is involved in an issue? 
2) How do these actors interact? In what ways are they linked, related to the specific 
issue? 
3) How powerful is each of these actors related to this issue? 
In the exercises analysed in the current study, two separate Net-Map exercises were undertaken 
— one at the national level and one in the province of Punjab. While the processes were the 
same in the two locations, the focus and scale differed; the national interview focused on the 
influence over policy at the national level and the Punjab interview discussed influence over 
water policy in Punjab. Given Punjab’s key role in agriculture in Pakistan, national level 
decisions are particularly pertinent to and dependent on Punjab. In the context of these 
exercises, the Net-Map questions became: 
 
Overall Question: Who influences agricultural water management policy (at the national 
level/in Punjab)? 
Links: Who has formal oversight over whom? Who provides funding to whom? Who 
provides technical information to whom? Who informally influences whom? 
Power: How powerful is each actor over agricultural water management policy (at the 
national level/in Punjab)? 
The answers to these questions were arrived at by group consensus, facilitating discussion 
among the interviewees when there was disagreement. The actors’ names were written on small 
note cards and spread across a large piece of paper. Upon nominating an actor to be included, 
respondents explained why that actor was important to add. Next, links or flows were drawn 
between the actors, according to the group’s knowledge and perceptions. The specific links 
                                                     
9 A typical Net-Map usually includes a fourth step that examines the primary goals or priorities of each actor. This 
step was dropped in the exercises used for this study due to the challenges of pinpointing and the political 
sensitivity of specifying the competing goals.  
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drawn were: formal oversight depicting formal lines of authority, usually within the government; 
funding depicting allocation of funds, grants, or loans; technical information depicting provision 
of information related to technical aspects of agricultural water management; and informal 
influence10 depicting pressure for particular policy outcomes through informal mechanisms, 
regardless of degree of effectiveness. Then power scores were attributed to each actor card, with 
0 signifying that an actor has no power and 5 signifying the highest degree of power in the 
Punjab exercise and with 0 signifying no power and 3 signifying the highest power in the 
national exercise.  
The result of these two exercises is visual depictions of the stakeholder network for agricultural 
water management in Pakistan from two perspectives, and notes from the in-depth discussions 
during the interview process. The network data was entered into a social network analysis 
program, VisuaLyzer11, a program that forms network data into a graphic depiction of the actors 
as nodes and the links between them and allows for a variety of network analysis functions, 
allowing us to better assess the network structures and characteristics. The power scores 
attributed by the respondents were inputted as well, so that the nodes (the representations of 
each stakeholder in the network) can be sized according to perceived influence over shaping 
agricultural water management policies and decisions. The visual depictions of the network, 
and the key lessons learned from the networks, and in particular from the discussions with 
respondents, are described in the next section. In addition to discussing the quantitative results 
(social network data and influence scores) and qualitative results (discussion with experts), we 
also attempt to put the results in perspective, analysing the reasons for conflicting opinions or 
inconsistent data. 
 
4.4 Net-Map Results 
 National Net-Map results 4.4.1
The national-level Net-Map exercise yielded linkages among actors at both the national and provincial 
level and perceived influence scores for each of the actors considered relevant. Figure 1 shows the 
computerized version of the network drawn in the national Net-Map exercise, including all four types of 
links that were asked about and with the actors (or nodes) sized according to the power score, ranging 
from 0 to 3). Networks for technical information, funding, and formal oversight combined with informal 
influence are shown separately in Figure 2. The resultant network includes 48 actors (Annex 1) and 130 
individual links (Annex 2). It has a very high level of centralization, meaning that a few actors are highly 
                                                     
10 While this link was largely used to indicate instances of actors pressuring others to take actions to their favor 
(excluding instances wherein formal authority was the means, and sometimes described as nepotism or 
clientelism), the interviewees appeared to be more comfortable describing this as influence.  
11 VisuaLyzer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 
2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/53135 
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linked while most actors have few links. A core-periphery analysis shows that the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Planning & Development (MoP&D) and the Provincial Government make up the core 
of the network and all other actors are seen as the periphery.  Sixteen of the actors are a part of the 
federal government and 9 are in the provincial government, making the majority of actors governmental. 
While the emphasis of the interview was to examine water management policy nationally, because 
Punjab plays a large role in water policy nationally, provincial actors also show up in the national 
network and, as noted above, play a central role in the network. In fact, when respondents were asked 
to rate the power of the actors, the Provincial Government and PID were rated as equal in power to the 
key federal government actors: the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the MoP&D 
and the Ministry of Finance.  
Figure 3. National multiplex network 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Net-Map data, figures created in XLNode. 
Note: Links indicating formal authority are shown by black solid lines, informal influence by grey dashed lines, 
technical information by black dashed lines, and funding by grey solid lines. Actors are sized by power score.  
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Figure 4. National networks of (a) technical information, (b) funding, (c) formal oversight and 
informal influence 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Net-Map data, figures created in XLNode. 
Notes: Links in (C) indicating formal authority are shown by black solid lines, and informal influence by grey dashed lines. 
While some actors related to the IMT process did appear in the network, they were not 
thoroughly discussed and they are not directly connected to each other. PID was mentioned 
but not PIDA. WUAs and FOs were mentioned but not linked to each other, to PID or to 
farmers. According to the perceptions of the interviewees, PID is under the formal authority of 
and receives funding from the Provincial Government. A few actors also attempt to pressure or 
influence PID: IRSA, the Federal Ministry of Water and Power (MoWP), and the Provincial 
Agriculture Department (PAD). The WUAs are perceived to be under the formal authority of 
the PAD and to receive funding from and exchanging technical water-related information with 
Rural Support Programmes (RSP). While there was little discussion about these exchanges, 
interviewees noted that FOs attempt to influence RSPs, the Agricultural Extension Services 
(AES), and On-Farm Water Management (OFWM). And AES, in turn, tries to exert influence 
on the FOs. Farmers receive technical information from a variety of sources, and are also 
pressured by AES presumably related to their irrigation practices. They are also shown as 
receiving funding from OFWM. 
When we view each of the links as a separate networks, the Ministry of Planning & 
Development (combined with the National Planning Commission by the interviewees) is highly 
targeted (high in-degree centrality) with technical information and informal influence by various 
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donors and a few government bodies. The newly formed Ministry of Food Security and 
Research (MFSR) is the only ministry perceived as trying to influence the Prime Minister’s 
Office on agricultural water management policy.  
 Punjab Net-Map results 4.4.2
The Punjab Net-Map interview yielded a multiplex network made up of four types of links: 
formal oversight, informal influence, funding and technical information. The resultant network 
has 17 actors (Annex 1) and 73 total links (Annex 2). It has very low centralization, meaning 
that there is a relatively equal level of participation of all the actors. The Provincial Government 
(ProvGov in Figure 5) represents the Chief Minister of Punjab as well as the other “central” 
provincial government bodies under his purview. This actor has the highest degree centrality—
total number of links—on the map, with 21 links. Respondents noted that since the passing of 
the 18th Amendment this actor has become more active in decision-making and as a recipient of 
funding from donors.  However, the Federal Government (FedGov in Figure 5) yet remains the 
actor with the second highest degree centrality (11 total links) suggesting that it still plays a 
significant role in Punjab’s water management. 
Figure 5. Punjab multiplex network 
 
Source: Author calculations from Net-Map data, figures created in XLNode. 
Notes: Links indicating formal authority are shown by black solid lines, informal influence by grey dashed lines, 
technical information by black dashed lines, and funding by grey solid lines. Actors sized by influence. 
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Figure 6. Punjab networks of (a) technical information, (b) funding, (c) formal oversight and 
informal influence 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Net-Map data, figures created in XLNode. 
Notes: Links in (C) indicating formal authority are shown by black solid lines, and informal influence by grey dashed 
lines. 
Interviewees chose to group together many of the actors related to the IMT reform. For 
instance, PID and PIDA were grouped together as a single actor. While interviewees noted that 
they would not consider themselves the same organization, a variety of perceptions about these 
two bodies caused interviewees to combine them: First, they are seen as simultaneously 
managing the same water issues and thus having largely the same links to other actors; second, 
they are both managed by the Secretary of Irrigation; third, interviewees described a lot of 
“shuffling” of staff between the two bodies diminishing their independence from each other.  
Similarly, while WUAs and FOs were both mentioned in discussions, the network that was 
drawn during these discussions showed them as a single actor. (Also included in this grouping 
were “Kisan Boards”. It is unclear if the respondents were referring to AWBs or some other 
body that they thought was involved in the irrigation management structure so we leave this out 
of the results.) WUAs and FOs were considered to be parallel in terms of formal oversight and 
to all have approximately the same links. Farmers are also denoted in the network as a distinct 
actor. Interviewees described WUAs and FOs, which were designed to give small farmers a 
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voice in the irrigation management process, as largely led by and representing the interests of 
large landowners.  
Figure 4a depicts formal oversight and informal influence or pressure. The Provincial 
Government is the only actor with formal oversight over other actors at the provincial level. 
According to the figure, PID/PIDA does not have formal oversight over the other bodies in the 
reformed irrigation system: WUAs and FOs. Interviewees described the relationship between 
PID/PIDA and WUAs/FOs as “regulatory” but not one involving formal oversight. They also 
note, as is depicted in the network, that PID/PIDA has tried to exert informal influence over 
them. The technical information network in Figure 4b shows that PID/PIDA and WUAs/FOs 
are also thought to exchange technical information about water and irrigation management.  
Farmers are shown in the Figure 4a network as attempting to influence the Provincial 
Government. This link refers to the perception of interviewees that influential or wealthy 
farmers can successfully pressure the government on water rates and other policy details in 
order to skew water policy to their favour. 
Most flows of technical information in the network are bi-directional. That is, they reflect 
exchanges of information. The actor with the highest degree centrality in the information 
network (Figure 4b) is the Provincial Government, with 16 links (8 incoming and 8 outgoing). 
This suggests that the provincial government exchanges information on water management with 
many different types of actors, including the federal government, research, media, NGOs and 
donors/bilaterals.  
The Punjab Agriculture Department (PAD) has the second highest centrality, with 7 total links. 
PAD is one of the few (3) actors giving information to farmers. In addition, PAD is linked 
directly to the federal government body WAPDA  
The provincial government has an equal number of incoming and outgoing funding links. This 
indicates that it may play the role of a conduit for funding; receiving from some (NPC and 
donors) and then allocating these down to others (PAD and PID/PIDA). The RSPs receive 
both external funds from donors/bilaterals and governmental funds from the Provincial and 
Federal Governments.  
Interviewees explained that PID and PIDA receive a large amount of funding from the 
Provincial Government. PID and PIDA are also seen to assess the fees charged farmers for 
water use, but because this money is thought to be paid directly to the Irrigation Department 
(within the Provincial Government) they do not denote a funding link from WUAs/FOs to 
PID/PIDA. PID/PIDA do have a direct funding link to IRSA, meant to denote the fees they 
pay for taking water out of the river basin. WUAs/FOs receive payments directly from farmers. 
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Farmers also receive funding from RSPs, described as credit schemes and other social support 
programs. 
 
4.5 Discussion – Signals of Reform in the Net-Map Exercise, and Implications 
 IMT, Formal Authority and Informal Influence 4.5.1
The IMT process establishes a clear, decentralized system of formal authority within the 
irrigation sector.  Farmers participate in WUAs; WUAs send representatives to FOs; FOs send 
representatives to AWBs, which fall under the broader authority of PIDA.  A functioning, 
decentralized system would thus have formal authority links between WUAs and FOs, between 
FOs and AWBs, and between PIDA and the AWBs.  In a truly functional system, these links 
would be bi-directional – representative, decentralized governance provides a formal 
mechanism for stakeholders at more local tiers to have a voice in higher-level decision-making.  
Given the definition of formal authority as oversight in the Net-Map exercise, this mode of 
influence might be represented as informal influence links rising from the WUAs through to 
PIDA. 
This structure was not reported in either of the discussions in the Net-Map exercises.  At the 
national level, formal authority over WUAs directly from the Provincial Agricultural 
Department (as opposed either the PID or PIDA) was noted, while AWBs were not cited at 
all, and FOs had no formal authority link mentioned.  FOs were noted as trying to informally 
influence the World Bank-funded On-Farm Water Management (OFWM) projects, 
agricultural extension services, and RSPs, programs focused on community-level development 
and mobilization, but their role in water management was not observed in the discussion.  At 
the Punjab level, none of the management tiers of IMT appeared in the formal authority 
network, save for the PID and PIDA – their roles not clearly distinguished in this discussion – 
falling under the authority of the provincial government.  Farmers were noted as directly 
pressuring the provincial government (not mediated via WUAs or FOs), while the only link 
among any of the management tiers was an informal influence link from PID/PIDA to the 
WUAs. 
Though IMT remains a work in progress, the poor fit of these results with the expected model 
is surprising, given the extent to which IMT has been implemented nationally and within 
Punjab.  The role of FOs within irrigation management appears to have been missed in both 
discussions, suggesting that to date WUAs play a more relevant role in addressing local 
irrigation issues while FOs (and their role in assessing water-use fees – discussed below) are not 
yet nearly as established within the IMT structure.  In the Punjab discussion, it was noted that 
not only are the established FOs having difficulty exerting their designated influence over water 
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management, but that in many villages they have not even been set up. The absence of a 
distinct PIDA in the national level discussion, as well as the poor distinction between PID and 
PIDA in the Punjab discussion, likely reflects the early stage (and challenging path) the PIDA 
has faced in claiming dominion over its set of functions from the PID (notes taken during the 
discussion indicate a perception that PIDA, emerging as the head of a participatory 
management approach through efforts by FOs, struggles to claim any legitimate power from 
PID).  Notable as well is the absence of AWBs in the discussions, suggesting that their role and 
function is not resolved in the minds of participants in the sector as distinct from that of the 
PIDA. 
There are several interpretations of this lack of fit.  Though implementation of IMT has been 
widespread, it is certainly not yet comprehensive (as above, only about 1/5 of command areas 
across Punjab and Sindh have established functioning AWBs).  One interpretation of the Net-
Map results is that participants had simply not had the opportunity to observe the IMT mode 
of governance in practice, only being familiar with prior management via the PID.  Another 
interpretation is that their perceptions of the system reflect judgments on their part of the 
function and future of the IMT.  In either case, through lack of exposure or through judgment, 
the results provide an indication to those interested in the advance of the reform that the 
relatively low levels of adoption are mirrored by a weak perception of the importance of IMT 
institutions among water sector experts. 
 IMT and Financing 4.5.2
Similarly to formal authority, IMT provides (in principle) a clear and direct mechanism for 
financing of irrigation operation, maintenance, management, and development via water-use 
fees or abiana.  Abiana are assessed twice a year by FOs at the flat rates of Rs. 85/irrigated acre 
in the Kharif season and Rs. 50/irrigated acre in Rabi (rates are cut in half for properties in the 
tails – downstream 20% – of their water course) (Raza, 2008a).  KP chairmen collect abiana 
from the members of their watercourse (a task previously undertaken by local tax collectors 
known as numberdars and patwari), keeping a 5% share of the collected abiana as incentive and 
passing the rest up to their FO; FOs in turn retain a 40% share of the abiana they receive and 
pass the remainder up to PIDA via the AWBs (Raza, 2008b).  Thus, the functioning system of 
irrigation management would have a funding chain beginning with farmers and feeding up 
through the KPs to the FOs and from there to AWBs or directly to PIDA. 
The discussion of financing in the Net-Map exercises deviated from this expected model.   In 
the national-level discussion, the farmers, WUAs, and FOs were discussed only as recipients of 
funding – farmers receiving funding from OFWM projects, and WUAs and FOs receiving 
support from Rural Support Programmes (RSPs).  At the Punjab level, funding from farmers to 
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the WUAs/FOs was noted, as well as directly from the WUAs to the provincial government; 
the RSPs appeared again as a source of funding but here directly to the farmers.  AWBs do not 
appear in the Punjab-level discussions at all. While PID and PIDA were discussed in Punjab as 
able to assess fees to farmers, they were not noted as direct recipients of financing from FOs or 
WUAs; funding was noted only via the provincial government.  This observation suggests the 
participants in this exercise are cognizant of the lack of a closed loop in the system as currently 
designed – not managing the funds itself, PIDA perhaps lacks some incentive not only to 
oversee collection of fees but also to advance the reform process more broadly. 
These deviations are striking as the process of IMT has been ongoing for more than a decade, 
and abiana collection via the current model has taken place since 2004.  While collection rates 
for abiana have been in decline in recent years, they remain significant (for example dropping 
from around 80% to 60% of the amount assessed in Punjab's LCC East Canal from 2004 to 
2007; Asrar-Ulhaq, 2010), and it is surprising that this widely-practiced and well-established 
financing mechanism is neither consistently nor accurately represented in discussions with 
experts connected to water and agriculture.  One possibility is that the abiana – whose nominal 
rates have been insufficient to cover O&M costs since the 1970s and are widely regarded as 
being too low (Briscoe & Qamar, 2005; Khan, 2009) – were not considered as significant by the 
participants in either of our discussions, or rather, the financing collected via abiana is not 
sufficient to stand out in a clear and consistent way to participants in the water and agricultural 
sector not directly connected to its assessment, collection, or use.  Once again, while the data 
are agnostic on why the participants’ perceptions don’t match the IMT model, they suggest that 
either by judgment or by lack of exposure, IMT has not embedded itself strongly in the 
perceptions of water sector experts. 
It is worth highlighting, as a last note on financing, that three major sinks for donor and bilateral 
funds were perceived by the participants at the national scale – the Ministry of Finance (and 
onward to various ministries), the Provincial Governments, and the International Water 
Management Institute (IWMI).  It is not possible to resolve from the data whether this 
acknowledges a past body of research and support from IWMI in agricultural water 
management, recognizes a current and future role for IWMI, or simply reveals a perception 
that IWMI acts as a siphon for donor funds that might otherwise go directly to federal or 
provincial agencies.  Further inquiry into the perceived impacts of IWMI efforts in the region 
could shed valuable insight on the potential for such outside research bodies to leverage donor 
funds in moving the reform efforts forward. 
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 Constitutional Amendment and Devolution of Responsibilities 4.5.3
Because the implementation of the amendment is so recent, and the distribution of 
responsibilities so complicated, it is difficult to lay out an ‘expected model’ of how the 
functioning national governance system ought to be perceived.  There are however some key 
insights that can be drawn from the Net-Map exercises. 
First, the national scale discussion referred to the recently formed MFSR as an actor, and 
identified three disconnected networks of formal authority relevant to agriculture and water – 
the federal government, the provincial government, and the Pakistan Agricultural Research 
Council (PARC, the apex of Pakistan’s federal and provincial agricultural research institutes).  
This suggests recognition of the goals of the reform among participants – that provinces have 
domain over a range of issues in agriculture and water management, as does the federal 
government, but that there are no areas of joint domain.  Significantly, the perceived influences 
of the provincial government and provincial irrigation departments are as great as any of the 
actors at the federal scale, suggesting potential for true devolution and relevant institutions 
existing at multiple scales.  Additionally, the Inter-provincial Coordination Committee (IPCC) – 
under the domain of the CCI – appears to have significant influence and has an informal 
influence link from the provincial government, again suggesting some connection to the 
intended realities under the reformed constitution – here, that with more powers devolved to 
the provinces, the importance of the CCI (and thus the IPCC) is greater.  
The national-level discussion noted correctly the maintenance of the funding link from the 
newly formed MFSR to the PARC, but the absence of a formal authority link to PARC is of 
interest.  Under the reform, both the federal and provincial governments maintained parallel 
research-council structures – a failure to devolve that Pakistan’s National Management College 
notes as a significant missed opportunity (National Management College, 2012).  Both the 
national-level and Punjab-level discussions show bi-directional exchange of technical 
information among actors at the provincial scale, suggesting (as did the National Management 
College study) that more efficient and effective research work could be accomplished at the 
provincial scale.   
The separation of federal and provincial formal authority networks is replicated in the Punjab-
level discussion, as is the bi-directional exchange of technical information among actors.  One 
additional important feature of the Punjab-level discussion is the direct linkage (informal 
influence and funding) of donors to the provincial government – a linkage made much more 
significant under the reformed constitution.  Overall, we see a number of indicators from the 
exercises that suggest either i) despite the early stage of implementation and remaining 
uncertainties, the 18th amendment has already had significant impacts in the perception of how 
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governance of water and agriculture does or should operate, or ii) pre-existing structures and 
perceived notions of how governance should operate already appear supportive of many of the 
aspects of decentralized governance pushed forward by the constitutional reform.  In either 
case, these results – though from a small study – suggest strong potential for the changes made 
under the 18th amendment to be successfully implemented and embraced. 
 
4.6 Limitations, Conclusions, and Next Steps 
There are several key limitations that must be placed on the inferences we have drawn in this 
study.  Firstly as has been previously stated, the Net-Map exercises upon which we base our 
discussion were conducted with a small number of individuals working within water-related 
agencies or working on water-related issues in Pakistan and specifically in Punjab in the 
provincial-level exercise.  Invited individuals were not within a sample of individuals designed 
for statistical power or significance.  Further, hierarchical aspects of Pakistani government and 
academic culture may have influenced the willingness or interest of more junior participants to 
volunteer opinions differing from those more senior, implying a less-representative polling of 
opinion from those present.  Finally, it is worth highlighting once more that the processes of 
change upon which the current study has focused (IMT and the 18th Constitutional 
amendment) remain active areas of change.  In the case of the 18th amendment, the process 
has only quite recently commenced.  Thus, it is reasonable to expect these perceived actor 
networks to continue to change as the outcomes of both IMT and the 18th amendment begin 
to accrue.  This study is meant only as an opportunistic glance into current processes of change 
affecting water and agriculture. 
With limitations thus stated, there are a few insights from this work worth highlighting in 
conclusion.  Now many years into IMT, the perceptions of the participants in the Net-Map 
exercises at both the national and provincial scales were poorly matched with the clear roles of 
AWB, FO, and WUA groups as designed. Coupled with the unwillingness of participants in 
Punjab to make a distinction between PID and PIDA, it is further evidence that something new 
may be necessary in order to make the paradigm shift away from traditional PID control 
effective, and devolve power and management capacity from the provincial scale downward into 
the canal, distributary, and watercourse scales.  Bengali (2009) suggests that water management 
in Pakistan retains a fetish of developing physical water infrastructure to answer water issues, 
with water management seen as a vehicle to finance and pay for these developments.  Along this 
line of thinking, a more ‘socio-centric’ re-imagining of the reform process that is built more 
around developing appropriate water use practices and norms for sharing resources than 
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around managing available water supply may be necessary to shift the level of engagement and 
awareness of the reform observed in our exercise.   
In contrast to the lack of clear foundational support for IMT, in the case of changes related to 
the 18th amendment and devolution of responsibility from national to the provincial scale, 
there are indications that the underlying relationships among actors at the provincial scale will 
provide some necessary social and institutional infrastructure for these provincial actors to work 
effectively.  Though this process is new and much of how it will actually take place is still 
uncertain, this is an encouraging sign.  To draw further insight on the potential for effective 
decentralization from the federation to the provinces, and from the provinces downward across 
the scales of the irrigation system, we hope to expand upon the results highlighted in this study, 
extending downward to reach actors from the AWB, FO, and WUA groups formed under 
IMT, and extending across to Sindh, where the process of devolution (as above cited) is known 
to have followed a different trajectory. 
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4.8 Appendix 1. Complete actor lists 
Table A1-1.   National map: complete actor list. 
 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AES Agricultural Extension Services 
DFID Department for International Development 
Energy Co’s Energy companies 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
FDP Friends of Democratic Pakistan 
Fed Flood Comm Federal Flood Commission 
FOs Farmer organizations 
IDB Islamic Development Bank 
Intl Ag Co’s International agricultural companies/importers 
IPCC Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee 
IRSA Indus River System Authority 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature 
IWMI International Water Management Institute 
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
FCAP Federation of Chamber of Agriculture 
Media Media 
MFSR Ministry of Food Security and Research 
MoCommerce Ministry of Commerce 
MoDef Ministry of Defense 
MoEnv Ministry of Environment 
MoFinance Ministry of Finance 
MoIndust Ministry of Industries 
MoP&D/NPC Ministry of Planning and Development; National Planning 
Commission 
MoWP Ministry of Water and Power 
NARC National Agricultural Research Centre 
NDMA National Disaster Management Authority 
Netherlands Dutch government 
OFWM On-Farm Water Management 
Pak Water Partnership Pakistan Water Partnership 
PARC Pakistan Agricultural Research Council 
PCRWR Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources 
PMD Pakistan Meteorological Department 
PMO Prime minister’s office 
Prov AD Provincial Agricultural Department 
Prov Ag Training Provincial agricultural training institutes 
Prov Gov Provincial government 
Prov Health Dept Provincial Health Department 
Prov Irrig Dept Provincial Irrigation Department 
Prov P&D Provincial Planning and Development Board 
Prov Power Dept Provincial Power Department 
RSPs National and Punjab ‘Rural Support Programmes’ 
UNDP United National Development Programme UNICEF Wat-San 
Network UNICEF’s Water-Sanitation Network 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority 
WASA Water and Sanitation Agency 
WB World Bank 
WUAs Water user associations 
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Table A1-2.   Punjab map: complete actor list. 
 
Donor/bilaterals JICA, WB, ADB, JBIC, Netherlands, USAID Engineering 
consultants NESPAK: National Engineering Services Pakistan 
(semi-government); ACE: government contractor 
Farmers Farmers 
FedGov Federal government; prime minister’s office 
IRSA Indus River System Authority 
IWMI International Water Management Institute 
Media Media 
MoWP Ministry for Water and Power Nat Planning Comm National 
Planning Commission 
PAD Punjab Agriculture Department/OFWM 
PARC Pakistan Agriculture Research Council 
PID/PIDA Provincial Irrigation Department; Punjab Irrigation and Drainage 
Authority 
ProvGov Punjab government 
RSPs Punjab Rural Support Program; National Rural   _Support Program  
UAF/UET University of Agriculture of Faisalabad; UET Center for Excellence 
in Research 
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority 
WUAs/FOs Water user associations, farmer organizations and …“Kassan 
Boards” 
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4.9 Appendix 2. Network analysis tables and figures 
Table A2-1.   Comparison of centrality and influence scores, national multiplex network. 
Actor Degree InDegree OutDegree Influence 
MoFinance 20 11 9 3 
Prov Gov 20 10 9 3 
MoP&D/NPC 17 16 1 3 
PMO 12 4 8 2 
MoWP 9 2 7 2 
Large Farmers 9 6 3 0 
RSPs 8 4 4 1 
Media 8 4 4 3 
Prov AD 7 2 5 2 
Large Ag 4 1 3 3 
PID 5 4 1 3 
WAPDA 2 2 0 3 
IPCC 3 2 1 2 
 
 
Table A2-2.   Comparison of centrality and influence scores, provincial multiplex network. 
Actor Degree InDegree OutDegree Influence 
ProvGov 21 11 10 5 
FedGov 11 3 8 2 
PAD 9 4 5 2 
Donor/bilaterals 9 3 6 4 
WAPDA 9 4 5 3 
PID/PIDA 8 3 5 3 
MoWP 6 4 2 3 
IRSA 5 4 1 1 
WUAs/FOs 5 2 3 1 
Farmers 5 3 2 2 
Engineering 4 3 1 0 
Media 4 2 2 1 
PARC 4 3 1 0 
UAF/UET 4 2 2 0 
Nat Planning 3 2 1 0 
IWMI 2 1 1 0 
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5 Governance Challenges of Agricultural Export Promotion: The Case of 
Soybean in Malawi  
 
Noora-Lisa Aberman, Brent Edelman, and Regina Birner 
 
The development of the agricultural sector, including diversification of crop production and 
promotion of non-traditional exports, is an important strategy for low-income countries to 
reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. However, governance challenges often 
hinder agricultural export growth, such as cumbersome bureaucratic procedures faced by 
exporters and politically motivated interventions. This mixed-methods study assesses 
institutional context related to the soybean export sector in Malawi and finds a high amount 
of discretion and variability in the enforcement of the rules and a reliance on clientelism for 
exporters to fulfil the requirements in a timely manner, stifling the growth of the sector. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The development of the agricultural sector is an important strategy for low income countries to reduce 
poverty and stimulate economic growth. Diversification of crop production and promotion of non-
traditional exports can play an important role in this regard. However, to apply this agricultural 
development strategy, countries need to overcome the governance challenges that often hinder 
agricultural exports, such as cumbersome bureaucratic procedures faced by exporters and politically 
motivated interventions. While such governance problems have, in general, received increasing 
attention in recent years, specific empirical studies on the governance problems occurring in agricultural 
exports are rare. This study uses the soybean export sector in Malawi as a case study. 
In spite of relatively strong per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, Malawi continues to 
face a variety of economic challenges, including severe balance of payments shortfalls, fiscal deficits, 
and pervasive poverty. In 2013, Malawi imported USD 2.8 billion worth of goods and services, but 
managed to export only USD 1.2 billion (ITC, 2014); this USD 1.6 billion trade deficit represents 36 
percent of Malawi’s GDP (World Bank, 2014a). 
Malawi’s economy relies heavily on agriculture—it contributes one-third of the country’s GDP. 
Agriculture is critical to Malawi’s trade—agricultural products make up 90 percent of export revenues, 
with tobacco alone accounting for 60 percent of Malawi’s exports by value (World Bank, 2010a). 
The country’s reliance on tobacco as its primary export revenue earner leaves its economy 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. In 2012, for example, the impact that the erratic rains of that 
cropping season had on the tobacco crop reduced real GDP growth by 2 percent (Reserve Bank of 
Malawi, 2013). Furthermore, with the official poverty rate at 50 percent of the population and an 
estimated 1.9 million people at risk of food insecurity in 2013-14, economic shocks potentially can 
have dire human consequences (FEWSNET 2013). 
One strategy for promoting a more stable and vibrant economy is to diversify away from tobacco and 
broaden Malawi’s export base. In the Malawi National Export Strategy: 2013-2018, soybean 
(Glycine max) is identified as a high-potential crop and prioritized for export promotion (MoIT, 
2013). Within the oilseeds sector, soybean is identified further as a commodity that has strong 
domestic and regional demand, has high potential for improved incomes for farmers, and is a 
subsector of the economy in which Malawi already has a comparative advantage. Moreover, planting 
more soybean has the potential to increase incomes of the smallholder farmers who produce 93 
percent of Malawi’s soybean, can improve soil fertility through the ability of the crop to fix 
atmospheric nitrogen in the soil, and could address dietary deficiencies if consumed by more 
Malawians (Jayne & Rashid, 2013; Salvagiotti et al., 2008; Ecker & Qaim, 2011). One part of 
developing a more dynamic soybean sector in Malawi is to develop the soybean export sector. 
However, data shows that, while Malawi’s soybean production has steadily increased over the last 
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decade, and is internationally competitive, exports have been volatile in spite of rising international 
prices. 
In order to stimulate robust and sustained growth in Malawi’s soybean export sector, the academic 
literature on trade policy reform generally advocates reducing existing barriers to trade in order to 
improve linkages between domestic and international markets (ITC, 2012; Hoppe et al., 2013). In 
addition, many developing countries, such as Malawi, face challenges in the implementation and 
enforcement of the formal laws and regulations on agricultural exports. The uncertain regulatory 
environment that results may be equally or more limiting for trade than traditional barriers such as 
tariffs, because it increases risk and, thus, transaction costs for exporters (Kirsten et al., 2009; Andrews 
& Bategeka, 2013).  
This study undertakes an institutional analysis of the soybean export sector in Malawi to determine the 
critical institutional barriers to engaging in and expanding soybean exports. Institutional analysis allows 
for the study of both formal and informal rules, examining the impact both on transaction costs and 
resultant actor behaviour.  
 Institutions and the business environment in Sub-Saharan Africa 5.1.1
Institutions can be defined as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure the 
interactions of economic actors (Hodgson, 2006). Where institutions are weakly developed, 
individuals engaging in that particular arena often bear high transaction costs due to weak 
coordination of economic activity and enforcement of formal rules (Kirsten et al., 2009). Similarly, 
states with strong institutions are also less inclined to corruption (Levy & Kpundeh, 2004).  Thus, while 
facilitation of the business environment broadly, or trade specifically, often focuses on physical 
infrastructure (such as roads or electricity) or decreasing financial barriers (such as import or export 
tariffs), the quality of institutions can play a powerful role therein.  
Drawing on the World Bank's Enterprise Survey's, analysis by Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran (2008) 
suggests that the indirect costs associated with poor infrastructure and public services, particularly the 
state capacity to deliver business services, present a major barrier to competitiveness for firms in poor 
African countries. 
Highlighting the role of capacity in institutional quality, Levy and Kpundeh (2004) discuss challenges of 
state capacity for effective public administration in Africa. They highlight that state capacity is embedded 
within a complex system, made up of the bureaucratic apparatus, political institutions, and social, 
economic, and political interests, counter to earlier approaches to development that considered it purely 
a management issue. Similarly, Levy (2007) specifies that for governance reform to be effective it must 
consider the formal and informal political and social institutions.  
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Describing challenges of state capacity in Africa, Levy and Kpundeh (2004) review the process of post-
independence bureaucratic decay that took place in many countries across Africa, characterized by a 
decline in transparency and increase in governance through informal rules. While there has since been 
improvement in many states throughout Africa, this decline in bureaucratic performance increased 
corruption and the cost of doing business and thus negatively impacted economic performance, as 
described in the quote below: 
“The decline of bureaucracy inﬂuenced economic performance by affecting 
policymaking, regulation, and service delivery. Neopatrimonial rule generally 
operated by conferring discretionary rents on favored allies, giving little attention to 
the impact of rentier policies on economic growth, the efﬁciency of public services, 
or the quality of business regulation. The classic consequences, evident in country 
after country, included the disruption of markets, rising costs of doing business, 
urban bias, and increased protectionism. The intensiﬁcation of a rentier relationship 
between business and government progressively transformed the structure of the 
business class itself, bringing about a progressive rise of a politically dependent 
business class.” (Levy & Kpundeh, 2004, pg.5) 
Furthermore, they describe how the level of corruption can be seen as a useful proxy for the quality of 
political institutions in a country. This is because the level and characteristics of corruption 
demonstrates the extent to which institutions can: a) constrain public actors from extracting rents and 
otherwise pursuing objectives for personal benefit, and b) direct private interests to use formal rather 
than informal channels to influence policy (Levy & Kpundeh, 2004). Rodrik (2004) supports this last 
point, maintaining that public-private engagement is important for economic development, but must be 
facilitated through a democratically accountable and publicly legitimate body to decrease corruption and 
rent seeking.  
In their related study, Harstadd and Svenssen (2011) describe the evolution from bribery to lobbying. 
They theorize that income growth will typically drive this evolution, but that in equilibrium incentives to 
invest may be reduced. Because bribe amount tend to be linked to firm wealth, with wealthier firms 
paying higher amounts, and bureaucrats cannot commit to not charging bribes in the future, firms 
eventually get priced out of bribery and prefer to engage in lobbying. But as firms anticipate the hold-up 
problem and the larger bribes to come as they grow, this may reduce their incentive to invest. Thus they 
may never reach a high enough capital level to switch to lobbying, resulting in a poverty trap.  
Furthermore, they model interaction among firms, bureaucrats and the government, and prove that 
government could benefit from bribery (in addition to bureaucrats) because it can pay bureaucrats a 
lower wage based on expected bribes to be collected and because it could monitor and collect a fraction 
of the bribes (Harstadd & Svenssen, 2011). However, given that bribery may decrease firm investments, 
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the government may also lose out with bribery, assuming that it benefits from economic development 
and taxable output. Thus, they show that “red tape” policies—those policies in place mainly to extract 
bribes from firms—will be relaxed by lobbying when there is a large enough effect on economic 
development because there are more firms or they are wealthier. Finally, they show that for lobbying to 
be successful firms must be coordinated and share the cost of lobbying.  
Schleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that corruption occurs when bureaucrats have “control rights” over 
ﬁrms: specifically, the degree of discretion public ofﬁcials have in implementing, executing, and 
enforcing rules and beneﬁts that affect ﬁrms, such as business regulations and licensing requirements. 
Similarly, interviews with firms from the Middle East and North Africa region support this, specifying 
that the core challenges with the business environment lies not in the de facto regulations, but in the 
inconsistent, discretionary and preferential implementation of them (World Bank, 2009). 
Given the dearth of good data on the business environment, The Doing Business index, developed and 
collected by the World Bank, is an important data source (World Bank, 2014b). It measures the ease of 
doing business across 189 countries throughout the world. It is a composite measure of a number of 
different business activities, such as the ease of starting a business, getting electricity, paying taxes 
enforcing contracts and trading across borders. It primarily measure efficiency, such as by recording 
procedures, time and cost to trade across borders or start a business.  
The 2015 scores show Sub-Saharan Africa at the bottom of the ranking at 51.87 (where best practice is 
100) on average but with a large distance between the highest and lowest in the region: 74.81 and 33.16 
respectively (World Bank, 2014c). Malawi performs particularly badly in this measure, ranked at 164 of 
189 countries globally, and 31 of 47 in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2014b).  
Narrowing the discussion slightly, we will now focus on the trade facilitation environment. Although 
tariff barriers are relatively low across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, trade performance has not grown 
as expected. The “Trading Across Borders” component of the Doing Business index is of particular 
interest here, as it reflects the trade promotion from a regulatory perspective. It records the number of 
documents required, the cost, and the number of days required to expedite import or export of a 20-
foot container (World Bank, 2010). On this measure Malawi is ranked at 172 out of 189 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also underperforming compared to its neighbours and trading partners, with 
Mozambique at 136, Zimbabwe at 167 and Zambia at 157 (World Bank, 2010). 
There are a number of empirical studies examining the effects of institutions on cross-border trade. 
Francois and Manchin (2007) estimate the effects of institutions on trade using a measure of economic 
freedom––including legal structure and property rights, business regulation, and size of government––to 
reflect institutional quality. They find that strong institutions are associated with increased cross-border 
trade for developing countries. Similarly, another global study by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) 
focuses on insecurity and corruption and the impact on trade. They find that the increased transaction 
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costs associated with weak institutions and insecurity have a major impact on trade, wherein a 10 
percent rise in a country’s index of transparency and impartiality leads to a 5 percent increase in import 
volumes.   
Using the Doing Business data, Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2009) run an econometric model that 
assessed the impact of costs and time requirements of trade, compared to traditional tariff barriers. 
They find that the higher the trading costs, the lower the propensity to trade and the lower the volume 
of traded goods. Deconstructing the indicator, they find that the number of days needed to fulfil 
regulatory requirements is negatively correlated with trade flows but the number of documents required 
is not significant.  
Similarly, Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) demonstrate the impact of delays in time for an export to 
clear customs, including pre-shipment activities such as inspections and technical clearance; inland 
carriage and handling; terminal (port) handling, including storage if a certain storage period was 
required; and customs and technical control. They find that each additional day of delay reduces trade 
flows by 1% and is the equivalent of a county distancing itself from its trade partner by 70 kilometre. 
Furthermore, 75% of the delays reported were related to administrative hurdles, often before the 
container reached the port, rather than due to insufficient physical infrastructure.  
Hoekman and Nicita (2011) estimate the effects on trade of red tape and entry barriers––reflected by 
the Doing Business Index and a logistics performance index––compared to border protection. Their 
results suggest that the impact of the behind-the-border domestic costs of trade could have a greater 
payoff for developing countries than further reductions in border barriers such as tariffs and NTMs, or 
seeking additional trade preferences. 
The studies reviewed here highlight state capacity, corruption and red tape as reflections of institutional 
quality, and institutional quality has been found to be important to business and trade facilitation. 
However, few studies have assessed institutional quality in the agriculture sector, in terms of its 
facilitation of agricultural businesses. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the agriculture sector is typically viewed as 
made up of public sector service delivery and farmers (primarily medium and small scale), who are 
considered to be a part of the informal sector. Little emphasis is given to agriculture as the main income 
earning and business activity throughout most of this region. By assessing the extent to which institutions 
facilitate business activity within the agricultural sector, we hope this study begins to fill this gap. 
Furthermore, because institutional dynamics are context specific, the country-specific sector-specific 
case study approach undertaken here allows us to understand the distinct social and political realities 
underlying the institutional outcomes and incentives for economic actors.   
 Competitiveness of Malawi’s soybean sector 5.1.2
Malawi is well suited for a case study on this topic because there is evidence that institutional problems 
are a major obstacle to agricultural export growth in the soybean sector. Malawi’s soybean production 
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has steadily increased over the last decade (12.5 percent compound annual growth rate12). However, 
data shows that, while the price is internationally competitive, exports have been volatile. As shown in 
Figure 1, there is little relationship between the competitiveness of Malawian soybean (as  measured 
by the domestic price of soybean relative to the export parity price) and exports13. Soybean exports are 
close to zero at times when the domestic price is well below export parity14. 
Figure 1: Soybean in Malawi – regional and domestic prices and exports, 2010 to 2013 
Source: International Trade Centre 2014 
Note: Export parity prices are calculated as monthly averages of the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) spot prices for soybean minus 
freight, insurance, and administrative costs for exporting to Harare, Zimbabwe, the largest regional importer of soybean from 2010-13 
(International Trade Centre, 2014).  Costs are based on interviews with transporters and exporters. 
 
One can also examine revealed comparative advantage (RCA) as indicative of the competitiveness of a 
specific product in terms of its cost of production and other non-price factors (Mzumara, Chingarande 
& Karambakuwa, 2013). RCA considers the share of domestic exports of a specific product compared 
to the global share of exports of the product. An RCA between 0 and 1 indicates comparative advantage 
for a given commodity. According to authors’ calculations with TradeMap data from 2010-2013 (ITC, 
2014), Malawi’s soybean RCA shows strong volatility, falling from 1.7 to 0.8 in 2011 and 2012 and then 
                                                     
12 Authors’ calculations based on MoAIWD production estimates 
13 Export parity prices are calculated as monthly averages of the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) spot prices for 
soybean minus freight, insurance, and administrative costs for exporting to Harare, Zimbabwe, the largest regional importer of 
soybean from 2010-13 (International Trade Centre, 2014).  Costs are based on interviews with transporters and exporters. 
14 One potential explanation is the imposition of export bans on soybean. See Section 6 for further analysis of soybean export 
bans. 
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increasing to 2.36 in 2013. RCA is a proxy for comparative advantage with actual exports, however, 
RCA measures can be susceptible to trade restrictions such as trade tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as 
export bans that distort trade flows (Ng & Yeats, 2000). On the other hand, a recent soybean value chain 
analysis that takes a variety of other factors into consideration beyond actual exports, concludes that 
Malawi soybean is competitive both compared to regional and Argentinian soybean (Technoserve, 
2011). 
The focus of this study is on the institutional and policy environment, the exporters and the regulatory 
actors, the framework of legal rules and requirements for exporting soybean from Malawi, and the way 
in which the environment and the regulatory framework influence actor behaviour. We hypothesize 
that there are institutional barriers impeding consistent growth in soybean exports from Malawi and 
seek to identify the critical ones and understand the context in which they arise. The innovative study 
methodology, combining qualitative and qualitative analytic techniques, and sampling approach are 
described in the next section. Then the paper presents the study results through describing the policy 
and governance environment in the soybean export sector, the actors involved and their attributes, 
the details of the regulatory framework, and actor responses to these institutional characteristics. 
Finally, the implications for policy are discussed. 
5.2 Methodology 
This study undertakes an institutional analysis of the soybean export sector in Malawi to determine the 
role of institutions in impeding growth of soybean exports. Institutions are characterized by various 
degrees of formality. This study assesses both the formal rules and regulations associated with the 
soybean export sector as well as the social norms and conventions that determine how the rules are 
complied with and enforced (Ostrom, 2005; Buchanan, Chai, & Deakin 2013). 
The empirical approach is guided by the analytical framework described in the next section and utilized 
innovative data collection tools—Net-Map and Process Net-Map—to implement a series of participatory 
interviews. These interviews yielded both qualitative and quantitative data about the institutional 
characteristics of the soybean sector in Malawi. This novel empirical approach can be replicated in 
other studies on this topic. 
 Analytical Framework 5.2.1
When institutions are not viewed as embedded in the social, economic and political systems, attempts at 
institutional reform are likely to be unsuccessful. For instance. An example of extensive institutional 
reform in Uganda contrasts institutional reforms in terms of form (policy reform) versus function (the 
implementation of the reforms), and concluding that in spite of best-practice institutional mechanisms 
put in place, institutional weaknesses have caused them to be unsuccessful in terms of improving actual 
government functionality (Andrews & Bategeka, 2013). In the case of Uganda, corruption reforms did 
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not address the contextual issues around corruption, such as low pay and poor leadership among 
policemen, the body tasked with enforcing anti-corruption laws.  
Dorward and Omamo (2009) argue that understanding institutional dynamics is fundamental to 
understanding and influencing processes of social and economic change in agricultural development. As 
such they develop a framework to guide empirical analysis of institutions for agricultural development in 
Africa. They build on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) approach (Ostrom, 2005) and 
the branch of New Institutional Economics known as transaction-cost economics.  
Central to the Dorward and Omamo framework for institutional analysis is the identification of the 
action domain, borrowed from the IAD approach, which defines the spheres of activity and interest of 
the analysis (such as economic exchange of goods and services or the management of natural resources) 
(2009, pg.78). The action domain is made up of: the institutions to be analysed, the activities that the 
institutions engage in, and the actors in those institutions and activities. An important facet of the 
analytical framework is the identification of these components and their relevant attributes.  
The action domain is set in and affected by a wider environment, which is made up of the broader 
policy and governance environment, socioeconomic characteristics, and physical infrastructure. 
Institutions, actors, and activities are affected by the broader environment, and in turn they can affect 
the environment.    
Figure 2: Framework for Institutional Analysis of Agriculture in Africa 
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 Methods 5.2.2
Buchanan, Chai and Deakin (2013) explore a range of methods for assessing institutions and argue that 
quantitative methods, while helpful, are limited and do not sufficiently answer many institutional 
questions. They point out that institutional phenomena are path-dependent and contingent on local 
factors, making it critical to ascertain the aspects of the social environment that have shaped the 
Source: Dorward & Omamo, 2009, pg. 79 
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institutions of study. Furthermore, qualitative approaches can more easily reveal nonlinear and 
cumulative effects, clarify issues of sequencing, and delve into assumptions of quantitative research 
methodologies. Finally, where social norms and conventions do not yield a high level of respect for laws 
and rules, issues of enforcement and implementation—which are challenging to measure 
quantitatively—generally are more important in guiding actor behaviour than are de jure laws. 
Consistent with the above discussion, this study takes a mixed-methods approach to assessing the 
institutional environment for the soybean export sector in Malawi. The focus is on the action arena—
the exporters themselves and the regulatory bodies they engage with to fulfil the legal requirements—
and on the broader policy and governance environment, particularly in terms of how it influences trade 
policy rules and governance structures. 
 Data collection and sampling 5.2.3
Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews with exporters, regulators, government 
actors, and other policy stakeholders. We undertook a criterion sampling approach, wherein 
individuals with rich information on a topic are identified for interview (Cohen and Crabtree 2006), 
and interviews continued until saturation was reached. In addition to recording actors’ narratives about 
the formal requirements for exporting soybean and the institutional environment in which these 
requirements are embedded, quantitative information was also recorded, including: 
a. Costs and time requirements for completing formal export requirements; 
b. Perceptions about the amount of discretion that regulatory actors employ in the soybean 
export process, quantified into a ranked score of 1 to 5; 
c. Social network data reflecting policy actors involved in pressuring for or, alternatively, 
blocking reform of the formal export requirements for soybean. 
The key data collection tool utilized is Net-Map, which allows for the collection of quantitative and 
qualitative data in the context of a semistructured interviews (Birner, Cohen, & Ilukor, 2011; 
Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). Net-Map is an interview-based mapping tool that layers actor interactions—in 
the form of social network data—with principles from stakeholder mapping and power mapping to 
assess how different actors influence outcomes (Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). A paper-based tool, Net-
Map is participatory, rather than extractive, is flexible for adapting to various research questions and 
contexts, and its use in illuminating the structure of the institutional environment is based in principles of 
actor-network theory and social network analysis. 
Actor-oriented approaches to research help illuminate how individual actions combine to create a 
“process of mutual construction” of institutions (Keeley & Scoones, 1999). A network can be viewed 
as a conceptualization of the institutional environment, yet it is also made up of individual relations – 
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also referred to as links or ties – that represent social capital, control of knowledge, or aspects of 
power, depending on the context (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
A variant of Net-Map, Process Net-Map, was specifically designed to understand implementation of 
complex processes in practice, a critical piece of understanding the action arena (Raabe et al., 2010). 
This tool was applied here to track the steps required to export soybean from the farm gate to the 
border. Adaptations made to the tool include the addition of questions on the time and cost 
requirements for each step of the process and framing discussion of power in terms of the 
discretionary power of each regulatory actor, as discussed above. 
In order to collect qualitative and quantitative information, semi-structured individual interviews were 
held with nine policy stakeholders (which accounts for approximately 70 percent of the soybean trade 
policy actors15) using the Net-Map method and with eight soybean exporting firms (which accounts for 
approximately 40 percent of firms who planned to export in the year leading up to the study16) using 
the Process Net-Map method. In addition, unstructured interviews were held with all government 
and private sector entities involved in implementing the formal export policy rules. Furthermore, 
formal government documents were sought and acquired whenever possible in order to triangulate 
the information collected through the semi-structured interviews. 
 Analysis 5.2.4
Qualitative data was recorded through detailed note taking during interviews and, when permitted by 
the interviewee, interviews were recorded. This data was used in forming the narrative of the study and 
for triangulation of the quantitative data collected. 
Social network analysis data was compiled and analysed for network and actor characteristics using 
UCINet software (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). The mapped soybean export process was 
compiled across interviews and confirmed with government officials.17 In addition to the export process 
map, we report on two additional outcomes for each step in the process: time (in number of calendar 
days) and cost (in USD), similar to the Doing Business Trading Across Borders measure (World Bank 
2010b). For time requirements for a given step, we present the median values. For costs, only official 
fees and fees for legal services required by law are reported; any unofficial or informal payments are 
                                                     
15 An actor generation activity was undertaken with each of the policy stakeholders, asking interviewees to list all the 
actors involved in influencing soybean trade policy in a given time frame, in order to confirm that none were 
missing. Those that were included in the population of actors were agreed to across at least three interviewees. 
16 Based on a review of MoIT-issued export licenses for soybean for the period 2011 to 2013. 
17 Network data was collected in the form of complete network, rather than ego networks, which is the more common 
approach in the social network analysis literature. The complete network approach was preferable because: a) we did not 
know the bounds of the network as a policy network is ill-defined, and b) some actors are no longer available or not willing to 
submit to interviews (such as the President). We rationalize the validity of a sample of actors’ ability to represent the whole 
network based on research by Krackhardt (1987), who suggests an actor’s perceptions of a given network structure and the 
power of the relative actors in the network are associated with objective measures of structure and power. However, an 
actor’s position in the network will influence their perception. As such, we ensured that data was sought from different types 
of actors in different positions in the network and aggregated the data obtained in order to capture all the relevant perspectives 
of the network and to mitigate positional bias. 
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excluded. This approach is a direct application of the Doing Business method (World Bank, 2014b) of 
measuring the time and costs. 
To complement the qualitative and social network analysis where necessary, we studied formal exports 
of soybean using Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) data, informal exports based on the Famine Early 
Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) border monitoring reports. Price data was acquired from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development (MoAIWD) and from the South African 
Futures Exchange (SAFEX). And data on trade flows were downloaded from TradeMap.  
All respondents’ identities have been kept confidential given the possibly politically sensitive nature of 
the discussions. In addition, the study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 
5.3 Regulatory framework governing soybean exports 
This section describes the regulatory system, including implementation and enforcement of policies, 
governing soybean exports. It describes the steps required to export soybean from the vantage point of 
an exporter who procures the soybean at the farm gate and then follows all of the rules and regulations 
required to formally export soybean within the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
region. Using data collected in the Process Net-Map interviews, we also quantify the time and cost 
requirements for exporters. Thereafter, we use findings from the interviews to examine how 
consistently the rules and regulations governing the export process are enforced on exporters.  
The export process is complex and time consuming. The complete process is illustrated in Figure 3. 
First, the exporter, who must own a registered business in Malawi, and the process to export soybean 
requires the exporter to obtain the six official documents.  
Before a prospective exporter can purchase soybean from a farmer, she or he is required by law to 
apply to the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development (MoAIWD) for a Buying 
License. Authorities can enforce the Buying License requirement; if an exporter does not have a valid 
Buying License, the entire consignment can be confiscated. The application process typically requires 
three visits: after submitting the required documentation, if the application is approved, the exporter 
must return to the Ministry one week later to pay. Then three days later she can pick up the license. 
The Buying License is valid from the date of approval until March 31 of the following year, but not for 
longer than one year, as applications are accepted only after March 31 of the current year. 
Second, the exporter must acquire an export license. Up until September 2013, prospective exporters 
of soybean were required by law to have a valid Export License issued by the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MoIT). Exports without a valid Export License were subject to detainment at the border and 
possible confiscation. In September 2013, the Minister of Industry and Trade amended the Third 
Schedule of the Control of Goods Act to remove soybean from the list of goods requiring an export 
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license (Malawi Government Printer, 2013), but several exporters reported on exports that took place 
before the removal of the requirement. Exporters indicated that the removal of the export license was a 
positive development, but that the permanency of the reform was uncertain. See section VII for further 
discussion. 
The exporter must submit required documentation to MoAIWD, and typically visit again to check on 
the status of the application, but eventually will pick up the license from the MoIT in Lilongwe, if 
approved. The Export License is valid for three months from the date of issue. 
Third is the Currency Declaration Form (Form CD1), which is a legally required foreign exchange and 
currency control document that must be submitted by the exporter’s commercial bank on behalf of the 
exporter to the Reserve Bank of Malawi for any export valued at more than 1000 USD. Parliament has 
been debating raising this threshold to 5000 USD. The process to complete the Currency Declaration 
Form requires three office visits to the exporter’s commercial bank and is valid for six months from the 
date of issue and three months from the date of export. While it is usually a simple step, new exporters 
reported this as particularly challenging to determine bank requirements.  
The fourth requirement is the Phytosanitary Certificate is a document issued by Malawi’s Plant 
Protection Services (PPS) stating that the consignment is free from any pests specified by the importing 
contracting party. As such, it is not a legal requirement to export but is required in order to apply for the 
Customs and Excise Declaration Form in Step 6. The process takes two days and costs 5000 MWK, 
plus any associated chemical costs. The process to receive the Phytosanitary Certificate requires the 
following two office visits: 1) Contact PPS to come to storage facility of exporter to fumigate the 
consignment; 2) One day later, contact PPS to return to de-gas the consignment and issue the 
Phytosanitary Certificate. It is unclear for how long the Phytosanitary Certificate is valid. 
The SADC Certificate of Origin is the fifth step. It is a document issued by Malawi Confederation of 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCCI) stating that the product being exported was indeed 
produced in a SADC country. As with the Phytosanitary Certificate, the SADC Certificate of Origin is 
not legally required to export but necessary in order to apply for the Customs and Excise Declaration 
Form in Step 6. The process requires a single office visit. It is unclear for how long the SADC 
Certificate of Origin is valid. 
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The fifth step is the Customs and Excise Declaration Form (also known as Form 12), which is a legally 
required document issued by the Malawi Revenue Authority. While the law or act governing the 
Customs and Excise Declaration Form is not clear, no export can leave Malawi without the Form. 
Required documents must be taken to an authorized customs clearing agent. Two days later, receive the 
Customs and Excise Declaration Form. It is unclear for how long the Customs and Excise Declaration 
Form is valid. 
Figure 3: Soybean export process 
Source: Authors’ calculations from interview data 
Notes: CD1: Currency Declaration Form. MCCCI: Malawi Confederation of 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry. MoAIWD: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Water Development. MoIT: Ministry of Industry and Trade. MRA: Malawi 
Revenue Authority. PPS: Plant Protective Service. RBM: Research Bank of Malawi.  
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From start to finish, formally exporting 30 metric tons of soybean requires 21 calendar days and USD 
95 to comply with the administrative requirements imposed by the government of Malawi.18 In 
addition to these cost and time requirements, exporting legumes requires a total of 15 unique 
supporting pieces of documentation, 11 separate office visits, and interactions with 8 different 
institutions. These figures do not take into account the time and costs of transport of the soybean 
within Malawi or the costs and time delays incurred after the export has crossed out of Malawi 
into a neighbouring country.19 
Figure 3 shows the institutions responsible and the reported time and cost requirements for each step 
in the export process for soybean from Malawi. These time and cost requirements pertain to a first-
time exporter who has not previously engaged in the export of soybean in a given year. As each of 
these documents is valid for less than one year and a unique copy is required for a single container 
— here, a 30 metric ton truck — being exported, these time and costs requirements align with the 
World Bank’s methodology for its “Trading Across Borders” indicator (2014b)20. The results are 
comparable with the “Trading Across Borders” indicator, specifically the section on document 
preparation as we did not take into consideration time and cost for freight to the border or to the 
destination port.  
 Discretionary power and consistency of enforcement 5.3.1
We also sought to determine the consistency with which rules and regulations governing the 
export process are applied and enforced and the degree to which discretionary power was applied by 
regulatory bodies. To accomplish this, we first asked exporters about the average or “normal” amount 
of time a particular step in the process took. We then inquired about the shortest and longest 
amounts of time each particular step of the export process took for exporters. With these measures 
we can better understand how much the time taken for a given step in the export process deviates for 
a given exporter across multiple exports. If rules and regulations are being applied consistently 
across exports for a given exporters, then these times should converge. 
Second, we asked exporters about the relative discretionary power of each institution involved in the 
export process. If a given institution has little ability to speed up or slow down the process, then rules 
and regulations are being applied consistently for that step of the process; if, however, an exporter 
has the impression that an institution has the discretion—either through deliberate actions or 
increased efficiency—to speed up the export process, then this is an indicator that rules and 
                                                     
18 All costs are reported in USD and time is reported in calendar days; the Reserve Bank of Malawi’s 9 June 2014 exchange rate 
of 397 MWK/USD is used for all currency conversions. 
19 This study assumes that the exporting entity has already established itself as a legal company within Malawi; based on the 
World Bank’s Doing Business survey (2014b), this requires an additional 38 days and USD 243. 
20 As most soybean exporters engage in multiple exports throughout the season, some documents can be used for multiple 
export consignments, whereas other documents are required in original for each truck within a given export consignment. In 
order to capture these complexities, we pro-rate the time and cost requirements outlined above for a typical soybean export 
consignment of 30 metric tons, along with an estimate of costs incurred due to time delays. 
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regulations are not being applied consistently across exporters or across the different export 
experiences of a given exporter. 
Finally, we asked exporters to describe the effectiveness with which the rules and regulations of the 
export process were enforced. In other words, to what extent does the formally stated process for 
fulfilling the rules differ from how the exporter navigates the process in practice? If enforcement is 
effective, then the underlying reason for which a particular administrative requirement was originally put 
in place—assuring the sanitary state of the export through the phytosanitary certificate, for example—is 
being satisfied. 
 
Table 1. Discretionary power by institution 
Step  Days  Institution 
Discretionary 
Power 
 Min Median Max  (0-5) 
Buying License 5 6 15 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, 
and Water Development 
2.8 
Export License 5 10 30 Ministry of Industry and Trade 2.3 
Currency Declaration Form 1 1 10 Reserve Bank of Malawi 0.0 
SADC Certificate of Origin 1 1 3 Malawi Confederation of 
Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry 
0.0 
Phytosanitary Certificate 1 1 3 Plant Protection Services 0.0 
Customs and Excise Declaration Form 1 2 3 Malawi Revenue Authority 1.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Net-Map data 
For time requirements, the period needed to obtain the export license (5 to 30 days) and the buying 
license (5 to 15 days) exhibited the most variation; the other four steps of the export process showed 
little variation in time requirements (Table 1). Not surprisingly, the two regulatory institutions 
involved in issuing the export and buying licenses, MoAIWD and MoIT, were ranked as having the 
most discretionary power in the soybean export process. 
Regarding consistency of enforcement, information from interviews indicated that enforcement was 
either inconsistent or non-existent for the following requirements: 
1. Buying License: exporters reported that this was almost never enforced.  
2. SADC Certificate of Origin: exporters reported that they could obtain this certificate without 
showing any proof that the soybean was actually grown in Malawi. 
3. Phytosanitary certificate: exporters reported that they could obtain this certificate by taking 
their own sample of soybean to Plant Protection Services (PPS), rather than having PPS staff 
come to visit the export consignment and randomly sample the soybean. In some cases, 
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exporters obtained the certificate without showing any evidence of the condition of the 
soybean that they were to export. 
For two of the other procedures, the currency declaration form and the export license, enforcement 
of the requirements did not provide government with the information the requirements were put 
in place to obtain. Officials reported that the currency declaration form (intended to ensure that 
foreign exchange earned on exports was being repatriated to Malawi) was being underreported by 
exporters, but that resources for enforcement were lacking. The export license requirement was 
originally put in place to ensure that only registered exporters were engaged in exporting and to enable 
government to track exports. However, exporters reported not being asked to show proof of being a 
registered exporter when applying for the license and government did not have a mechanism in place to 
track which export licenses had been used and for what quantity of goods. 
Finally, a review of detailed informal export data from 2013 shows that both registered and many other 
smaller scale unregistered exporters shipped consignments of soybean across Malawi’s borders illegally. 
These ranged in size from 120 to 600 metric tons (based on authors’ calculations analysis of 
FEWSNET informal trade data). In these cases, firms did not show any documentation, but rather 
bypassed the formal border checkpoint altogether. The existence of these large scale informal exports 
means that, in at least some instances, none of the requirements for formal soybean export were 
enforced, and that the risk of the illegal crossing (and resultant bride cost if discovered) is worth 
avoiding the formal requirements. 
These findings all point to inconsistent application of the rules and regulations governing the export 
process for soybean:  specifically, administrative processing time variations, perceived discretionary 
power, and lack of enforcement of regulations. These examples of institutional weakness are due to a 
combination of limited state capacity and a high degree of clientelism.   
Fo r  in s t anc e , the large time variations in obtaining the export license and the lack of enforcement of 
its use could be partially explained by understaffing of officers to issue such licenses and the 
impracticality of randomly checking farm gate procurers for whether they possessed buying licenses. In 
the case of PPS, the agency simply lacks the resources to effectively sample and test soybean exports 
and to issue a phytosanitary certificate that can be trusted by exporters and buyers in the importing 
country.  
In addition, the clientelist nature of the regulatory system explains some of the institutional weakness. 
For instance, based on Harstad and Svensson (2011), unenforced and meaningless regulations, can be 
viewed as beneficial only to the bureaucrats who can collect associated rents. Furthermore, exporters 
report that having access to high level bureaucrats within MoAIWD or MoIT facilitates timely 
completion of the export requirements. In addition, the higher in the hierarchy ones contact is, the 
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speedier response you are likely to get. While not reportedly based upon bribes, there is likely some 
quid pro quo behind this time of clientelist favouritism.  
5.4 Policy and governance environment 
The policy and governance environment is a key aspect of the institutional environment in which the 
action domain is embedded. Characteristics of the environment will condition how actors react to 
institutions. Kirsten et al., (2009) describe the policy and governance environment as a set of 
fundamental political and social ground rules in which institutions are developed. The environment is 
considered to be fixed in the short and medium-term. 
This section examines the characteristics of the policy and governance environment for the soybean 
export sector that, in part, determine trade policy rules and governance structures. We use social 
network analysis to assess the policy network structure and characteristics. The network analysis is 
complemented with qualitative data obtained from interviewees further describing the network and its 
characteristics. The network, shown in Figure 4, depicts the way in which actors try to influence 
soybean export policy. The trade policy network includes 11 actors. The size of the circle representing 
each actor reflects the perceived power of each to influence the regulatory framework for soybean 
(the larger in size the more powerful the actor) and their colour reflects their position on trade policy 
reform: i.e., supportive, opposed, conflicted, or undecided. 
The network structure depicts a highly centralized and top-down government decisionmaking 
structure. This network structure, with few in-flows of influence to top decisionmakers, agrees with the 
qualitative interview data in that it indicates that policy reforms are more likely to be determined 
according to political concerns, rather than technical concerns. Technical advisors within the 
ministries are not likely to risk pushing for reforms that are not favoured by the political leadership, 
even if they are technically sound. The centralized network also gives the impression, supported by the 
qualitative data collected and previous research, that the key ministries—MoIT and MoAIWD—are not 
undertaking their own technical analysis to inform policy decisions. Rather, such policy advice is 
received by these Ministries largely from external stakeholders.  
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This results are not uncommon in policy networks in Africa. Other policy research in Malawi 
describes the leader-centric and clientelist nature the political system (Aberman et al., 2012; Resnick, 
2012; Said & Singini, 2014). Said and Singini (2014) describe Malawi’s historical tendency toward 
centralized governance that prioritized rentseeking over economic growth. Interviewees also 
described how past presidential administrations in Malawi did not tolerate dissenting views, such that 
technical staff within the MoIT refrained from passing pro-reform technical advice up to the senior 
leadership under previous administrations, reflecting the top-down structure of the policy network. 
This top-down governance reflects a culture of strong leaders and highly controlled policy 
environments that is more likely to add layers of regulation to agricultural export processes rather than 
to rely on market forces, in spite of low enforcement capacity.  
 
5.5 Actor power and policy positions 
Various characteristics of the actors involved in soybean exports from Malawi and related policy 
development will determine the institutional landscape. There are just a handful of firms consistently 
exporting soybean from Malawi. These firms are all prominent m e d i u m  t o  large-scale firms in 
Malawi. We were unable to locate any smaller firms or farmers’ cooperatives engaged in formal 
soybean exports. In spite of the small size, the sector is not well coordinated, as evidenced by lobbying 
Figure 4: Trade policy network: policy pressure links, power scores and policy positions 
Source: Authors’ calculations with UCINet from interview data. 
Notes: MoF: Ministry of Finance. dev_partners: development partners. MoAIWD: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and 
Water Development. MCCCI: Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. NASFAM: National 
Association of Smallholder Farmers. Actors are sized according to power scores. Policy position legend is at the top left. 
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or policy engagement taking place by individual first rather than collectively, and the lack of a 
coordinating body. 
MoIT is the focal government body for the promotion and regulation of exports. MoAIWD is also 
relevant to the soybean export sector as the Ministry regulates domestic marketing of agricultural 
products and plays a role in the approval process for firms who want to export soybean. Other relevant 
regulatory bodies are the Reserve Bank of Malawi, which works with a firm’s commercial bank to 
issue a Currency Declaration form, the Plant Protective Services, and the Malawi Revenue 
Authority, the main authority for ensuring that fees are paid for all imports and exports. 
The actor power measure, depicted in Figure 5, reflects influence over the soybean regulatory system. 
The measure is based on interviewee perceptions of actors to influence changes in soybean trade policy 
and takes the average of scores from across interviews. The most powerful actors in terms of influencing 
soybean export policy are the President, followed by MoIT and the poultry industry within the private 
sector. Interviewees pointed to the highly top-down nature of government to explain the power of 
the President and MoIT. MoAIWD, in contrast, is less engaged in these issues and so has a lower 
power score, even though they are generally a highly influential ministry, and one would expect them to 
play a central role in soybean promotion. But their emphasis on food security as a core goal leaves 
agricultural exports or value addition largely outside of their area of interest (although that is slowly 
changing). 
The poultry industry, which is made up of a handful of companies who are the primary domestic 
consumers of soybean in Malawi, have a high power score. Poultry is largely a luxury good in 
Malawi with only wealthier Malawians consuming it regularly. With very little industry in the country, 
the commercial poultry firms are among the few successful, and thus influential, businesses in Malawi. 
Soybean processors largely produce soybean oil and use the by-product, soybean cake, to produce 
feed for poultry companies. These two industries, thus, are closely related and, in some cases, even 
jointly owned, although interviewees perceived the poultry industry to be the more powerful influencer 
of policy. This grouping of industries appears to be well-coordinated, as evidenced by joint lobbying 
efforts and two coordinating bodies: the Poultry Association of Malawi (PAM) and the recently 
developed Soya Association of Malawi (SOYAMA), which does not include exporters. Both the 
poultry industry and soybean processors were described both by themselves and by other stakeholders 
as opposed to reforming the soybean export regulation to increase exports, although one firm noted that 
it had changed its position based on development partner information and pressure.  
Exporters, not surprisingly, were in favour of reforming the soybean export regulations to make it easier 
to export. Development partners and the MoIT were both in favour of policy reform as a mechanism 
for improving the business environment and spurring private sector development. 
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Figure 5: Actor power in trade policy reform 
Source: Authors’ calculations from interview data. 
Note: MoF: Ministry of Finance. dev_partners: development partners. MoIT: Ministry of Industry and Trade. MITC: Malawi 
Investment and Trade Centre. MoAIWD: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development. MCCCI: Malawi 
Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. NASFAM: National Association of Smallholder Farmers.  
 
The Bingu wa Mutharika Presidential administration from 2004 to 2012 was opposed to reforming the 
soybean export policy to facilitate exports, while the technical leadership within MoIT at the time 
was conflicted about the policy reform. These policy positions have since changed. President Joyce 
Banda, who succeeded President Bingu wa Mutharika, was vocal about her reform agenda to improve 
the business environment. However, the interviewees considered President Banda to be conflicted 
over these reforms, as they thought she likely had important constituents advocating both for and 
against reform.  
The MoIT was considered to be supportive of reforms during her administration. The policy position 
of President Peter Mutharika, who took office in May 2014, and his cabinet on soybean export policy 
were not investigated in the study but current policy discussion are centred around increasing 
restrictions on soybean exports. 
The Ministry of Agriculture had been perceived as undecided on the issue of soybean export policy 
reform, reflecting that agriculture policy in Malawi has been largely concerned with food security and 
the Ministry is only recently beginning to see trade as relevant to its mission and scope of work. This 
change in outlook is indicated by the formation in 2014 of a MoAIWD Technical Working Group 
on Commercialization and engagement in a new private sector-focused policy framework—the 
New Alliance Framework for Food Security and Nutrition—that is increasingly guiding policy action 
by MoAIWD. 
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Finally, the Public Private Dialogue Forum (PPDF), facilitated by the MCCCI plays an important—if 
inconsistent—role in convening the private sector and communicating their requests and opinions to 
government decisionmakers. However, at the time of writing it was considered defunct by most 
interviewees, as it had not met in many months, and has been actively sidelined by President Mutharika 
(Said & Sangini, 2014). Rodrik (2004) highlights the importance of such a body in facilitating sectoral 
coordination among firms and pinpointing opportunities to decrease transaction costs. However, he 
specified the need for democratic processes and legitimacy in the administration of such a body, both of 
which need are lacking in the PPDF. Smaller sub-sector coordinating bodies do exist 
 
5.6 Navigating the institutional set-up: actor responses 
Central to the importance of the study of institutions is understanding how they affect the behaviours of 
economic actors. As mentioned above, institutional weakness and inconsistency can increase transaction 
costs for economic actors. In order to avoid the commercial risks associated with an inconsistent and 
weakly enforced institutional environment, exporters may decide not to engage in the sector—to stop 
exporting or decide not to enter the sector—or to find ways to cope with or bypass the institutional 
challenges, all of which may carry implicit costs. Institutional weaknesses may also provide 
opportunities for bureaucrats to benefit from patronistic or rent-seeking behaviours. 
As described above, soybean exporters in Malawi tend to cope with the inconsistent and s low 
implementation of the requirements for exporting soybean through clientelism: making use of their 
personal connections. Exporters say that contacting people within the regulatory agencies with 
whom they have personal connections is an effective way to cut down on administrative delays. 
They also use their connections to bypass or simplify some of the requirements. 
In addition, the soybean exporters interviewed have each developed their own distinct ways of fulfilling 
regulatory requirements: no two exporters follow exactly the same procedures. New entrants to the 
soybean export sector find it challenging to navigate the requirements even when seasoned 
exporters do not report major problems. This points to a lack of clarity about the regulations and how 
they are to be fulfilled that acts as a significant barrier to entry into the sector and facilitates 
corruption and clientelism. Those that have invested in learning the soybean export regulatory 
system generally are able to navigate it, though faced with high transaction costs, but new 
entrants are likely deterred from entering at all. Even those firms that have learned to effectively 
navigate the system have likely incorporated the cost of administrative delays into their prices, 
perhaps making them less competitive in the regional market, but more likely decreasing the price 
they pay to farmers. 
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In all of the regulatory bodies with oversight on soybean exports, unclear and inconsistent information 
about how an exporter fulfils the regulatory requirements was pervasive. This appears to be based 
on low government capacity to inform and enforce regulations. For instance, MRA staff rely on 
hard-copy memos entitled “MRA Circulars” for policy changes. At one border post, some MRA 
representatives were not aware of recent policy reforms because the relevant circular was lost. 
Furthermore, low government salaries likely add to the propensity for patronage and reinforce 
bureaucratic incentives to keep information vague. 
Actions undertaken by the Banda administration to improve the business environment included freeing 
up the exchange rate, establishing the Malawi Investment and Trade Centre (MITC), and simplification 
of the soybean export regulatory system (Said & Singini, 2014). However, these actions did not mean a 
departure from the previous emphasis on rentseeking and corruption, as evident from the major 
corruption scandal, referred to as “Cash Gate” wherein bureaucrats at all levels of the government were 
found to have been steeling relatively small amount of government funds. Furthermore, the MITC is 
viewed as an ineffective toothless body that has not fulfilled its potential and the export process reforms 
were not formally legislated and so easily reversible, as discussed in the following section. 
 
 Soybean export bans 5.6.1
Domestic industrial consumers of soybean have actively opposed reforms to make soybean exports 
from Malawi easier in order to ensure an adequate supply of low-cost domestic soybean for their 
businesses. Of particular consequence to the soybean export sector, they have successfully lobbied 
government officials to ban the export of soybean in the past, keeping domestic prices low relative to the 
international price, but disrupting trade volume flows and distorting price signals from the global 
soybean market. 
According to interviewees in government and the private sector, to implement a ban on soybean exports, 
the Minister of Industry and Trade exercises powers derived from the Control of Goods Act (Malawi 
Law Chapter 18:08) to (a) invalidate all previously issued export licenses that have not yet been 
exercised and (b) stop issuing new export licenses. The Government of Malawi then communicates 
the export ban through the media, including press and radio. Without an export license, MRA will 
refuse to issue the Customs Declaration document required for export and border officials will refuse 
to allow an export consignment to leave Malawi. Legally speaking, an export ban should also be 
printed in the Government Gazette as an official Government Notice. Up to now, however, we have 
not been able to find any of these press releases, records of radio announcements, or any official 
communications announcing the start and end of past soybean export bans. However, soybean 
exporters and MoIT representatives reported that the export of soybean was banned in June and July 
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2010, from June through October 2011, and from March through October 2012. The timing of 
exports bans can be inferred from the pattern of (lack of) exports presented in Figure 1.   
The International Trade Centre (ITC 2012), UNECA (2013), and the World Bank (2014a) all 
highlight the export license requirement and the frequent imposition of export bans as critical 
obstacles to increasing exports of agricultural commodities from Malawi. A recent simulation of the 
economy wide costs of a soybean export ban estimates that the ban alone could cost Malawi 12 
percent of the overall economic activity generated by the soybean sector and reduce soybean 
farmers’ net revenue by 56 percent in a given year (USAID 2013). 
In September 2013, the Government of Malawi took a major step towards addressing these non-tariff 
barriers by removing the export license requirement for soybean. It did so by amending the Third 
Schedule of the Control of Goods Act to remove soybean from the list of goods requiring an export 
license and, at least in theory, making it impossible to ban soybean exports (Malawi Government 
Printer 2013). It was a simple amendment to enact because, as it was an amendment to one 
schedule of the Act, rather than an amendment of the Act itself; it only required a letter from the 
Minister of Industry and Trade to the Minister of Justice to have the policy reform take effect. No 
Parliamentary approval was required. Because of the nature of how the amendment was enacted, 
however, it is an amendment that would be quite easy to reverse; all that would be required is a similar 
letter from the Minister of Industry and Trade to the Minister of Justice requesting that soybean be 
added back to the Third Schedule of the Control of Goods Act. In other words, the export license 
requirement could be resumed at any time, thus making it possible to put in place another export ban 
through the same mechanism as past bans. Furthermore, even if the export license requirement is 
not resumed, soybean could be banned under the powers granted to the Minister of Agriculture, 
Irrigation, and Water Development through the Special Crops Act (Malawi Law Chapter 65:01). 
Exporters and traders of soybean found this unpredictability in the regulation of the Malawi soybean 
market to be a significant hardship to their business. One multinational agricultural commodity trader 
and exporter noted that his firm has largely divested its activities on soybean in Malawi due to the 
impact of the soybean export bans on their business. Furthermore, MoIT officials and soybean sector 
stakeholders have been actively debating the reinstatement of some type of export control, such as an 
export levy or ban, in spite of continued strong pressure by development partners to the contrary.    
 
5.7 Contrasting with other export sectors 
To what extent are these results universal across all export sectors in Malawi or exclusive to the soybean 
export sector? To support our interpretations of the results of this study and highlight the implications 
of the distinctive characteristics of the soybean sector’s institutional environment, we contrast this with 
two other promising export commodities:  tobacco and groundnuts. 
127 
 
 
Tobacco has dominated Malawi’s exports and played a central role in its economy for decades. 
Previously, the sector was dominated by large estates who sold directly to international buyers, and 
smallholders were highly restricted in their involvement in the sector (Jaffee, 2003). In the 1980’s and 
90’s policy reforms allowed mini estates and eventually small-farmer “clubs” to grow tobacco and sell 
directly to exporters in a well-organized open auction, described further below. 
A detailed study of the tobacco sector by Otañez, Mamudu, and Glantz (2007) describes a well-
organized sector, if skewed to favour the two multi-national exporters, wherein the market and 
mechanism for selling one’s consignment is mandated by law. The sector is regulated by the Tobacco 
Control Commission (TCC), which is the one-stop-shop for registration and licensing for all actors in 
the tobacco sector. Member of its board include representatives of the Limbe Leaf and Alliance One, 
the companies that, in 2008, held 95% of the tobacco market in Malawi. They purchased almost all the 
tobacco produced in the country, and thus were able to maintain favourable trade regulations and 
prices. Auction Holdings Limited is the designated tobacco trading platform, where farmers and 
aggregators all go to auction off their tobacco. While Auction Holdings, and another recent entrant in 
this sector the Agricultural Commodity Exchange, had tried to engage in trading of soybean and other 
crops, these have been slow to pick up. Thus, while the heavy engagement of private sector in the 
tobacco sector had managed to keep prices low for producers, it has also streamlined the export process 
making it no surprise that tobacco has dominated Malawian exports. In fact, a review of trade policy in 
Malawi by the International Trade Centre (2012: xv) described the tobacco sector as an example of best 
practice, wherein an export license can be obtained from the TCC “in a matter of minutes”.  
The groundnut sector makes an interesting contrast. While also highlighted as a priority crop in the 
government’s National Export Strategy and targeted for scale-up, this sector enjoys high market density 
both domestically and regionally, but has also suffered from the last decade of restrictions on aflatoxin 
levels, which has all but halted exports to high-enforcement high-value markets. Malawi groundnuts are 
in high demand domestically and are extremely competitive in the region. Formal export destinations 
include Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia. There is also a large informal export market and very 
porous borders, providing groundnut traders with alternatives if the formal export process becomes too 
cumbersome (Edelman & Aberman, 2015).  
According to a similar case study by Edelman and Aberman (2015) the export process for groundnuts is 
almost the same as for soybean, with one critical difference that there are no large industrial players 
influencing policy to periodically impose export bans. The combination of more predictability and a 
much denser market–with many options for buyers and for offloading a consignment even if there are 
delays in the export process–produces a very different result with exports growing over the last decade 
even as some regional partners begin to put in place stricter aflatoxin restriction, putting this trade at risk 
in the future.  
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This comparison highlights the importance of a parallel governance system for the success of the 
tobacco export sector. Tobacco exports are not subject to the institutional challenges that other export 
sector in Malawi face. Groundnuts, on the other hand, face some similar challenges as the soybean 
sector in terms of the level of complication of the export process and lack of transparency. However, we 
surmise the deterrent effect of this is somewhat offset by the dense easy-to-access market—although 
there are questions about this future of this market due to aflatoxin contamination. Moreover, an 
additional factor may be that groundnut exporters are not subject to the high unpredictability associated 
with ad hoc export bans, as with the soybean sector, allowing the export sector to flourish relative to 
soybean.  
 
5.8 Discussion and policy implications 
This study assesses the institutional environment of the soybean export sector. Soybean is a high priority 
crop in Malawi, with the potential to promote agricultural growth, increased incomes for smallholders, 
improved soil quality, and lead to sectoral transformation through value addition and accessing export 
markets. However, in spite of steady increase in production and competitive prices, soybean export 
levels have been inconsistent. This study examines the institutional environment in the soybean sector 
to determine the critical barriers to promoting exports and development of the sector as a whole.  
Guided by a framework for institutional analysis in African agriculture, we assess the regulatory 
framework and the policy environment, and how they influence actor behaviour and incentives 
(Dorward & Omamo, 2009). Our analysis of the soybean export process finds a cumbersome and time 
consuming process that takes 21 calendar days (median), 15 supporting pieces of documentation, 11 
separate office visits, interactions with eight institutions, and costs USD 95 to satisfy the administrative 
requirements for a one-time, formal export of a 30 metric ton consignment of soybean. To put 
these results in context, they are comparable to the World Bank’s Doing Business “Trading Across 
Borders” indicator for Malawi, which ranks the country as 172 out of 189 countries ranked, and lowest 
among its neighbours and regional trading partners. Beyond the costs of complying with the official 
requirements, the degree of variation in terms of the time required and the inconsistent enforcement 
of rules and regulations creates considerable uncertainty for exporters, increasing their risk and 
associated transaction costs. Our analysis shows that the minimum time required to complete the 
official requirements for an export consignment is 14 days, while the maximum is 61 days.  
Furthermore, a lack of clarity about how official regulatory requirements are supposed to be met, 
and a leader-centric governance environment, create opportunities for patronage and rentseeking 
behaviour. Exporters often rely on personal connections or their substantial stature in the community 
to have their export requirements attended to efficiently and to engage in lobbying. Regulatory bodies 
apply their discretionary power in the export process in a biased manner, further weighting the system 
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in favour of well- connected actors. Finally, some regulations governing the export of soybean were 
enforced either inconsistently or not at all. 
According to Harstad and Svensson (2011), the “red tape” regulations described above that do not serve 
any substantive oversight purpose are kept in place because of the associated rents and bribes received 
by bureaucrats. Theoretically, as exporters’ capital grows, they should eventually price themselves out of 
paying rents and rather begin to lobby to change the regulations for the whole sector. However, there 
appear to be three impediments to this evolution in the soybean sector in Malawi: 
First, the renty relationship between bureaucrats and exporter keeps risks and transaction costs high and 
decreases profitability. It can also decrease incentives to invest as bureaucrats cannot commit to not 
asking for higher bribes once the firm is larger (Harstad & Svensson, 2011). In addition to making 
soybean trading and exporting less profitable and less competitive, it is likely that these costs are largely 
passed on to the smallholder farmers who produce soybean and are considered “price takers” with few 
market options for their commodity.  
Second, the population of soybean exporters is small and not well coordinated. Their engagement with 
bureaucrats and politicians is ad hoc, informal and individual. While the Public Private Dialogue Forum 
is supposed to support coordination, it is largely defunct and lacking in legitimacy in terms of ability to 
inform policymakers’ decisions. Furthermore, the poultry industry opposes reforms of soybean export 
regulations, they have closer connection to high level decision makers, and have their own coordination 
body, The Poultry Association of Malawi (PAM). Thus interests of decision makers are more likely to 
align with the poultry sector, against the interests of the soybean sector. 
Third, the business environment in Malawi is impeded by pervasive institutional weaknesses, 
characterized by low capacity, corruption and rentseeking. This environment can be partially explained 
by very low civil servant salaries. Furthermore, post vacancies and poor training and communication 
further exacerbate the effectiveness of the civil service to regulate the sector. Finally, clientelism and 
rentseeking is normalized in relationships between exporter and bureaucrats, as exporters describe 
these activities as the only way of getting around inefficient bureaucratic systems.   
These combined factors create a perfect storm wherein investment is disincentivised, pressure to 
decrease institutional barriers to exporting are countered by a stronger poultry industry, and poor 
government capacity masks a culture of pervasive rentseeking behaviour. Perhaps only a major shift in 
the policy and governance environment would break this cycle. For instance, efforts to increase 
cohesiveness of the sector actors could increase their policy influence. Renewed emphasis on the Public 
Private Development Forum could help in this regard. However, this strategy will only be effective if the 
forum’s legitimacy is greatly increased, through high level attendance by decisionmakers, and perhaps—
to help shift the current balance of powers—by development partners indenting to support agricultural 
development and a more favourable business environment.  
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5.10 Appendix 1—Net-Map actor abbreviations, attributes, and centrality scores 
Actor Complete Name Power Position Type 
Out-
degree 
In-
degree 
dev_partners Development Partners 3.25 supportive development partner 18 0 
FMoIT Former Ministry of Industry and Trade 3.00 undecided government 0 3 
FPresident Former President 4.33 opposed government 1 5 
FUM Farmers Union of Malawi 2.25 supportive civil society 3 0 
MCCCI Malawi Confederation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry 
3.43 supportive private sector 18 15 
MITC Malawi Investment Trade Centre 2.00 supportive government 3 0 
MoAIWD Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development 
2.67 undecided government 5 21 
MoF Ministry of Finance 2.75 undecided government 2 4 
MoIT Ministry of Industry and Trade 4.22 supportive government 10 46 
NASFAM National Smallholder Farmers Association of 
Malawi 
2.20 supportive civil society 9 0 
poultry_industry Poultry producers and Poultry Industry 
Association of Malawi 
4.00 opposed private sector 7 0 
President President of Malawi 4.44 conflicted government 4 19 
soybean_export
ers 
Soybean exporters 2.43 supportive private sector 13 0 
soybean_proces
sors 
Soybean processors, including soybean oil and 
poultry feed 
1.67 opposed private sector 15 0 
SOYBEANMA Soybean Association of Malawi (incorporates 
soybean processors and users, e.g., poultry 
industry) 
2.50 opposed private sector 0 2 
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6  Discussion and Conclusions 
As discussed in chapter one, the core objective of this work is to explore the informal and formal 
institutions related to problems of agricultural development. Furthermore, this research applies novel 
methodological approaches and thus expands the toolkit for analysis in this field. Chapter one laid the 
basis both for understanding the importance of an institutional focus and for the application of a set of 
participatory tools that allow for both subjective and rigorous research. The subsequent chapters 2-5 
presented empirical studies that applied these approaches, with an aim to tangibly demonstrate the value 
that they can contribute to the field of agricultural development studies. This final chapter discusses the 
methodological contributions of this work and then it identifies some of the common themes resulting 
from the four institutional studies. Finally, the chapter lays out the policy implications that can be 
inferred from the combined results.   
6.1 Summary of Study Conclusions and Lessons 
Across the four studies, the evidence supports the premise laid out by intuitional theorists that the rules-
in-play, determined largely by social norms, have a significant effect on the behaviour of economic 
actors (Hodgson, 2006; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Formal rules and laws may have little effect 
on the behaviour of economic actors if they are constrained by social aspects of the institutional 
environment.  
Chapter 2 examines socially-constructed and articulated definitions of power and decision-making for 
men and women in rural Kenyan households. The household is an institution central to structuring and 
reinforcing gender norms and gendered interactions. This research approach allows for examination of 
the gendered power dynamics played out within households, allowing for a deeper understanding of the 
level 1 institutions to inform gender policies and programs. Economic models of household bargaining 
promote focus on drivers of power, emphasizing transfers of resources to women as a key driver. 
Distinctly, this research examines how power shifts happen and the implications for the institutional 
environment, in this case the household and the community.  
The research adds detail and complexity to the common economic understanding of household 
bargaining and power. It provides a community-based definition of power that is conceptualized largely 
as power over others; a zero-one conceptualization that by definition requires the man to lose power if 
the woman gains power. This result provides an explanation for why resource shifts to women have 
been known to produce unintended consequences and backlash (de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, & 
Roy, 2014; Roy, Ara, Das, & Quisumbing, 2015). However it also reveals a policy-relevant situation in 
which this conceptualization of power relaxes. The results indicated that when a man sees 
empowerment or asset growth of his wife as “family development”, allowing the family as a unit to 
increase in power relative to others in the community, he is more amenable to it. Thus suggesting that 
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family-centred interventions that engage husband and wife, though challenging to implement, are less 
likely to be met with resistance.  
Chapter 3 similarly examines gender and power in Kenya, this time assessing the governance 
mechanisms of community self-help groups that impact women’s effective participation. The study 
examines the rules-in-play and the effect of the social context in shaping and interpreting those rules. 
The results echo previous empirical work to show that participation alone is not sufficient to ensure that 
women have decision-making power (Kabeer, 1999). Groups must take responsibility for ensuring 
decision-making power of women members, not just de jure power. Also, pro-gender governance 
structures explicitly favouring women increase their feeling of legitimacy and thus group engagement. 
Finally, enhancing women’s political experience and groups’ understanding of pro-gender governance 
mechanisms are effective ways of improving women’s participation.  
Chapter 4 moves on to consider issues of agricultural policy and agricultural water management wherein 
reforms have devolved power from federal to local levels in Pakistan through a constitutional devolution 
process and an Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). These types of transfers of responsibility seek 
to empower local authorities to advocate for local priorities (Mitchinson, 2003). Much of the 
institutional research on this topic examines the effectiveness of the transfer of responsibility for 
managing resources. And it examines the design elements or rules that objectively increase effectiveness.  
In chapter 4, we consider the identities and interests of reformed agencies, as well as the other 
stakeholders that could influence the implementation, by mapping the complete network of actors, their 
perceived formal and informal linkages and influence. Once again with an emphasis on the rules-in-
play, as perceived by experts and professionals in the sector, the chapter sheds light on potential barriers 
to the formal reform implementation by determining their shared beliefs about the reforms processes. 
The network maps indicated a lack of fit with the IMT structures as designed and the structures 
described by stakeholders. Adoption of IMT processes were likely impeded by weak perceptions of its 
importance among participants in the water management sector. Whereas the institutional structures for 
the constitutional devolution process, in spite of being in an early stage, were well-reflected in the 
network maps.  
A number of studies explore and confirm the relationship between institutional weaknesses—in 
particular corruption and red tape—and challenges in business and trade facilitation. However, these 
have rarely taken place within the agriculture sector in terms of promoting agri-business development. 
Furthermore, because institutional dynamics are context specific, the quantitative approaches taken by 
most studies are not able to illuminate the distinct social and political realities underlying the 
institutional outcomes and incentives for economic actors.  
Thus chapter 5 explores the policy and regulatory environment related to agricultural exports. 
Contrasting the formal regulations and the rules-in-play, the study explores the shared beliefs about 
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policy reform dynamics that determine the regulatory environment. Results show that, in Malawi, 
exporters are able to openly and systematically bypass cumbersome rules and regulations through 
patronage.  Furthermore, most of the rules and regulations are only implemented bureaucratically, such 
as requiring permits.  They typically are not implemented to the extent that they have broader social 
benefit other than generating a small amount of government revenue. Thus, decreasing complexity and 
opaqueness of the export requirements would likely have significant broad positive effects for supply 
chain actors and cost little to implement.  
6.2 Cross-Study Lessons 
This section presents lessons that can be derived from a comparative analysis of the different case 
studies presented in this thesis. 
 Understanding and Harnessing Shifting Norms  6.2.1
As discussed in Chapter 1, social embeddedness has significant and long-lasting impacts on economic 
activity. Related institutions—such as the household, the community, and associated social norms—are 
slow to change and the drivers of change are not well understood. The results described in this thesis 
provide some insights into mechanisms that may drive such change related to gender norms.  
To begin with, the results suggest that social norms in the Kenyan study population for Chapters 2 and 3 
are already slowly shifting. Specifically, social norms are in the initial stages of shifting from a paradigm 
wherein power is male dominated and occurs in terms of power over another person, towards a view of 
power with that is inclusive of women and requires unity within the family. Other empirical studies have 
found similar results throughout the world (Boudet, Petesch, & Turk, 2013), supporting this result and 
also indicating that gender norms are to some extent being globalized.  
These results also confirm the role that programs and policies can potentially play in advancing this shift 
in social norms. Firstly, as discussed above, policies and programs can harness and reinforce 
households’ views that traditional gendered power hierarchies can be overlooked in order to support 
development and advancement of the family as a unit. Secondly, women’s participation in mixed-sex 
self-help groups was successfully promoted by national policies and development partner programs. 
While participation in groups does not necessarily shift social norms, we do find that self-help groups 
serve as a distinct parallel institution to that of the home—governed by constitutions and by-laws. Thus 
women’s group participation does enable (though not ensure) women to push the boundaries of 
community gender norms. This opportunity is enhanced by policies and programs that support pro-
gender group governance mechanisms and governance training for group members, especially women.  
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 Socio-centric policymaking 6.2.2
The results from Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that in a developing country context the quality of the rules 
and laws as written do not determine their effectiveness. Across both case studies, government policy is 
developed from a government-centric perspective, not considering a number of critical unconsidered 
institutional factors. The unconsidered factors include, a) the capacity of the government to enforce 
rules and laws; b) social norms dictating rule-following; and c) the impact on transaction costs of 
additional rules. For instance, a common characteristic of regulations in the Malawi soybean sector is 
that they are bureaucratically enforced (for instance, an exporter is required to pay a fee and obtain the 
proper paperwork) but not substantively enforced in that the desired social impact is lost, as discussed 
above. Lessons from this work indicate that for policy to be effective in terms of guiding social and 
economic behaviour it must take a realistic and socio-centric view, understanding the behaviours, 
incentives and norms that guide economic actors, particularly in a context of low enforcement capacity.  
6.3 Methodological insights and limitations  
In addition to the thematic contributions discussed in the previous section, a major aim of the thesis was 
to make methodological contributions: Firstly in terms of the rigorous application of a new set of 
research methods—Net-Map and its family of associated tool. Secondly, in terms of the application of a 
research paradigm, to which these tools are well suited, that is rarely applied in agricultural economics. 
The combined body of work in the preceding chapters demonstrates that broadening the 
methodological toolkit of agricultural economists, in terms of what questions are asked and how they are 
answered, has the potential explain social phenomena critical to the well-being of the rural poor and 
promote progress in the field towards a more realistic and theoretical approaches.  
While these methods and research approaches, applied to agricultural development, begin to fill 
important knowledge gaps, they also come with challenges and limitations. Firstly, it is important to note 
that Net-Map and related tools are methods of data collection, not a methodology. That is, they do not 
require a particular epistemological approach, nor do they provide a body of theory by which to assess 
the results. These and other aspects of the research design must be determined by the researchers 
depending on their discipline and the specific application. Furthermore, validated analytical and data 
collection approaches can be borrowed from other research approaches.  
For instance, an individual Net-Map interview can be viewed as a semi-structured qualitative interview 
and a group Net-Map interview can be approached like a focus group, to which standard qualitative 
analytic and data collection techniques can be applied. It is more difficult to determine an appropriate 
analytical approach for power data. And while network data can be analysed with network analysis, 
multiplex networks are not common in SNA. Finally, the layering of different types of data associated 
with different research approaches, makes it more challenging to determine a valid sampling approach. 
138 
 
 
However, the innovations associated with Net-Map tools, while raising some methodological changes, 
are also part of what makes them unique and valuable.  
Net-Map uses social network data to reflect the structure of a complex situation in which many actors 
engage. Net-Map explicitly allows for and promotes the use of multiple links overlain on the same 
network of actors. However, a more common approach to Social Network Analysis (SNA) is to choose 
a single link depicting exchanges among actors for a given study. In particular, Net-Map emphasized 
combining both formal and informal links. Schiffer and Hauk (2010) illuminate the relationship 
between links and power towers in a Net-Map (the elements of Net-Map are described in detail in 
Chapter 1), explaining that the different links relate to the different ways that actors exert power in a 
network.  
However network analysis techniques do not differentiate between different links. Thus to analyse the 
network data one must either combine all the links as though they are the same, or at least equal to each 
other, or analyse each link separately, thus losing the value of the combined links and perhaps missing 
characteristics of the complete structure. To address this, we typically analyse and show a complete 
combined network as well as networks of the individual links. The complete network allows for general 
analysis of characteristics of the network. However, this assumes that each type of links is the same in 
terms of depicting the structure of the network. For instance, it assumes that informal and formal ties 
can be equated, and that different types of informal interactions are equally reflective of the network 
structure. Thus it is common, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, to also analyse each link separately and 
discuss the implications related to that particular type of interaction, in which case we are able to be 
more specific about the interpretation of the data but lose the value of having multiple links.  
Relatedly, the interpretation of power scores is not straightforward. Power is a nebulous concept that 
evades precise and universal definitions. However, applications of power mapping in a focus group are 
relatively easier to interpret as the group (if well-sampled and well-facilitated) can come to consensus 
both on the definition of power and on the relative scores of each actor in the network (Smithson, 
2000). However, when individual interviews are used, the researcher must determine how to synthesize 
the power scores attributed to each actor by each interviewee. This can be done by taking the mean 
score for each actor, although this approach obfuscates the discrepancies across responses, which may 
be interesting. For instance, an actor with some very high scores and some very low may be very 
different from one who has all medium scores. Alternatively, one could weight certain actors’ responses 
as more important than others. For instance, an actor with direct ties to another may have better 
information about their power. 
Finally, in SNA, one typically defines a population (a classroom of students, a network of companies in 
a particular sector, or the employees of an organization) from which a researcher will collect data 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). However, multi-actor governance and policy networks do not have clearly 
139 
 
 
defined boundaries. There will typically be actors peripheral to the network but still involved in some 
ways, and the researcher must determine whether or not to include them, usually through an actor 
generation exercise in advance of or in the process of data collection. If the process of generating actors 
can be aligned with a typical purposive sampling approach for qualitative analysis, then the sample can 
be viewed as valid both for network analysis and for qualitative textual analysis.  
Furthermore, determining at what scale to define actors is also challenging. For instance, typical network 
data will define the scale across actors (all individuals or all companies). However, networks to which 
Net-Map is typically applied usually require more flexibility. Sometimes a donor organization will be an 
important actor, as will a high level politician distinct from her organization. The process of determining 
the lowest scale necessary to demonstrate the different links, power, and goals of important actors is the 
job of the facilitator. An inability to do so will yield either a chaotic crowded map or a map devoid of 
interesting detail.  
The challenging aspects of undertaking research with Net-Map must be counteracted with a heavy 
reliance on the textual data. The in-depth discussions that necessarily come out of the interview process 
can be relied upon to both triangulate and interpret the other aspects of the data.  
6.4 Prospects for further research 
There are a number areas of research that would benefit similar approaches to those laid out in this 
thesis examining the interplay of formal and informal institutions. The following two areas follow on the 
research laid out in this thesis and are areas wherein examination for formal and informal institutions is 
particularly important. .  
Firstly, the rent-seeking and patronage uncovered in Chapter 5 are significant sources of transaction 
costs in the developing country context. Addressing these issues will require a better understanding of 
the drivers of social norms: what makes corruption in any form socially acceptable to most people in a 
particular society. In a historical review, Uberti (2015) determines that the current body of theory on 
corruption fails to capture to social determinants of corruption and thus fall short in their effectiveness. 
Thus, dedicating more effort to understanding social aspects of corruption in Malawi will allow us to 
design programs and policies that actually work and drive change in intractable areas.  
In addition, in the area of gendered group participation, direct observations of group bargaining would 
add to our understanding of the power of gendered approaches to group governance, as described in 
Chapter 3. Furthermore, experimental games that take into consideration gendered priorities and 
perceptions and then determine repeated bargaining outcomes—in groups and in the household—would 
provide valuable insights on top of the outcomes of Chapters 2 and 3, as show in related studies 
(Cochard, Helene, & Hopfensitz, 2009; Doss, 2012).  
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In general, the application of qualitative and mixed-methods approaches to the examination of formal 
and informal institutions have the potential to significantly improve our understanding of institutions for 
agricultural development. In addition, there is potential to better understand the social barriers to 
development policy and push for change in previously intractable policy areas.  
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